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 Cover photos: 
Front: An overall view of the shuttle flight control room in 
Houston’s Mission Control Center (MCC) at the Johnson 
Space Center (JSC). At the time this photo was taken, flight 
controllers had just lost contact with the Space Shuttle 
Columbia at 08:59:32 CST, February 1, 2003. 
Back: The Space Shuttle Columbia is just about to clear 
the tower at Launch Pad 39A for STS-107. Following a 
flawless and uneventful countdown, liftoff occurred on-time 
at 10:39 EST, January 16, 2003. 
Spine: The United States flag, in front of the Johnson Space 
Center’s (JSC) Project Management Facility (Bldg. 1), is flown 
at half-staff in memory of the seven Space Shuttle Columbia 
crewmembers who lost their lives on February 1, 2003. 
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DEDICATED TO THE CREW OF COLUMBIA STS-107
 
From the left (bottom row), wearing red shirts to signify their shift’s color, 

are astronauts Kalpana Chawla, mission specialist; Rick D. Husband, mission commander; 

Laurel B. Clark, mission specialist; and Ilan Ramon (Israeli Space Agency), payload specialist. 

From the left (top row), wearing blue shirts, are astronauts David M. Brown, mission specialist; 

William C. McCool, pilot; and Michael P. Anderson, payload commander.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Foreword
Jeffrey R. Davis 
On the morning of February 1, 2003, the Space Shuttle 
Columbia underwent a high-altitude, high-velocity 
breakup during the entry-to-landing phase of flight. 
The external investigation by the Columbia Accident 
Investigation Board (CAIB) provided the overall causes 
of the accident in a report that included an analysis by 
the Crew Survivability Working Group to determine 
the cause of the crewmembers’ deaths and the lessons 
learned. The next year the Space Shuttle Program 
commissioned the Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated 
Investigation Team to perform a comprehensive analysis 
of the accident, focusing on factors and events affecting 
crew safety and developing recommendations for 
improving crew survival for future human space flight. 
This report was published in December 2008. 
Loss of Signal presents the aeromedical lessons learned
from the Columbia accident that will enhance crew
safety and survival on human space flight missions.
These lessons were presented to limited audiences
at three separate Aerospace Medical Association
(AsMA) conferences: in 2004 in Anchorage, Alaska,
on the causes of the accident; in 2005 in Kansas City,
Missouri, on the response, recovery, and identification
aspects of the investigation; and in 2011, again in
Anchorage, Alaska, on future implications for human
space flight. As we are embarking on the development
of new spacefaring vehicles through both government
and commercial efforts, the NASA Johnson Space
Center Space Life Sciences Directorate (SLSD)1 
proceeded to make this information available to a
wider audience engaged in the design and development
of future space vehicles.
Historically, the SLSD has always prepared for space
flight mishaps. From the beginning of the Space Shuttle
Program with the launch of the first Space Shuttle
mission in 1981 through the Challenger accident in
1 The Space Life Sciences Directorate was renamed the Human Health and 
Performance Directorate in 2012. 
2 Armed Forces Institute of Pathology was disestablished in 2011 as part of the Base 
Realignment and Closure Act. 
1986, the SLSD interfaced with the Department of
Defense Manned Space Flight Program Support
Office (DOD DDMS), Patrick Air Force Base, Florida,
with preparation for launch and landing emergencies.
After the Challenger accident, these efforts were
upgraded by enhancing crew safety including improved
egress, escape, and bail-out procedures with the new
Launch Entry Suit. In preparation for return to flight
in 1988, the SLSD developed a flight surgeon training
program, the Space Operations Medical Support
Training Course. These improvements led to a more
direct interface of NASA with DOD DDMS in training
medical personnel and trauma teams at landing sites
in the United States and international locations on
equipment, procedures, and communications for
response, search, rescue, and recovery operations.
In 1998, the SLSD Medical Operations Branch formed
a Contingency Medical Group, a cadre of flight
surgeons that specialized in preparation for any aviation
and spacecraft mishap. This group met with the Office
of Armed Forces Medical Examiner and Armed Forces
Institute of Pathology2 in 1999 to renew and improve
the SLSD relationships with these organizations for
mishap investigations. This coordination greatly
assisted the recovery and identification efforts during
the Columbia tragedy.
Loss of Signal summarizes and consolidates the
aeromedical impacts of the Columbia mishap process— 
the response, recovery, identification, investigative
studies, medical and legal forensic analysis, and future
preparation that are needed to respond to spacecraft
mishaps. The goal of this book is to provide an account
of the aeromedical aspects of the Columbia accident
and the investigation that followed, and to encourage
aerospace medical specialists to continue to capture
information, learn from it, and improve procedures and
spacecraft designs for the safety of future crews.
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 Preface and Acknowledgments
 
The editors of Loss of Signal wanted to document
the aeromedical lessons learned from the Space
Shuttle Columbia mishap. The book is intended to
be an accurate and easily understood account of the
entire process of recovering and analyzing the human
remains, investigating and analyzing what happened
to the crew, and using the resulting information to
recommend ways to prevent mishaps and provide better
protection to crewmembers.
We organized this book into 5 sections— 
• The Mission 
• The Response 
• The Investigation 
• The Analysis 
• The Future
Our goal is to capture the passions of those who
devoted their energies in responding to the Columbia
mishap. We have reunited authors who were directly
involved in each of these aspects. These authors tell the
story of their efforts related to the Columbia mishap
from their point of view. They give the reader an honest
description of their responsibilities and share their
challenges, their experiences, and their lessons learned
on how to enhance crew safety and survival, and how to
be prepared to support space mishap investigations.
As a result of this approach, a few of the chapters have 
some redundancy of information and authors’ opinions 
may differ. In no way did we or they intend to assign 
blame or criticize anyone’s professional efforts. All 
those involved did their best to obtain the truth in the 
situations to which they were assigned. 
Our gratitude goes out to all members of the editorial 
board who guided us patiently through the various 
sections of this undertaking. We thank the NASA/ 
Johnson Space Center Space and Clinical Operations 
Division and NASA Human Research Program that 
provided the financial resources. 
We want to acknowledge the multitude of local,
state, and federal government agencies as well as
civilian agencies, especially citizen volunteers, whose
organizational efforts were a great achievement despite
the magnitude of this tragedy.
By going forward with these aeromedical lessons 
learned to enhance crew safety and survival, we honor 
the families of the crewmembers, who have lost 
their loved ones. We pay tribute to the crewmembers 
themselves for their courage. Their efforts and sacrifice 
of their lives will benefit survival of future fliers in the 
exploration of space. 
Executive Editor 
Philip C. Stepaniak 
Editor in Chief 
Helen W. Lane 
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 Introduction
Michael Barratt 
Seated in front are astronauts Rick D. Husband (left), mission commander; Kalpana Chawla, mission specialist; and William C. McCool, pilot. 
Standing are (from the left) astronauts David M. Brown, Laurel B. Clark, and Michael P. Anderson, all mission specialists; and Ilan Ramon, payload 
specialist representing the Israeli Space Agency. 
On the morning of February 1, 2003, the US Space
Shuttle Columbia broke apart during reentry into
Earth’s atmosphere at the end of a highly productive
16-day science mission. The usual upbeat anticipation
associated with the return of a ship and its crew from
space was utterly shattered with this loss. Mourning
for Columbia’s seven-member crew was followed
by a 2½-year stand down of Shuttle flights, in spite
of NASA and its international partners being in the
midst of a flight-intensive period of constructing the
International Space Station.
NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe commissioned
the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB)
within hours of the accident. This board worked
diligently to produce a report, released in August of
2003, that detailed the causal factors, from hardware
failures to organizational and technical oversight
anomalies, that contributed to the mishap. The CAIB
offered a set of recommendations for actions to be
taken before Shuttle flights were resumed. A constituent
group of the CAIB, the Crew Survivability Working
Group (CSWG), concentrated their analysis on the
ix 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     T-38s flying over Johnson Space Center during the Columbia memorial service on February 4, 2003. 
crew environment, the forces inflicted on
crewmembers, and cause of death. They released
their final report in October 2003 as an appendix
to the CAIB report. In 2004 NASA established the
Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation
Team to complete the work of the Crew Survivability
Working Group with more extensive resources. Their
report, published in 2008, provided comprehensive
understanding of the forces and factors that directly
affected crew survival. They analyzed performance
and failures of structures and crew equipment designed
to protect human space flyers, with a deliberate aim to
improve these for future flights and vehicles.
The Columbia accident was the second loss of a US
Space Shuttle and its crew. As was true for the previous
US space tragedies, the Columbia mishap sparked
fundamental questions and vigorous public debate about
flight safety, mission planning and oversight, and the
very justification of human space flight. Fortunately our
nation’s resolve to continue to explore won over; Shuttle
flights resumed in 2005, and the International Space
Station was completed without mishap.
The methodical investigation of a vehicle accident is 
one of the most important responses to such a tragedy, 
and its contribution to progress is well established. 
The rapid pace of aviation development in the 1940s 
and ’50s, during which significant advances in aircraft 
speed, altitude, and maneuverability were realized, 
was unfortunately punctuated by spectacular accidents 
and significant loss of life. But the rigorous analysis of 
mishaps provided valuable lessons that were applied 
directly to ongoing development programs and led 
to future successes. An implicit understanding was 
that a mishap investigation must be as disciplined and 
documented as any other aspect of a flight. Aircraft 
accident investigation is now a well-developed 
discipline. The return from this discipline is seen in the 
realities of modern-day high-performance aviation and 
civil jet transport, with expectations of safe operations 
and exceedingly low rates of accidents per mile. 
In many respects, human space flight is analogous to
the aviation test programs of decades ago. Hardware
and systems operate near the limits of their performance
specifications, space crews are highly trained and fit
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individuals, and each launch may be considered a
test flight. The space flight environment, however, is
decidedly different from the aviation environment.
The two most dangerous phases of space flight are
launch and reentry into Earth’s atmosphere; during
these phases a spacecraft requires enormous energies to
overcome gravity and attain orbital velocity, and then
to shed that velocity upon return to Earth. The space 
flight environment is really three different environments, 
and all contain many hazards to human health. The 
outer space environment is a near-vacuum, with 
highly reactive monatomic oxygen, radiation (ionizing 
and solar ultraviolet), acceleration forces, extreme 
temperature shifts, and hypervelocity and shock 
wave interactions; near the spacecraft are hazards 
such as propellants and coolants; and the weightless 
environment deconditions crewmembers. After every 
mission, engineers methodically analyze data on 
these environmental factors along with the flight’s 
performance, and subsequently brief mission managers 
on these aspects. 
All spacecraft mishaps will invariably involve
combinations of these factors. Thoroughly understanding
the environmental factors, and determining which of
them led to specific hazards and injuries, is of paramount
importance in understanding a mishap event for
causation, timing, and sequence. The loss of Columbia
constituted the first high-altitude hypersonic breakup,
exposing crew and hardware to an unprecedentedly
hostile environment.
	
Reflecting current efforts and understanding,
	
Loss of Signal aims to present the story of Columbia
from an aerospace medical angle, focusing holistically
on what is important for future investigations and
analysis of spacecraft mishaps. This book is written
by those who participated in the crew recovery and
analysis and is written from their first-hand perspective
of the events. The loss of a human crew implies
sensitivities that must be balanced against the public
and industry need to know, with the guiding principle
being prevention of further mishaps and enhanced
protection for crewmembers.
	
Two factors prompted the production of this book.
	
First, the passage of time has caused some of the
sensitivities to ease. Second, and critically important,
are the vigorous activities now underway in the design
and production of new human space vehicles. It is a
unique time in human space flight, in that there have
never been so many new human-rated spacecraft
in design and production. These are meant for low
Earth orbit and space station servicing, exploration
beyond Earth orbit, and a burgeoning suborbital tourist
industry. This activity drastically increases the benefits
of disseminating lessons learned from such events. 
Human space flight is a very public endeavor, with 
high-profile operators and continual open debate about 
the balance between cost and benefit. There is a great 
sense of public ownership and of sharing the adventures 
and successes; in turn, our tragedies and losses are 
keenly felt on a nearly global level. However, it is a 
truism that we are defined as much or more by how we 
respond to our failures as by how we respond to our 
successes. In the long run this is what moves us forward, 
as individuals, as nations, and as a civilization. In 
particular when technology progresses and boundaries 
are pushed, the learning curve is steep. We cannot 
anticipate the mishaps that may occur in the future, and 
thus it is vital to study every aspect of a current mishap 
to prepare and prevent, to learn the lessons and apply 
them. Aside from prevention, developing a methodical 
approach to spacecraft mishaps ensures a rapid and 
aggressive response to future events. 
Loss of Signal and other works before it contain
knowledge that has been given to us at a very high
price, and the space medical community is morally
and professionally bound to make the best use of it.
Educating our community enables these facts and
observations to be integrated into every relevant aspect
of human space flight. With this information and with
every subsequent flight, we continue down a path toward
safer and more routine access to space, ultimately
making space flight similar to jet transport today.
xi 
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The Mission and The Crew 
Helen W. Lane, Smith Johnston, and John B. Charles 
NASA dedicated a majority of the Space Shuttle 
missions to science with focus on the effects of 
microgravity on biological, chemical, and physical 
systems. These included cellular, animal, and human 
types of experiments as well as atmospheric sciences, 
combustion, fluid mechanics, crystal growth, protein 
properties, and basic physics. After 20 years, NASA
along with her international partners and commercial 
organizations had developed expertise in conducting 
these types of experiments during Space Shuttle flights. 
STS-107 was the final Space Shuttle flight totally 
dedicated to science to provide the foundation for future 
ISS research programs. It was the 113th mission of the 
Space Shuttle Program and the 28th flight of the Shuttle 
orbiter Columbia, launched on January 16, 2003, at 
10:39 a.m. EST for a 16-day mission. At 11:20 a.m. 
EST, a 2-minute burn of the orbital maneuvering system 
engines began to position Columbia in its proper orbit, 
an inclination of 39° to the equator and about 175 miles 
above the Earth. 
Before we recount the mission’s purposes and the 
skills of the crewmembers who made it possible, we 
will briefly describe the structure of the Space Shuttle, 
emphasizing the capabilities of the orbiter Columbia, 
and the environment at NASA at the time of the mission. 
Photo of Columbia STS-1 on the launch pad at Kennedy Space Center, ready for the historic first launch on April 12, 1981. Columbia, the first 
orbiter in the Shuttle fleet, was named after the Boston, Massachusetts-based sloop captained by American Robert Gray. On May 11, 1792, 
Gray and his crew maneuvered the Columbia past the dangerous sandbar at the mouth of a river (now named Columbia River, extending more 
than 1,000 miles through what is today southeastern British Columbia, Canada, and the Washington-Oregon border). Gray also led Columbia 
and its crew on the first American circumnavigation of the globe, carrying a cargo of otter skins to Canton, China, and then returning to Boston. 
Other sailing ships have further enhanced the luster of the name Columbia. The first US Navy ship to circle the globe bore that title, as did the 
Command Module for Apollo 11, the first lunar landing mission. 
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The Vehicle 
The Space Shuttle had three major components: the two
solid rocket boosters, the external tank, and the orbiter.
Each of the six orbiters was slightly different from the
others, and each was given a name: Atlantis, Challenger,
Columbia, Discovery, Endeavour, Enterprise. Each
orbiter contained three Space Shuttle main engines and
the orbiter thrusters, crew compartment, and payload bay.
The crew compartment included the flight deck, from
which the commander and pilot controlled the spacecraft,
and the middeck, the location of some research and
the crew facilities such as sleep stations, galley, waste
collection system, crew supplies, and environmental
control system supplies. The crew compartment structure
“floated” inside the forward fuselage and was attached
to it at four discrete points. This construction provided
greater thermal isolation and potentially ensured pressure
integrity even if the orbiter aluminum shell cracked.
Columbia was the first space flight-worthy orbiter and 
therefore unique in several ways. (The first orbiter, 
Enterprise, was built to perform approach and landing 
tests and was never converted to a spacecraft with 
rockets such as the Orbiter Maneuvering System and 
Reaction Control System engines). In 1981 and 1982 
Columbia flew the first five Space Shuttle flights—the 
first three were test flights, the fourth was a test and 
Department of Defense flight, and the fifth was the first 
operational flight, which included an expanded crew 
of four. These test flights were successful and they 
allowed NASA to begin flying payloads sooner than 
anticipated. Columbia’s early flights as a test platform 
validated the concepts and techniques for the fledgling 
Shuttle program.
Columbia was built to carry a laboratory for scientific 
research in its payload bay. The first laboratory to 
occupy Columbia’s payload bay was Spacelab, which 
was first flown in space in 1983 on the STS-9 mission. 
For the STS-107 flight, Spacehab, Inc provided the 
last of these pressurized payload laboratories, the 
SPACEHAB Research Double Module. 
The NASA Environment 
The climate at NASA during the time leading up to 
the Columbia launch was rapidly changing in response 
to political and financial pressures on the agency. A
growing federal deficit led to a push for reductions in 
government spending, and NASA’s budget, like that of 
other federal agencies, was reduced. Budget constraints 
reduced the Space Shuttle Program workforce and 
operations budget by an estimated 40% relative to the 
previous decade. At the same time, however, Shuttle 
operations were essential for continuing support 
of development, assembly, and operation of the 
International Space Station (ISS). The Space Shuttle 
Program was under significant pressure to meet launch 
dates to ensure the timely construction of the ISS. The 
STS-107 Columbia flight, unique in its purpose and 
significance, had a limited budget in this environment 
of reduced federal spending. NASA science managers 
were forced to constantly justify the role of a science-
dedicated flight in an otherwise ISS-focused agency. 
The STS-107 mission was delayed many times from
the announced launch date in 2000 to the final launch in
2003. These delays occurred because higher priority was
given to launches for ISS construction and for repair and
upgrades of the Hubble Space Telescope, and because at
different times damaged insulated wiring and damage in
the main engines of Columbia had to be repaired. Finally,
in early 2003, Columbia was slated for launch. By this
time the crew, who had been training together for the
better part of 3 years, functioned as an organized and
integrated team, and close friendships had been formed
among crewmembers, family members, and support staff. 
The Mission 
When STS-107’s flight was announced, the Space 
Shuttle Program was focused on assembling the 
ISS. However, NASA decided to have this one last 
research-dedicated Space Shuttle mission using the 
SPACEHAB laboratory. STS-107 research focused on 
the consequences of microgravity on physical and living 
systems. The underlying goals were to enhance the well­
being of people on Earth, using microgravity for basic 
scientific understanding; this knowledge might enable 
scientists to build better spacecraft and to understand 
the human system. Also, the goal was to develop 
countermeasures to allow astronauts to stay healthy 
during long duration missions such as those on the ISS 
or beyond low Earth orbit. With a large set of submitted 
proposals, NASA and its international and commercial 
partners conducted peer review to determine the best 
scientific studies that could be implemented during this 
Space Shuttle flight. Once the science was selected, 
NASA mission managers and the STS-107 crew worked 
with the investigators to ensure the highest quality of 
research. The crew trained diligently to ensure they 
could conduct the research at the highest levels. 
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This is the insignia for
STS-107, which is a multi-
discipline microgravity and
Earth science research
mission with a multitude
of international scientific
investigations conducted
continuously during the
planned 16 days on orbit.
The central element
of the patch is the
microgravity symbol,
µg, flowing into
the rays of the
astronaut
symbol.
The mission
inclination is
portrayed by the 39-degree
angle of the astronaut symbol
to Earth’s horizon. The sunrise is
representative of the numerous 
experiments that are the dawn of a new era for continued 
microgravity research on the International Space Station 
and beyond. The breadth of science conducted on this 
mission will have widespread benefits to life on Earth and 
our continued exploration of space illustrated by Earth and 
stars. The constellation Columba (the dove) was chosen to 
symbolize peace on Earth and the space shuttle Columbia. 
The seven stars also represent the mission crewmembers 
and honor the original astronauts who paved the way to 
make research in space possible. The Israeli flag is adjacent 
to the name of the payload specialist who is the first person 
from that country to fly on the Space Shuttle. 
This science mission had a mixed complement
of experiments that had been selected through
competition. The mission had 32 payloads, 40% of
which were international or commercial. Sponsoring
organizations ranged from multiple NASA research
divisions to military research organizations, educational
institutions, and international partners. The research
was proposed by 59 separate investigators and
represented numerous scientific fields, including
biology, medicine, materials science, physics, and
atmospheric sciences. The astronauts served as
researchers and test subjects for experiments related
to astronaut health, including respiratory monitoring
and bone physiology studies, and an investigation of
circadian rhythms and light exposure. 
International payloads were from Canada, Germany, 
the European Space Agency, and Israel. The Israeli 
Space Agency sponsored a payload bay project called 
Mediterranean-Israeli Dust Experiment (MEIDEX), 
and it was designed to study atmospheric dust over 
Africa and the Mediterranean to provide important 
understanding of dust and weather, and thus climate 
changes. As part of this project, the first Israeli 
payload specialist flew, causing the flight to have 
significant attention from the international community 
and, of course, Israel. 
The Crew 
The complex payloads on this mission required an 
exceptionally qualified crew with strong scientific, 
medical, and research backgrounds. Also, because 
the astronauts would function as both scientists and 
test subjects, NASA asked for volunteers from the 
astronaut corps who would be dedicated to successful 
accomplishment of scientific goals. 
Rick Husband, an Air Force test pilot, embraced his
role as the commander of the STS-107 mission. His
pilot was William McCool, a Navy test pilot. Both
Husband and McCool had engineering backgrounds,
and both were active participants in multiple research
projects during the flight. Michael Anderson, the payload
commander, had a background in physics and astronomy,
and was well suited to lead research efforts on orbit.
The mission’s flight engineer, Kalpana Chawla, had a
background in aerospace engineering. The crew had two
Navy flight surgeons: David Brown, a naval aviator,
physician, and scientist, and Laurel Clark, a naval
commander, physician, and zoologist. Ilan Ramon, a
colonel in the Israeli Air Force and a fighter pilot, had a
background in computer engineering. Ramon, the first
Israeli astronaut to take the ride into orbit, worked with
the Israeli Space Agency MEIDEX investigation.
This crew’s rigorous preparation included about
5,000 hours of general training, as well as an additional
3,500 hours of training specific to the research payloads
and the objectives and procedures for each experiment.
Some of the research was dedicated to biological and
medical sciences, and thus required consultation with
the crew flight surgeons throughout training and the
mission itself. The medical impact of this mission, which
included a wide variety of experiments, was important. 
Research 
Crew research activity was planned for every hour
of the day, and called for crewmembers to work in
two shifts, called the Blue Team and the Red Team,
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on opposite schedules during the mission. This
required careful preparation of schedules to ensure
that crewmembers had enough time to rest. The Red
Team comprised Commander Richard Husband, Flight
Engineer and Mission Specialist 2 Kalpana Chawla,
Mission Specialist 4 Laurel Clark, and Payload
Specialist Ilan Ramon. The Blue Team consisted of
Pilot William McCool, Mission Specialist 1 David
Brown, and Mission Specialist 3 and Payload
Commander Michael Anderson.
During their flight on January 28, the STS-107 crew
honored those who lost their lives in the Apollo 1
fire and the Challenger accident. The Columbia crew
never anticipated the danger that was awaiting them,
or that, ironically, they too would be honored and
never forgotten.
At the end of their final research day, the crew had 
completed all the experiments. By all indications at 
this time, the STS-107 crew and the researchers on the 
ground had had a highly successful science mission, 
and all were ecstatic over completion of the mission 
objectives. On February 1, 2003, the Columbia and its 
crew would make preparations to reenter the Earth’s 
atmosphere and return home. 
Commander
Rick D. Husband 
(Colonel, US Air Force) 
A native of Amarillo,
Texas, Rick earned
a BS degree in
mechanical engineering
from Texas Tech
University and an
MS degree in the
same discipline from
California State
University, Fresno.
Rick served as the
Astronaut Office
representative for
Advanced Projects
and served as Chief of Safety for the Astronaut Office.
He served as pilot for STS-96 (1999), a 10-day
mission during which the crew performed the first
docking with the International Space Station. STS-107
was Rick’s second Space Shuttle mission and his first
as Commander. 
Pilot
William C. “Willie” McCool
(Commander, US Navy) 
Willie was born in
San Diego, California.
He held a BS degree
in applied science
from the US Naval
Academy, an MS
degree in computer
science from the
University of
Maryland, and an
MS degree in
aeronautical
engineering from the
US Naval Postgraduate
School. Willie logged over 3,000 hours of flight
experience in 24 aircraft and more than 400 carrier
arrestments before NASA selected him as an astronaut
candidate in 1996. STS-107 was Willie’s first Space
Shuttle mission. 
Mission Specialist
Michael “Mike” P. Anderson 
(Lieutenant Colonel, US Air Force) 
Mike was born in
Plattsburgh, New York,
but called Spokane,
Washington, home.
He received a BS
degree in physics/ 
astronomy from
the University of
Washington and an
MS degree in physics
from Creighton
University. With
over 4,000 hours in
various models of
the KC-135 and the T-38 aircraft, Mike served as an
aircraft commander, an instructor pilot, and a tactics
officer before he was selected as an astronaut for
NASA in 1994. He flew on STS-89 (1998), the eighth
Shuttle-Mir docking mission. STS-107 was Mike’s
second Space Shuttle mission. 
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Mission Specialist
Kalpana “K.C.” Chawla, PhD 
K.C. was born and 
raised in Karnal, 
India. She received 
a BS in aeronautical 
engineering from 
Punjab Engineering 
College, Chandigarh, 
India, an MS in 
aerospace engineering 
from the University 
of Texas, and a PhD 
in aerospace 
engineering from the 
University of Colorado. 
In 1988, she started work at NASA Ames Research 
Center, and she was selected as an astronaut candidate 
by NASA in December 1994, reporting to the Johnson 
Space Center in March 1995 as an astronaut candidate 
in the 15th group of astronauts. K.C. flew as a mission 
specialist on STS-87 (1997). STS-107 was K.C.’s 
second Space Shuttle mission. 
Mission Specialist
David “Dave” Brown, MD 
(Captain, US Navy) 
Dave was born in
Arlington, Virginia.
He received a BS
degree in biology
from the College of
William and Mary
and a doctorate in
medicine from Eastern
Virginia Medical
School. Brown
joined the Navy and
completed flight
surgeon training. In
1988, he was the only
flight surgeon in a 10-year period to be chosen for
pilot training. He was ultimately designated a naval
aviator, ranking number one in his class. Dave logged
over 2,700 flight hours, with 1,700 hours in high-
performance military aircraft, and was qualified as
first pilot in NASA T-38 aircraft. NASA selected
him as an astronaut candidate in 1996. STS-107 was
Dave’s first Space Shuttle mission. 
Mission Specialist
Laurel Blair Salton Clark, MD
(Commander, US Navy) 
Laurel was born in
Ames, Iowa, but called
Racine, Wisconsin,
her hometown. She
received both a BS
degree and a doctorate
in medicine from
the University of
Wisconsin-Madison.
Prior to her selection
as an astronaut
candidate in 1996,
she served as a flight
surgeon for the Naval
Flight Officer advanced training squadron (VT-86) in
Pensacola, Florida. While at NASA, Laurel worked on
International Space Station and Space Shuttle medical
systems and payload operations and development.
STS-107 was Laurel’s first Space Shuttle mission. 
Payload Specialist 
Ilan Ramon
(Colonel, Israel Air Force) 
Ilan was born in 
Tel Aviv, Israel. 
He received a BS 
degree in electronics 
and computer 
engineering from 
the University of 
Tel Aviv, Israel. He 
graduated as a fighter 
pilot from the Israel 
Air Force Flight 
School. In 1997, Ilan 
was selected as a 
Payload Specialist. 
He was designated to train for a Space Shuttle mission 
carrying an Israeli payload (MEIDEX) that included 
a multispectral radiometric camera for recording 
atmospheric desert aerosols from space. In August 
1998, he started basic Shuttle training at Johnson 
Space Center. In August 2000, he was assigned as one 
of the seven crewmembers for this flight. STS-107 
was Ilan’s first Space Shuttle mission, and he was the 
first Israeli to fly in space. 
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Crew Activities During Flight of STS-107, Representing Research and Education Outreach 
STS-107 Commander Rick D. Husband works the controls on 

the support hardware for the European Research in Space and 

Terrestrial Osteoporosis experiment located in the SPACEHAB 

Research Double Module. 

STS-107 Pilot 
William C. “Willie” 
McCool views 
data on a laptop 
computer at a 
workstation on 
Columbia’s aft flight 
deck. He holds a 
checklist in one 
hand and a portable 
communications 
system in the other. 
STS-107 Payload 

Commander and 

Mission Specialist 

Michael P. “Mike” 

Anderson works with 
the Laminar Soot 
Processes experiment 
in the Combustion 
Module -2 in the 
SPACEHAB
Research Double 
Module. 
STS-107 
Mission 
Specialist 
Kalpana “KC” 
Chawla at 
work in the 
SPACEHAB 
Research 
Double Module. 
STS-107 Mission 
Specialist David 
“Dave” Brown, 
holding papers, 
smiles for the 
camera from 
orbiter Columbia’s 
flight deck/ 
middeck access 
way. Beside 
him is a spare 
mission specialist 
seat in stowed 
configuration. 
STS-107 Mission 
Specialist 4 Laurel 
Blair Salton Clark 
looks over her 
shoulder as she 
enters data on a 
Payload General 
Support Computer 
at a workstation 
on Columbia’s aft 
flight deck. 
STS-107 Payload Specialist Ilan Ramon works with the 

Space Technology And Research Students (STARS) 

educational payload housed in an Isothermal Containment 

Module (ICM) in the SPACEHAB Research Double Module. 

The STARS payload included the following experiments: 

“The Chemical Garden,” sponsored by Israel; 

“Astrospiders — Spiders in Space,” sponsored by Australia; 

“Silkworm Lifecycle During Space Flight” sponsored by China; 

“Flight of the Medaka Fish,” sponsored by Japan; 

“Carpenter Bees in Space,” sponsored by Liechtenstein; 

and “Ant Colony,” sponsored by the United States.
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The Mishap 
Stevan Gilmore and Charles Campbell 
Normal Launch and Reentry Dynamics 
The process of launching an object into low Earth
orbit and then returning it to Earth is an energetic
and dynamic process. To understand the nature of the
Columbia mishap and the ballistic effects that produced
the debris field, it is important to understand launch
and reentry dynamics.
The launch of the Shuttle demanded a dynamic 
expenditure of energy as the vehicle accelerated from 
rest to an orbital velocity of 17,500 miles per hour 
(mph). Including crew and cargo, a typical Shuttle with 
a complete payload weighed about 110 metric tons, 
and the acceleration of such a mass to orbital velocity 
required nearly one million watts of energy, or enough 
energy to power the average house for 41 years. 
Before landing, the energy of the vehicle in orbit had
to be dissipated; this was accomplished by converting
kinetic energy into heat. As the orbiter reentered the
atmosphere, the vehicle slammed into air particles in
the atmosphere, creating a shock layer where the kinetic
energy of the Shuttle was transferred to molecules
of air, ripping these molecules apart.
Within the shock layer, temperatures reached over 
10,000°F, an environment with characteristics 
approaching those of plasma-phase matter. In a 
true plasma, free electrons significantly affect the 
gas dynamic properties and involve significant 
electromagnetic effects. During reentry from low Earth 
orbit, however, the main effect of the large number 
of free electrons is the loss of radio communications. 
The orbiter surface did not make contact with this 
superheated gas in the shock layer but instead was 
protected with a thin boundary layer of atmosphere 
that limited heat transfer. The temperature of the orbiter 
surface, which was protected from these very high 
temperatures because of this boundary layer, normally 
had peak temperatures approaching 3000°F. Most 
Flow 
Nitrogen and 
oxygen molecules 
are dissociated in  
the shock layer. 
Atoms may recombine 
and form molecules 
on the vehicle surface. 
Oxygen molecules 
in the shock layer 
separate into 
O+ and O­ atoms. 
Recombination of atoms on 
the surface of the vehicle 
adds heat of dissociation to 
the Thermal Protection System. 
Shock
 Layer 
Boundary
Layer 
This image illustrates how the Thermal Protection System protected the orbiter’s aluminum shell. 
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After the Columbia accident, NASA instituted a policy that the orbiter 
would be inspected after it reached orbit. These photos were taken 
from the International Space Station for STS-114, 2005. The photo 
shows the Thermal Protection System (TPS) tiles on the belly of the 
orbiter Discovery; the insert is a closeup of the reinforced carbon-
carbon panels on the leading edge of the wing, the location of the hole 
in Columbia’s TPS that caused the accident. 
of the lower surface of the orbiter had temperatures 
above 2000°F. However, the orbiter’s aluminum 
airframe started to lose structural integrity at 345°F 
and had a melting point of 1220°F, far lower than the 
boundary layer temperatures. The Thermal Protection 
System (TPS), the specialized covering of the orbiters 
that was made of tile and high-temperature carbon-
carbon materials, provided the protection vital for 
maintaining orbiter integrity during the extreme 
temperatures of reentry. 
Reentry into the Earth’s atmosphere after any Shuttle
mission required complex choreography of effort and
activity. For the flight crew, it signified the completion
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This image illustrates the angle of the orbiter as it enters the Earth’s atmosphere beginning with the belly facing the atmosphere. Flying through 
the atmosphere decreases the speed due to aerodynamic drag. By rolling the orbiter left and right, the guidance brings the crew to a precision 
unpowered touchdown on the runway. 
of on-orbit mission objectives and required a sudden
focus of activity to reconfigure the orbiter from a
work and science platform back into a flying machine.
In Mission Control, analysts, flight controllers,
and management teams had to prepare for the
reentry to Earth’s atmospheric operations with the
deployment of personnel to landing sites and the
active analysis of orbiter systems, reentry weather,
and landing conditions.
Flight controllers divided the orbiter reentry profile
into three phases for tracking: reentry, terminal area
energy management (TAEM), and approach through
landing. The reentry phase began with entry interface,
arbitrarily determined to occur at an altitude of
400,000 ft. Entry interface signifies the beginning
of reentry, where the atmosphere is about to begin
exerting drag on the orbiter. During reentry, Shuttle
computers commanded the orbiter to perform a series
of banks and roll-reversals, decelerating the orbiter
from the initial reentry speed of Mach 25. At the same
time, these maneuvers protected the TPS surfaces,
limiting surface heating and surface temperatures
to within operational performance range. The flight
software running on the computer was designed to
carefully control the reentry path such that the
orbiter would achieve TAEM with enough energy to
reach the runway. TAEM would typically occur at
83,000 ft and a speed of Mach 2.5, about 52 nautical
miles from the runway. The distinctive “double sonic
boom” would thunder from the vehicle until it slowed
to subsonic speeds at an altitude of 49,000 ft, about
22 nautical miles from the runway. TAEM would
transition into the approach and landing phase below
10,000 ft after the Shuttle attained the appropriate glide
slope and air speed for landing. 
The Columbia Reentry Mishap 
Damage to the Columbia Orbiter 
By the time of reentry, the Columbia crew had 
completed 16 days of rigorous scientific endeavors 
and they eagerly anticipated their return trip to Earth. 
Columbia’s crew busily prepared to return home. 
Beginning on January 31, 2003, members of the night-
shift Blue Team (Anderson and Brown) woke up about 
3:30 p.m. CST. McCool, also a member of the Blue 
Team, earned a slightly longer sleep period and was 
awakened 2 hours later than his teammates so that he 
could be well rested for performing his flight duties 
associated with reentry. The team began their final day 
of activities, including configuration of the SPACEHAB 
and orbiter middeck and flight deck in preparation 
for reentry. The Red Team awakened shortly before 
1:00 a.m. CST February 1 for final deorbit preparations. 
However, the launch 2 weeks before this day had 
included significant events that would ultimately lead 
to disaster during reentry. As with all Shuttle missions, 
numerous videos of Columbia’s launch and ascent 
sequence were thoroughly analyzed by engineering 
experts during and after launch. These experts promptly 
recognized that an anomaly had occurred during launch: 
foam debris from the external tank had shed during the 
extreme conditions of launch and struck the left wing 
of Columbia exactly 81.9 seconds into the flight. In the 
context of operations in early 2003, foam strikes were 
not particularly unexpected or unusual. In fact, foam 
debris was shed on every launch before STS-107, and 
resultant debris strikes had become a regular occurrence. 
When it was recognized that Columbia had suffered a 
debris strike, analysis and engineering experts worked 
to identify the significance of this event for vehicle 
integrity. The videos of launch showed that the foam 
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Launch of STS-107 at Kennedy Space Center on January 16, 2003. 
struck Columbia’s left wing on or near a leading edge, 
an area covered in reinforced carbon-carbon panels 
because of the extreme heating of this region during 
reentry. Some analysts expressed concern about this 
event, given the limited analysis available and the 
possible implication of such a strike on the TPS and 
vehicle integrity. Because operational experience with 
previous foam debris strike events had shown that such 
strikes had never caused significant structural damage, 
this event ultimately was not considered mission critical 
and the flight continued uninterrupted. 
Reentry Sequence 
In Houston, responsibility for the mission was handed
over to the reentry Mission Control team at about
2:30 a.m. CST, February 1, and this team began
monitoring crew activities and vehicle telemetry,
coordinating reentry and landing site weather
assessments, and relaying entry parameter updates to
Left Bipod Foam Ramp where the loss of debris occurred on 
STS-107. Left side is the external tank, and right side is the orbiter. 
The foam strike on the leading edge of the wing at 81.9 seconds 
after lift-off. 
the crew for entry into the flight computers. At 8:10 a.m.,
members of the reentry team were polled for “Go/No-
Go” status for final approval of the reentry procedure.
At 8:16 the capsule communicator (CAPCOM)
informed the commander that he was cleared for reentry
and a landing at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC). 
Five minutes after receiving clearance for landing, 
as the Shuttle orbit passed above the Indian Ocean, 
Husband and McCool initiated a deorbit burn that lasted 
2 minutes 38 seconds. This procedure fires the engines 
against the direction of the orbital trajectory so that 
engine thrust works to slow the vehicle. The action 
slowed Columbia by only about 250 mph, but the new 
trajectory created by this deceleration placed the orbiter 
in a path that would contact the upper regions of the 
atmosphere. As they finished this maneuver, Husband 
and McCool reoriented the vehicle from the inverted 
orbital position (with the payload bay pointed down 
toward the Earth’s surface) to an upright, nose-forward, 
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pitched-up orientation, maximizing exposure of the 
vehicle’s heat-resistant surfaces to the atmosphere. 
Entry interface, the entry of the orbiter into the 
atmosphere, occurred on time and as expected at 
08:44:09 CST over the Pacific Ocean. On board and in 
the Mission Control Center, the crew and the ground 
team monitored the performance of the digital autopilot 
as it commanded flight maneuvers. At 08:49:32 CST, 
Columbia executed the first in a series of energy-
management maneuvers designed to reach the landing 
site with the appropriate conditions for an aerodynamic 
landing. The initial move in this energy management 
choreography, a bank to the right, occurred without 
incident. At 08:50:53 CST, Columbia was gliding 
roughly 300 nautical miles west of the California coast 
and entered a 10-minute period of peak heating on the 
TPS as it was slowed by the atmosphere. At 08:53:25 
CST, Columbia crossed the west coast of California at 
231,600 ft and traveling at Mach 23. All procedures and 
events appeared to be normal. 
The orbiter Columbia had the heaviest airframe of 
the orbiter fleet, and that frame had a multitude of 
integrated sensors for accurate measurements of 
vehicle performance and the flight environment. The 
inclusion of these sensors, so important for the first 
Shuttle flights by Columbia, ultimately contributed 
significantly to the reconstruction and understanding of 
the events that were to unfold during its last mission. At 
08:54:24 CST, as Columbia crossed from California into 
Nevada, flight controllers in Mission Control received 
the first nonstandard telemetry from the vehicle. The 
maintenance, mechanical, and crew systems (MMACS) 
officer, who was responsible for monitoring all of the 
orbiter structural and mechanical systems, reported 
to the flight director that four hydraulic sensors in the 
left wing were indicating off-scale low. As Mission 
Control specialists analyzed the telemetry signature and 
discussed possible causes, Columbia continued along its 
reentry path over the western United States. At 08:56:30 
CST, while transiting over northern Arizona, Columbia 
executed its nominal roll-reversal from a right to left 
bank as the flight-control computers continued the 
reentry energy-management choreography. 
At 08:58:20 CST, Columbia entered the skies over
Texas, traveling at Mach 19.5 and at an altitude of
209,800 ft. Shortly after this, CAPCOM received a
broken call from Columbia, “And, uh, Hou…” At
08:59:15 CST, MMACS reported a second unexpected
telemetry signature, the loss of tire pressure reading
data from both left main gear tires, to the flight director.
CAPCOM relayed the receipt of these telemetry
signals to the crew and requested a repeat of the crew’s
interrupted transmission. Shortly thereafter, CAPCOM
announced to the crew that a fault message about backup
tire pressure had been registered by ground telemetry;
this fault message may have been the reason the
commander had initiated the final voice communication. 
At 08:59:32 CST, loss of signal occurred with a mid-
sentence interruption of the final voice call from 
Commander Husband: “Roger, …” At this time the 
orbiter was in the vicinity of Dallas, TX, at an altitude 
of 200,700 ft and traveling at Mach 18. Although the 
significance was only recognized in retrospect, the 
time at which loss of signal occurred coincided with an 
expected transition between West coast communication 
assets tracking the Shuttle to those positioned on the 
East coast and on the ground at KSC. Unknown to those 
in Mission Control at the time, 08:59:32 CST would 
mark the time at which no further useful telemetry was 
received from Columbia. This moment would come to 
be known as the Loss of Signal. 
Flight controllers continued to discuss the possible 
causes of the unexpected tire pressure and telemetry 
signatures received from the orbiter. Additionally, 
the instrumentation and communications officer, 
responsible for monitoring communication systems 
and telemetry links between the vehicle and the ground, 
reported that the communications drop-out was rather 
longer than expected. The mission control team began 
to step through processes to confirm the last known 
configuration of communication assets and then 
reacquire communication with the orbiter. 
Unknown to Mission Control, observers located in the 
vicinity of the orbiter’s ground track across the western 
and central United States witnessed unexpected events 
as they watched Columbia’s reentry. A series of separate 
observers on the ground were filming the orbiter, using 
a variety of modalities ranging from amateur video to 
advanced optics from government assets. Starting near 
the coast of California, these observers documented 
discrete debris-shedding events as well as irregularities 
in Columbia’s wing profile. At 09:00:18 CST, as 
Mission Control began its series of steps to reacquire 
communications, military assets located in the Dallas 
and Fort Hood areas documented this catastrophic event. 
State and local authorities began to be inundated by calls 
from witnesses reporting a loud sonic boom followed 
shortly thereafter on the ground by falling debris. This 
visual confirmation of the catastrophic reentry event 
was part of the information that was eventually relayed 
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This graphic illustrates the sightings by amateurs and the Department of Defense during the reentry of Columbia. These videos and photos 
allowed NASA to better characterize the pre-breakup debris and ground impact areas. Time is represented as Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). 
to the Mission Control team in Houston as the team 
searched for the cause of the extended loss of signal 
from Columbia. 
At 09:02:21 CST, when Columbia was expected to be 
within range of communication with KSC, personnel 
at the Merritt Island Launch Annex (MILA) in Florida 
reported to the Houston team that they were unable to 
contact the crew on the radio. CAPCOM attempted to 
regain communication with the orbiter by means of an 
ultra-high-frequency antenna. The ground control officer 
reported that ground assets at the MILA were not in 
radio contact with the orbiter. 
At 09:09:29 CST, when Columbia was expected to enter
TAEM, the flight dynamics officer again reported that
they were not receiving any tracking data. A few minutes
later, when Columbia was expected to be entering the
third phase of reentry and the characteristic double sonic
boom was conspicuously absent, the flight director was
informed of events as witnessed by the public. Private
citizens, news media, military personnel, and others were
already witnessing and videotaping the significant events
taking place over the skies of Texas and Louisiana.
At 09:12:39 CST the flight director instructed that 
the control room doors be locked and that control 
team members begin securing their stations and the 
data within. 
Recovery Operations 
Once the Control Team became aware of the situation, 
the Shuttle contingency action plan was activated. 
This plan was made up of a number of actions including 
notification, through the NASA chain of command, 
of members of the astronauts’ families and members 
of the government. At Johnson Space Center (JSC), 
the Mission Management Team (MMT) convened a 
meeting in the action center of Mission Control at 
9:30 a.m. CST. One of their first actions was to prepare 
responders for immediate deployment to the disaster 
site. By 10:30 a.m. CST, the NASA administrator had 
named Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr., Chair of the 
Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). 
Soon after, President Bush informed the Israeli Prime 
Minister of the mishap and then declared the affected 
areas Federal disaster areas, mobilizing government 
relief and recovery resources for assistance. 
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Reconstruction of the Columbia from parts found in East Texas and western Louisiana. From this layout, NASA was able to determine that a large 
hole occurred in the leading edge of the wing and identify the burn patterns that eventually led to the destruction of the orbiter. 
At 11:30 a.m. CST, a second meeting of the MMT
occurred at which the management team presented 
information from local state agencies and the 
Department of Defense about the approximate 
coordinates of the orbiter breakup. Team members 
from a number of disciplines at the JSC were assigned 
to the Mishap Investigation Team (MIT), whose task 
was to spearhead NASA’s efforts in conjunction with 
other federal, state, and local entities to locate, preserve, 
and protect the hardware debris and human remains. 
The MIT deployed to Barksdale Air Force Base (AFB) 
in Louisiana from Ellington Field in Houston, Texas, 
at 3:30 p.m. CST to coordinate the recovery of the 
Columbia vehicle and her crew. Other members of 
the MIT deployed to Disaster Field Offices that were 
subsequently established in Lufkin, Texas; Fort Worth 
Naval Air Station, Texas; and other areas throughout 
northeastern Texas and western Louisiana. This initial 
response was vital in locating the Columbia vehicle and 
its crew and in preserving and protecting evidence for 
the mishap investigations conducted by the CAIB. 
Investigation (FBI) worked together with state and local
agencies in what was to be the largest recovery effort
ever undertaken anywhere. More than 25,000 people
participated in recovery efforts. Over 700,000 acres
of land were walked in a grid pattern to locate debris,
and more than 37 helicopters and 7 airplanes were used
to search 1.6 million acres by air. Even scuba divers
searched a number of lakes in the affected areas. 
Debris Recovery
In total, 83,013 debris pieces weighing 84,900 pounds
were recovered, equaling roughly 39% of the weight
of the orbiter. The Modular Auxiliary Data System
recorder that contained critical data needed for the
accident analyses was found near Hemphill, Texas.
It recorded data about the local flight environment and
dynamics, including data recorded for an additional
14 seconds after the loss of signal to Mission Control
in Houston. Searchers photographed and geo-tagged
recovered debris in the field, then sent the items
to designated sites across Texas for archiving and
Federal agencies including the Federal Emergency identification. Much of the recovered hardware debris
Management Agency (FEMA), the Environmental was forwarded to KSC from February 12 to May 6,
Protection Agency (EPA), the National Transportation 2003, and assembled on a full-scale grid for further
Safety Board (NTSB), and the Federal Bureau of analysis and reconstruction efforts. 
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President George W. Bush spoke at the 
Columbia memorial service at the Johnson 
Space Center on February 4, 2003. The
President was accompanied by NASA 
Administrator Sean O’Keefe (left) and Chief of 
the Astronaut Corps Captain Kent Rominger. 
Memorials
A memorial service to honor the 
crew occurred on February 4, 
2003, at JSC and was televised 
worldwide. President George W. 
Bush was accompanied by NASA
Administrator Sean O’Keefe and 
Chief of the Astronaut Corps 
Captain Kent Rominger. President 
Bush stated to the assembled 
group of employees, retirees, crew 
families, and other dignitaries, “Their mission was 
almost complete, and we lost them so close to home…. 
For these seven, it was a dream fulfilled. Each of these 
astronauts had the daring and discipline required of their 
calling. Each of them knew that great endeavors are 
inseparable from great risks. And each of them accepted 
those risks, even joyfully, in the cause of discovery.” 
On February 7, at KSC the orbiter Columbia was 
memorialized. Robert Crippen, Columbia’s first pilot, 
remembered the great matriarch of the Space Shuttle 
fleet with these touching words during the KSC 
memorial service: “Just as her crew has, Columbia has 
left us quite a legacy.” NASA and contractor employees attended the Columbia memorial 
service at the Johnson Space Center on February 4, 2003. 
A Columbia Crew Memorial Service was held at the Shuttle Landing Facility for KSC employees and invited guests on February 7, 2003. Columbia’s
first pilot and former KSC Director Robert Crippen is at the podium. Seated to his right are NASA Associate Deputy Administrator for Institutions
and Asset Management James L. Jennings, Florida Gov. Jeb Bush, and NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe. The Columbia and her crew of seven
were lost on February 1, 2003, over East Texas as they returned to Earth after a 16-day research mission. Taking part in the service were NASA
Administrator Sean O’Keefe, former KSC Director Robert Crippen, astronaut Jim Halsell, several employees, area clergymen, and members of
Patrick Air Force Base. The service concluded with a “Missing Man Formation Fly Over” by NASA T-38 jet aircraft. 
16
 SECTION 1 – THE MISSION
17 SECTION 2 – THE RESPONSE
 
 
 
 
 
Section 2 – The Response
 
Search and Recovery Team Operations 
Mishap Investigation Team Medical Efforts for
Crew Recovery and Identification 
Mishap Response and Lessons Learned:
The Role of the Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner
and the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology 
Johnson Space Center Space Life Sciences Response
and Crew Survival Investigation 
Kennedy Space Center Operations –
Commitment to Safety and Preparedness 
Crew Medical and Psychological Support Operations 
18 SECTION 2 – THE RESPONSE
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Search and Recovery 

Team Operations
James D. Wetherbee 
A difficult but essential component of aerospace
accidents is the recovery of human remains. Members
of the teams that participated in the search and recovery
of the human remains of the Columbia crew felt a
personal responsibility to succeed for the crewmembers’
immediate family members, the workers of NASA, the
citizens of the United States, and the international space
community. The participants had the guiding principle to
recover the remains of the astronauts with dignity, honor,
and reverence. The purpose of this chapter is to describe
this noble recovery effort, its organizational structure,
and the leadership that met this guiding principle.
Immediately after confirmation of the Columbia mishap, 
NASA initiated its contingency action plan. The NASA
Flight Crew Operations Directorate, which includes the 
Astronaut Office at the Johnson Space Center (JSC), 
was responsible for the search and recovery of the 
human remains of the Columbia crew. More than two 
thousand people contributed to this effort with inspiring 
and humbling self-sacrifice. The work was dangerous 
and the terrain was challenging; sometimes it rained 
and sometimes temperatures were just above freezing. 
Recognizing the complexity of the task, the number 
of teams working, and the speed required, the leaders 
of the search and recovery effort rapidly developed a 
centralized plan to guide the work and coordinate the 
teams involved. Over the two weeks that followed, the 
leaders adjusted the plan and refined the operations, 
based on valuable input from personnel in the field. 
Organizations involved in the effort were extraordinarily 
helpful. However, operational leaders quickly faced 
the challenge of knowing how much help to accept 
and how to coordinate effectively the valuable external 
assistance that was offered into a comprehensive and 
cohesive operational plan. Overcoming this challenge 
required the establishment of a clear and organized 
hierarchy of leadership. 
Initial Organizational Development 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was 
responsible for managing the investigation of this 
mishap. The location of the debris pattern on the 
ground in East Texas led to joint jurisdiction being 
shared by the Dallas and Houston Field Divisions of 
the FBI. Soon after the accident, when the FBI learned 
that possible human remains were being discovered 
on the ground, the FBI and NASA jointly decided to 
draw on the valuable experience of the FBI’s Evidence 
Response Teams (ERTs), which follow established 
protocols to recover all human remains with dignity. 
Members of these teams had previously participated 
in the Oklahoma City bombing investigation in 1995 
and the September 11, 2001, events at the World Trade 
Center and the Pentagon. The Dallas Field Division 
of the FBI assumed the lead and FBI Special Agents 
Multiple Organizations Contributed to 
the Search for and Recovery of the 
Human Remains of the Columbia Crew 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 

White House Liaison Office 

NASA Centers (including Ames Research 

Center, NASA Headquarters, Johnson Space 
Center, Kennedy Space Center, and Marshall 
Space Flight Center) 
Texas Army National Guard 

Texas A&M Forest Service 

Native American search teams 

Air Land Emergency Resource Team 

Local citizens of Sabine and San Augustine 

Counties (including the cities of Hemphill, 

San Augustine, and Lufkin) 

Department of Public Safety (Texas Police) 

Local Fire Departments 

Lufkin Civic Center 

Lufkin Mortuary
 
Carroway-Claybar Funeral Home
 
The Salvation Army 

McDonald’s Restaurant (Lufkin)
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from Dallas, Houston, and Lufkin were the principal 
field operatives. Special Agent Mike Sutton from the 
Houston Field Division coordinated the ERT operations. 
With knowledge and experience in disaster recovery, 
these ERTs made effective decisions in organizing and 
conducting the recovery operations. The FBI provided a 
well-functioning operation with exceptional personnel. 
NASA will always remember their valuable, selfless, 
and dedicated contributions. 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
was responsible for managing the crisis. Through
mutual assistance agreements, FEMA provided funding
and logistical support to enable the FBI to conduct the
investigation and multiple agencies to recover the debris.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was 
responsible for the safe recovery of hardware debris. 
EPA officials postponed hardware recovery to allow 
time for each piece of hardware to be assessed for 
contamination with toxic fuel and oxidizer from the 
propulsion systems in the Space Shuttle. For three 
days after the mishap, local sheriff, police, and fire 
department personnel guarded the locations of debris 
until each item was determined by EPA officials to be 
uncontaminated and safe for collection. Initially, NASA
search leaders decided that, although the contamination 
analysis might delay the recovery of human remains, the 
delay was acceptable to reduce risk to personnel. 
On the third day of the search (February 3), the search
leaders determined that the contamination-analysis
process was inefficient and that the officials who were
guarding the hardware were needed to accelerate the
search for human remains. Because NASA personnel
could accurately identify which items of debris were
not part of the propulsion systems and were free
from contamination, the EPA agreed to allow NASA
personnel in the field to designate the debris items
that were safe for collection by the search teams. The
efforts to recover hardware debris and human remains
safely proceeded in parallel without waiting for
contamination analyses. 
Selecting Command Centers 
Three types of command centers—strategic, tactical 
and forward—were established according to operational 
requirements and locations. First, a strategic command 
center was created at Barksdale Air Force Base (AFB) 
in Shreveport, Louisiana. This became the center of 
operations for FEMA management activities and the 
Command Centers 
According to the operational requirements, three 
types of command centers were needed in the 
locations described: 
Strategic Command Center – Barksdale Air Force 
Base (AFB), Shreveport, Louisiana, was chosen 
as the major command center for the hardware-
debris recovery operations. This was a large base 
located near the debris field, chosen because 
the US Air Force personnel on site were able 
to provide logistical, operational, and medical 
support for the recovery team. 
Tactical Command Center – The directors of the
search needed to be close to the search teams
that would be deployed into the recovery field,
so the Lufkin Civic Center was selected as the
Tactical Command Center for the human remains
recovery operation. The large, open space in
the building was quickly arranged to allow the
organizational leaders of the various agencies to
have line-of-sight and direct physical access to
each other while decisions were made in the early
stages of team formation.
Forward-Deployed Execution Posts – Two smaller 
forward posts were needed in the field for staging 
and briefing the search and recovery personnel. 
These were the areas where the operational 
plan, generated at the Lufkin Tactical Command 
Center, was disseminated to the search team 
leaders before the teams deployed into the field to 
execute the search and recovery operations. 
hardware-debris recovery, and the mortuary for the 
human remains. Barksdale AFB was located close to 
the debris field, and the US Air Force personnel on site 
provided the logistical, operational, and medical support 
for the recovery team. 
On the first day of operations (February 1), the recovery 
team determined that the planning and coordination 
of the search and recovery activities should take place 
much closer to the field operations. They chose the 
Lufkin Civic Center as the tactical command center for 
the human-remains recovery operation. 
On the basis of their extensive past experience
with large-scale disaster operations, FBI personnel
recommended that the operational team use a large,
open room for the managers to establish the search
and recovery planning and coordination activities.
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The Lufkin Civic Center was the Tactical Command Center for the human remains recovery operation. 
The Lufkin Civic Center had an acceptable area on
the main floor and this space was configured quickly.
The team arranged multiple tables to allow the
organizational leaders of the various agencies to have
line-of-sight and direct physical access to each other
while decisions were made in the early stages of team
formation. NASA installed a computer local area
network and telephones to improve communication
and coordination early in the operation. The leaders
developed and directed the operational plan for the
search and recovery of human remains at this tactical
command center in Lufkin, Texas.
Early in the search effort (February 3) the leaders decided
that two forward-deployed execution posts were needed
in the field for the personnel performing the search and
recovery operations in the two Texas counties of Sabine
and San Augustine. As the third type of command center,
these forward posts became staging and briefing areas
for the thousands of volunteer workers involved in the
search efforts. The Lufkin Tactical Command Center
generated the operational plan for the field leaders at
these sites, who then created field plans which were
given to individual teams before they deployed into the
field to conduct the search and recovery.
Communications were challenging at the beginning 
of the operation, as coverage for cellular phones 
was intermittent in the remote and hilly areas of the 
search corridor. Local mobile transmitters for radios 
were transported to San Augustine and Hemphill, 
Texas, to create improved and nearly continuous 
radio communications coverage for the search teams 
in the field. 
Establishment of the Operational 
Leadership Team 
The senior NASA official at the Lufkin Tactical 
Command Center was David King, from the NASA
Marshall Space Flight Center. King became the Search 
Director and was accountable for all aspects of the 
recovery of the human remains, including coordination 
21 SECTION 2 – THE RESPONSE
with executives at NASA and other federal agencies. 
To execute the operational aspects of the mission, 
King appointed astronaut and US Navy Captain James 
Wetherbee as the Operational Search Director to be 
responsible for creating and executing the search and 
recovery plan. Wetherbee was the senior representative 
from the Flight Crew Operations Directorate at NASA, 
Management Positions 
A military style of leadership, management, 
command, and control contributed to the success 
of this mission, which had simultaneous needs 
for centralized and decentralized decisions. The 
following managerial positions were created to 
lead the teams in the search and recovery effort: 
Search Director – responsible for establishing 
the organization and accountable for all aspects 
of the recovery of the human remains, including 
coordination with executives in NASA and other 
federal agencies. 
Operational Search Director – responsible for 
creating and executing the search and recovery 
plan, including the associated operational 
decisions involving the activation and deployment 
of the recovery teams, the methods used 
and locations designated for the search, the 
process and procedures used for the recovery 
and transportation of the human remains, the 
termination of the search, and the post-search 
activities for transition and closeout of operations. 
Ground Operations Officer – responsible for 
developing an operational plan for ground search, 
and coordinating with the different search groups 
to execute the plan each day. 
Air Operations Officer – responsible for developing 
and coordinating an operational plan with all the 
organizations that were offering airborne platforms 
and sensors for use in the search efforts. 
Forward Coordinator – responsible for 
disseminating the operational plan to the search 
team leaders at the Forward Deployed Posts 
before the teams went into the field to execute the 
search and recovery. 
Administrative Officer – responsible for decisions 
regarding the assignment of astronaut support 
personnel, local transportation, lodging, and 
supplies. This officer developed a file system 
for records and arranged the installation of a 
computer network and printer. 
and was responsible for operational decisions involving 
the activation and deployment of the recovery teams, the 
methods used and locations designated for the search, 
the process and procedures used for the recovery and 
transportation of the human remains, the termination of 
the search, and the post-search activities for transition 
and closeout of operations. 
At the start of the operations, the NASA Search 
Directors established a military style of leadership, 
management, command, and control. Astronaut John 
Grunsfeld, PhD, became the Ground Operations 
Officer in the Lufkin Tactical Command Center, and 
was responsible for developing the tactical ground-
search plans from the operational plan and coordinating 
with the different ground-search teams that executed 
the plans each day. He received field observation 
information, which was used as planning feedback each 
night to allow the Operational Search Director and the 
leadership team in the Lufkin Tactical Command Center 
to refine the operational plan. The Ground Operations 
Officer also developed the statistical analysis tool 
that was used to refine the search area and predict the 
location of the human remains during the search efforts. 
An Air Operations Officer had the responsibilities of 
developing an airborne-search plan and coordinating the 
flight activities of the organizations that offered aircraft 
and sensors for the search operations. Astronaut and 
US Air Force Colonel Scott Horowitz, PhD, filled this 
position. Horowitz also used his extensive computer 
applications skills to develop an independent mapping 
tool that provided data used in the analysis to narrow the 
search corridor. 
On the third day of the search (February 3), when the 
NASA team created the forward-deployed execution 
posts in Hemphill and San Augustine, Texas, astronaut 
and US Navy Captain Brent Jett became the Forward 
Coordinator in the field. He disseminated the operational 
plan and the tactical field plans from the leadership team 
in the Lufkin Tactical Command Center to the search 
team leaders in the field before the teams deployed to 
execute their search and recovery tactical operations. 
For the support of the astronaut operations in the 
Lufkin Tactical Command Center, astronaut Marsha 
Ivins was designated as Administrative Officer. She 
was responsible for decisions regarding assignment 
of astronaut support personnel, local transportation, 
lodging, and supplies. Ivins organized a system for 
collection and identification of crew-equipment debris 
and a file system for records, and she generated the 
rotational schedule for the field-deployed personnel. 
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Security personnel from NASA Headquarters and the 
Marshall Space Flight Center provided protection for 
all facets of the operation, including security of human 
remains in the field, record keeping and protection 
of sensitive medical and operational data, and the 
dignified transportation of remains to the temporary 
mortuary at Barksdale. In addition, the security 
personnel from Marshall Space Flight Center supplied 
the cellular phones that were needed to ensure that 
secure communications were always available to 
participating agencies. 
Readiness of Astronaut
Support Personnel 
As the recovery plan took shape, the NASA Search 
Directors decided that astronauts would provide 
leadership support to the deployed teams in the field. 
Because of the expected psychological difficulties of 
recovering the human remains of fellow astronauts, the 
Operational Search Director established a requirement 
that all astronauts directly involved in the recovery 
operations should return to Houston after a maximum 
of three continuous days of operations in the field. The 
Administrative Officer developed the schedule and 
coordinated with the Astronaut Office at Johnson Space 
Center for personnel rotation into and out of the field. 
Astronauts filling management positions were needed 
to stay in the Lufkin area and support the effort for 
periods longer than three days. Because of the stressors 
involved, these management astronauts were prohibited 
from participating in the search and recovery operations 
in the field. 
When support astronauts arrived for duty at the Lufkin
Tactical Command Center, the Operational Search
Director provided briefings on personnel safety,
the organizational structure, chain of command,
responsibilities in the field, and potential psychological
effects, and a description of the coordination required
Briefing for Arriving Astronauts 
The readiness of newly assigned astronauts to support the search and recovery mission was enhanced by 
setting clear expectations. To set expectations effectively while verifying understanding, and to create a 
common framework for operating, the Operational Search Director provided a briefing to astronauts arriving 
for duty at the Lufkin Tactical Command Center. The briefing contained the following items: 
Organization – A description of the organizational structure and chain of command, and an explanation of the 
various organizations that were supporting the search. 
Operations – A description of the search operations and what to expect after receiving tasking orders. This 
included a safety briefing for operations in the field, a description of the search teams, tasking that might 
be expected, transportation to the search area, search methods, description of terrain and weather, and 
cleanliness precautions for eating in the field. 
Responsibility – A statement of the search and recovery team’s responsibility to recover the human remains 
of the Columbia crew with dignity, honor, and reverence, and guidance detailing the methods and procedures 
used during recovery and transportation to the temporary morgue. 
Psychological Support – A brief description of what the astronaut would likely see in the field, and some 
suggested psychological techniques to use upon recovery of human remains. 
Communications – The communications protocols, including cell phone or radio operations, call signs and 
personnel, information required and desired, check-in and periodic status reports, and the methods used to 
rigorously control the transmission of information because of the highly sensitive nature of the search results. 
Administrative Items – Information on lodging, transportation, meals, search and debriefing times, possible 
press coverage, and tour of duty length (three days maximum). 
Out-briefing – An explanation of the requirement to check in with the Johnson Space Center space medicine 
psychiatrist after returning to Houston at the completion of the astronaut’s three-day tour of duty, regardless of 
self-perceived psychological fitness. 
Security – A description of the security protocols used and personnel assigned to help with transportation of 
suspected human remains. 
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for the various organizations supporting the search.
Each astronaut team leader was made aware of
individual responsibilities and orders within the
operation as a whole. The safety briefings included
information about field operations and hazards, a
description of the terrain, and precautions for working,
eating, and operating in the field environment.
Significant effort was spent in the orientation briefings
on the safety, decision-making, and emotional aspects
of the search, to prepare newly arriving astronauts
for the challenges of search and recovery of the
human remains of fellow crewmembers that had
been subjected to hypersonic reentry of the Earth’s
atmosphere from space.
The astronaut team leader provided each team member 
a clear statement of responsibility for the dignified 
recovery of all human remains, particularly detailing 
methods and procedures used during recovery and 
transportation of remains. This statement included 
communications protocols such as mobile phone and 
radio etiquette, call signs of teams and personnel, 
information required and desired, status reports, and 
methods used to transmit highly sensitive information. 
All astronaut volunteers also received a briefing on the 
nature of the psychological stressors involved in such 
an operation. Early in the recovery efforts, to reduce 
potential emotional stress, the Operational Search 
Director suggested to the support astronauts (as well 
as other volunteers) that they try not to think about 
identifying the remains but rather try to think of all the 
remains as being part of the Columbia crew. Many of 
the support astronauts appreciated this technique and 
found it helpful. 
All personnel who supported the human remains
recovery operations had to make critical decisions
while demonstrating great composure and distinction
in their actions. They accomplished their mission
under difficult environmental, physiological, and
psychological conditions. The tireless efforts and
leadership skills displayed by the astronauts who
participated in the search and recovery process led to
the success of the search and recovery operation.
Development of the Search and 
Recovery Plan 
The initial phase of developing the search and recovery
plan consisted of the activation of the command
centers, the identification of available personnel and
other assets, and the establishment of communication
and protocols for transferring information. Immediate
concerns for the safety of all personnel were identified
and addressed before further actions were taken. In
this initial phase, personnel were deployed to multiple
locations in the predicted debris field to gather
intelligence information to help shape the development
of the operational plan. 
On the basis of what was observed in the field, the
operational leaders at the Lufkin Tactical Command
Center developed the search and recovery plan and
filled management positions within the organizational
Guidelines for Making Decisions 
To succeed in this demanding and complex
search and recovery effort, which extended over
thousands of square miles, leaders had to make
correct decisions. Some operational decisions
were centralized, whereas others needed to be
decentralized and made quickly by distributed field
leaders. The following guidelines helped the search
and recovery leaders to make effective decisions: 
Mission Statement – We must recover the human 
remains of the Columbia crew with dignity, honor, 
and reverence. 
Timeliness – We must find the human remains 
quickly, because of the dual responsibilities 
we feel to satisfy the shared human value of 
recovering remains and to preserve the possibility 
of learning forensic information that might benefit 
future spaceflight crews through designing 
improvements in space vehicles. 
Integrity – To inspire the highest integrity in 
decision-making, we will follow an “8, 8, 8 Rule”
a reminder that “8 days, 8 months, and 8 years 
from now, we must be able to live with the 
consequences of the decisions that we will make 
in the field, so every decision must be based 
on our highest judgment using our greatest 
professionalism and human values.” 
Search Area Collapse – We will not reduce the
size of the search area until all members of the
leadership team are confident, on the basis of
technical analysis and justifiable rationale, that the
reduced area still contained all the human remains.
Data – To prevent being misled by any theories 
about how Columbia broke apart in the upper 
atmosphere, only the ground-truth data of 
confirmed locations of human remains will be 
used to reduce the size of the search area. 
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hierarchy. Simultaneously, the leaders designed a 
continuous improvement process for the plan. As 
information was reported from the field to the command 
centers, the search and recovery plan was adjusted 
and refined for more effective operations. Planning 
sessions were held each evening after sunset when the 
field team leaders returned, and tasking was revised for 
the operations on the next day. The field team leaders 
provided valuable feedback to improve the quality of 
the plan. A great deal of trust and respect developed 
among the operational management team. Over the  
12 days after the mishap, this integrated and dedicated 
team led 2,000 people in successfully recovering the 
human remains of the Columbia crew. 
Defining the Search Area
The impact pattern of Columbia debris was predicted 
by radar tracking of the falling debris. The prediction 
covered an area that was 200 miles long and 50 miles 
wide, designated as the initial search area. Local 
citizens reported several sightings of suspected human 
remains at sites in an eastern part of this initial search 
area. Local authorities were dispatched to each of  
these sites to provide security, and the FBI immediately 
deployed their ERTs to document the location and 
condition of any suspected remains. 
On the second day of the recovery effort (February 2), the 
Search Directors concluded that the 10,000-square-mile 
search corridor was too large to search expeditiously. The 
designated search area had to be reduced to a manageable 
size that still contained all the human remains. 
Guidelines for Making Decisions
The Operational Search Director developed several 
guiding principles to help the leaders make the correct 
decisions and to maximize the chances for successfully 
recovering the human remains of the Columbia crew.
Above all, the recovery of the human remains was to 
be accomplished with dignity, honor, and reverence. 
Timeliness of searching was of great importance, not 
only to satisfy the human emotional need to recover the 
remains quickly, but also to preserve the possibility of 
learning forensic information that might benefit future 
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space flight crews through design improvements in
space vehicles. A deliberate reduction in the size of the
search area was necessary. This reduction should be
accomplished only if all members of the operational
leadership team were confident, based on technical
analysis and justifiable rationale, that the reduced area
still contained all of the remains. Also, reduction of the
search area size should not be based on yet unproven
theories of how Columbia broke apart and the postulated
trajectory of human remains. To prevent being misled by
these theories, only the ground-truth data of confirmed
locations of human remains was used to reduce the
size of the search area. Finally, to inspire the highest
integrity in decision-making, the Operational Search
Director formulated what was briefed as the “8, 8, 8
Rule,” a reminder that “8 days, 8 months, and 8 years
from now, we must be able to live with the consequences
of the decisions that we will make in the field, so every
decision must be based on our greatest judgment using
our best professionalism and human values.”
Statistical Analysis Used to Reduce
the Size of the Search Area 
Several hundred suspected remains were found during
the search. The majority of suspected remains that
were found were later determined to be from animals.
Although the DNA results of suspected remains might
have provided conclusive data during the initial
search operations to determine accurate search areas,
these DNA results required several days to generate.
At the same time, some of the suspected remains had
the distinctive appearance of human tissue that had
been exposed to hypersonic descent to Earth. The
team plotted on a map the locations of these known-
human remains. Though all potential human remains
were collected and sent for DNA analysis, those that
appeared to be from animals were not used in the
mapping analysis. This statistically based analysis
allowed the leaders to identify a narrow search corridor
within the larger hardware-debris field. By the second
day of search and recovery efforts (February 2), the
operational leaders made the decision to reduce the
defined search area to a corridor that was 5 miles wide
and 60 miles long, centered on a statistically averaged
straight line along the path of distinctive remains
recovered in the field.
For the following two days (February 3–4), teams
searched designated areas with the highest probability
of finding human remains expeditiously. These were
areas with easy terrain, which enabled large regions
to be covered quickly within the 5-mile-wide corridor.
Search areas were chosen near previously sighted human
remains. Because of logistical constraints, the search
patterns were not changed daily. It took two days to
redirect the extensive search teams effectively to new
locations or new strategies. A great deal of effort was
NACOGDOCHES 
LUFKIN 
TEXAS LOUISIANA 
Sam Rayburn 
Reservoir 
Toledo Bend 
Reservoir 
Second-day Search 
Final Search 
Second-day Search Area (60 mi × 5 mi) and Final Search Area (25 mi × 1 mi). 
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made to ensure that team tasking and search directions
would not lead to wasted time in incorrect recovery areas.
After DNA results became available, the operational 
leaders of the search developed higher confidence in 
defining the search corridor. A statistical analysis was 
used to reduce the size of the search corridor to only 
1 mile wide and 25 miles long. The analytical reduction 
was accomplished by using two independent mapping 
models that provided a 95% statistical confidence that 
all remains found in the future would be located within 
the 1-mile-wide corridor. 
Final Adjustment of the Search Corridor 
Several days after the accident, the mishap team
determined the coordinates of the impact sites for the
densest parts of the Space Shuttle, the three high-
pressure turbopumps from the main engines. With their
high ballistic coefficients and therefore their greater
ability to overcome air resistance, these turbopumps
traveled the farthest and were found along the debris
trajectories farthest east in Fort Polk, Louisiana.
These locations, and the locations of the human
remains that had been found to the west, were plotted
on a map. The next step in the mapping analysis was
to connect the statistical centroid of the location of
human remains to the impact points of the turbopumps.
In a gnomonic projection, all great circle lines are
depicted as straight, so the connecting line represented
the accurate ballistic trajectory of the high-speed
debris and human remains. There was a slight angular
misalignment between this new accurate ballistic
trajectory and the previously defined search corridor
(shown as a red box in the figure), which was based
on a less accurate mapping analysis using a Mercator
projection. Without moving the centroid of the
previously defined search corridor, the azimuth of the
search corridor was rotated so that it was parallel to
the accurate trajectory of the high-density turbopumps
using the gnomonic projection. After this final analysis
was completed by rotating the search corridor using
the accurate ballistic trajectory, the operational leaders
had high confidence that any other human remains
would likely be found in this final search corridor.
Search teams were directed to different locations
corresponding to the slight rotation. 
No further analytical refinement of the search corridor 
was possible statistically. Analyses of the locations 
of human remains resulted in reducing the size of the 
corridor to 1 mile wide and 25 miles long. The ballistics 
analysis fixed the proper azimuth of the corridor. At this 
time, the strategy for the search was changed from a 
targeted search of specific areas within the corridor to a 
comprehensive search of the entire corridor. The Texas 
Army National Guard assisted with the comprehensive 
search strategy by providing necessary additional 
resources in the search and recovery. 
TEXAS LOUISIANA 
Toledo Bend 
Reservoir 
Sam Rayburn 
Reservoir 
5 mi 
10 km 
Search Corridor 
Turbopumps Trajectory 
Misalignment of Search Corridor Azimuth. The known trajectory of the turbopumps (blue line) was used to make a final adjustment to the 
misaligned search corridor (red box). 
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Search Methods 
The fundamental search plan was to use line
searches with large teams of volunteers, using Global
Positioning System (GPS) coordinates for tracking
and documenting the location of any suspected human
remains. This search method, which used the skills
and judgment of humans, proved to be the most
effective. During 12 days of searching, as many as
2,000 volunteers and Texas Army National Guard
troops engaged in the line searches. These volunteers
and troops maintained professional demeanors at all
times and were dedicated to accomplishing the goal.
The teams faced difficult challenges during the search
and recovery effort, including hazardous terrain with
rocky hills, dense forest, and thicket. In some areas, the
branches and bushes were so dense that the searchers
walked no farther than an arm’s length away from each
other to search the underbrush reliably. When these
conditions were encountered, the progress of the line
search slowed significantly. The operational leaders
appreciated the dedication displayed and personal
sacrifices made by the search teams.
Dog teams that specialized in human cadaver 
searches were also used. These teams were sometimes 
successful, but the dogs were occasionally confused 
Volunteers and Texas Army National Guard troops conducted line 
searches for crewmember remains. 
Dense forest and thicket were two of the many challenges encountered by searchers. 
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with false indications from other humans in the area. 
The operational leaders had more confidence in the 
reliability and greater numbers of the human search 
teams operating in long lines to search large areas. 
To develop confidence that human remains were not 
overlooked, the search directors used the dog teams 
effectively to search in expanding spirals around the 
sites of suspected human remains after the recovery 
teams had left the area. 
Horse teams were used to search open areas. Because 
they could cover large areas of territory quickly, this 
search method was used effectively in open areas 
just outside the defined corridor to verify that human 
remains had not fallen outside the boundaries. 
Helicopter spotters were used to identify areas of 
the forest where broken branches in the tops of trees 
indicated possible high-speed impacts of remains. 
Though successful initially in identifying the location of 
some human remains, this technique eventually became 
ineffective after high winds in the area led to extensive 
branch damage unrelated to the Columbia mishap. 
Search helicopters operated from the Angelina County Airport, 
six miles south of Lufkin, Texas. 
After 10 days of searching, a significant amount of 
human remains had not yet been found from one of 
the seven crewmembers. Emotions were strained and 
volunteers felt a strong desire to recover the remains 
of each crewmember successfully and bring closure to 
the search effort. On the tenth day of the recovery effort 
(February 10), more human remains were discovered. 
The team leaders attempted to counsel the ground-
search teams to manage their emotions and wait for 
identification that might confirm the recovery of the 
remains of the seventh crewmember. Unfortunately, 
the erroneous belief had already spread among the 
search teams that the search effort had been completed 
successfully. This created an emotional release that 
had to be reversed after it was communicated to 
the team members that the remains of the seventh 
crewmember had not been recovered. The remains of 
that crewmember were recovered successfully on the 
eleventh day of the search. 
Care of Crew Remains 
Each recovery team included members of the FBI ERTs, 
an astronaut, a religious member (minister, priest, or 
rabbi), a NASA security person, and a pathologist, if one 
was available. Ceremonial last rites were administered 
with reverence in the field. The teams recovered the 
human remains with dignity and used appropriate 
medical precautions. The astronaut and security 
personnel escorted the human remains with honor from 
the field to the Lufkin collection point. At this Lufkin 
facility a medical doctor from JSC Space Medicine 
accepted the crew remains. At the end of each day 
astronaut and security personnel escorted the remains to 
a temporary morgue at Barksdale AFB. 
In the morgue at Barksdale AFB, NASA flight surgeon 
Philip Stepaniak, MD, accepted the human remains. Dr. 
Stepaniak provided leadership for the development of a 
NASA medical contingency plan using lessons learned 
from the NASA Challenger accident in 1986 and the 
TWA-800 airliner accident in 1996. At the Barksdale 
AFB morgue, Dr. Stepaniak and his team enacted 
this contingency plan and made arrangements for 
identification and transportation of the crew remains to 
the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology at Dover AFB. 
With the appropriate honor-guard protocol, the initial 
human remains were placed in seven transfer cases to be 
accepted by the US Air Force and transported to Dover 
AFB on February 5, 2003. The seven transfer cases 
were draped with the national flags of the Columbia 
crewmembers, six Americans and one Israeli. 
The decision of when these initial remains would 
be transported to Dover AFB was challenging, as 
opposing considerations had to be balanced carefully. 
There was a desire to wait until the human remains of 
all seven crewmembers were recovered so that seven 
transfer cases could be sent one time to minimize the 
grieving process for the families and the international 
community. At the same time, there was a conflicting 
desire to transport the recovered human remains as 
soon as possible to the Armed Forces Institute of 
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Pathology to retrieve forensic information before tissue 
breakdown occurred by natural decomposition. This 
decision was further complicated by the fact that it 
was difficult to know if representative human remains 
had been recovered from all seven crewmembers. 
This information would be available only after DNA
or dental record analyses could be completed and 
verified, a process that might span several days. Four 
days after the accident, a joint decision was reached 
by Operational Search Director Wetherbee and Dr. 
Stepaniak to send the human remains in seven transfer 
cases, despite the fact that not all human remains had 
been recovered and some had not yet been identified. 
This decision, though difficult, was based on shared 
human values with cognizance of the difficulties faced 
by the grieving families, the NASA community, and the 
public at large. 
Analysis of Remains and
Dissemination of Data 
On arrival at Dover AFB, the remains were transferred
to the Armed Forces Medical Examiner. The medical
examiner and his team performed the forensic analyses
and transmitted the results of the DNA analyses to
the NASA Space Life Sciences Directorate at JSC
for immediate dissemination to the families of the
Columbia crew.
The medical examiner also provided the DNA findings
to Dr. Stepaniak and Director Wetherbee to assist in
field analysis, planning for search operations, and
establishment of tasks for the search teams to locate
additional human remains. The dissemination of
these results was controlled rigorously. Using a code
generated by Dr. James Bagian, a former astronaut
and an advisor to the Columbia Accident Investigation
Board, encoded results of the DNA findings were
transmitted by means of a landline telephone from
Dr. Stepaniak to the Lufkin Tactical Command Center.
Each specimen was identified using a two-letter random
code array, which enabled the locations of human
remains to be plotted on a map without crewmember
identity. Only Drs. Bagian and Stepaniak along with
Director Wetherbee possessed the key to the code array
and knowledge of the identity of all human remains. All
coded data of human remains were tightly controlled,
with the location information being separated from any
database containing hardware or debris information.
Maintaining confidentiality was not an easy task to
accomplish; in one instance, a potential breach of
security was identified when a volunteer-generated map
containing coded data and location of human remains
was exposed briefly to the Internet. Data security
personnel acted quickly to secure the breach, and to
increase security and control over data release. 
Many search team members, including members of the 
leadership team, expressed a desire to remain insulated 
from identity information about the human remains, 
as they felt that they could not operate effectively if 
they were aware of the location of the identified human 
remains. Among the leadership and search teams, only 
Operational Search Director Wetherbee knew this 
information. But this isolation of information introduced 
a risk that an erroneous decision made by Wetherbee 
in developing the plan would be unchecked by his 
insulated leadership team. To mitigate the potential 
consequences of such an error in decision-making, 
Wetherbee presented the comprehensive search plan 
to Dr. Bagian and included the identities of the human 
remains and how this information was used to refine 
the plan and search for additional human remains. 
Dr. Bagian had performed a similar role as the director 
of the search and recovery efforts for the human remains 
from the Challenger accident 17 years earlier. His 
valuable experience and insightful analysis provided 
the necessary confidence in the Columbia search and 
recovery plans and operations. 
Termination of Recovery Efforts 
The decision to terminate the search for human remains
of the Columbia crew was difficult. After careful
consideration, this decision was made according to
the following rationale. Although the recovery teams
had not found 100% of the crew remains, a high
percentage of remains of all seven crewmembers had
been found and identified. Statistical data indicated
that any remains that had reached the surface of the
Earth would likely be located within the 1-mile-
wide search corridor. After 12 days, the corridor
was searched extensively, along with many of the
marginal areas in the larger 5-mile-wide corridor.
The only part of the final search corridor that was not
searched extensively was a small area of particularly
dangerous wetlands containing potentially dangerous
snakes. The search leaders decided this area presented
an unacceptable risk to the volunteers, and the small
area was left unsearched. Finally, after observing the
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intense dedication and willingness of 2,000 volunteers
to risk personal safety to help accomplish the goal,
and because the search efforts had been so successful
until that time, the Operational Search Director made
the decision to terminate the official search for human
remains on February 13, 2003.
After conferring with the Armed Forces Medical 
Examiner and the Mortuary Affairs specialists, who 
had relevant experience investigating aircraft accidents, 
the search leaders anticipated that small amounts of 
human remains might be discovered more than a year 
after this accident. The NASA medical group at the 
Barksdale AFB Strategic Command Center arranged 
with NASA Headquarters, the Office of the Armed 
Forces Medical Examiner, the Armed Forces Institute of 
Pathology, and Armed Forces Mortuary Affairs to have 
a plan, with a contract in effect, for future recovery and 
transportation of suspected human remains that might 
be found. One hour before the active search for human 
remains was officially terminated on February 13, 
FEMA disseminated the forward plan to the local law 
enforcement agencies in the State of Texas. The plan 
provided reporting procedures to follow in the event any 
suspected human remains were found, with procedures 
for the delivery of any specimen to the Armed Forces 
Institute of Pathology. 
Because ground and airborne search teams remained 
in the Lufkin area to search for hardware debris, the 
plan contained a recovery process for human remains 
that was similar to the process that had been in 
effect. If suspected human remains were found by the 
hardware search teams, the Lufkin FBI ERTs would be 
notified immediately and deployed to the field site. If 
they thought it was likely that the remains were from 
the Columbia crew, the Lufkin FBI would call the 
Astronaut Office and a medical doctor would deploy to 
the site to recover and transport the remains to JSC in 
Houston. The Emergency Operations Center medical 
representative and the Flight Medicine Clinic at JSC 
would make arrangements with the Aircraft Operations 
Division at JSC to transport the human remains to 
Andrews AFB, where the remains would be received by 
the Armed Forces Medical Examiner. 
On March 7, 2003, teams that were searching the area 
for hardware debris found a small amount of human 
remains from the Columbia crew, less than one-half 
mile north of the northern boundary of the 1-mile-wide 
search corridor. These were the only human remains to 
be found outside this final search corridor. The remains 
were recovered and transported to Andrews AFB with 
an astronaut escort. Teams searching for hardware 
debris completed their search of the adjacent areas up 
to two miles north of the boundary of the final corridor. 
No other human remains were found. 
Psychological Readiness and Support
for Astronauts 
Profound psychological consequences must be 
anticipated for search and recovery personnel after an 
event such as the Columbia mishap. In light of initial 
reports of the condition of the human remains found by 
local citizens, the recovery process was predicted 
to be difficult for all involved. Compartmentalization 
was embraced as the best coping mechanism for the 
task, and concentrating on the operational task rather 
than considering the tragic nature of the mishap 
allowed volunteers to operate effectively. Some of 
those who participated in the recovery operation 
decided not to initiate their personal grieving process 
or to attend speeches or memorial services, to help them 
maintain compartmentalization of the psychological 
stress involved. 
Personal Commitment of Volunteers 
Throughout the operation many people made 
flawless decisions and displayed remarkable 
leadership, demonstrating the integrity of 
the individuals involved. Many personal sacrifices 
were made, and the overwhelming dedication 
and motivation of all involved was astounding. 
The personal commitment and selfless efforts of 
the volunteers will long be remembered. 
Acting on a recommendation from Special Agent 
Sutton, coordinator of the FBI ERTs, the Chief of 
the Astronaut Office directed all deployed astronauts 
who supported the recovery operations to have a 
psychological debriefing session with Dr. Chris Flynn, 
JSC space medicine psychiatrist, after returning to 
Houston. Making this debriefing session mandatory 
provided support to all deployed astronauts regardless of 
their self-perceived psychological fitness or willingness 
to request support. Some astronauts did not foresee 
that the session would be valuable. Other astronauts 
may have desired psychological support but chose not 
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to request such support because they felt embarrassed. 
Ultimately, most of the deployed astronauts considered 
the psychological debriefing to be a positive experience. 
Some members of the space community had advised 
against using active astronauts in the recovery process. 
Leaders of the search effort after the Challenger accident 
had found that adverse psychological effects could 
occur and linger in an astronaut long after the operation 
had concluded, and that these psychological impacts 
might decrease the performance of the individual 
during future flight operations. At the beginning of the 
search operation for the Columbia crew, the potential 
disadvantages were weighed against the value of having 
astronauts with considerable experience, dedication, 
and compassion conduct the challenging mission. 
NASA managers decided that it would be best to allow 
the volunteer involvement of active astronauts in the 
recovery process. If faced with a similar situation in the 
future, managers likely would make the decision to use 
active astronauts in the same way. 
Conclusions 
Because of the momentous nature of the Columbia
accident, the people who supported this search and
recovery effort arrived with an innate and clear sense of
the mission. More importantly, volunteers understood
that the recovery mission transcended their individual
desires and motivations, and they came with a pure
selfless intention to help. Although these factors created
powerful conditions for success, the leaders of this effort
nevertheless communicated an explicit mission statement
to the people and teams. The mission was to recover
the human remains of the seven astronauts of the Space
Shuttle Columbia with dignity, honor, and reverence.
Ultimately, the remains of the seven crewmembers
of space flight STS-107 were found, ceremonial last
rites were administered with reverence in the field, and
astronaut and military personnel escorted the remains
with honor to the medical examiner at the Armed Forces
Institute of Pathology at Dover AFB. 
From the beginning of the recovery efforts, the leaders 
of the search and recovery operations observed that 
those who volunteered for this mission embraced the 
highest of personal values. These values were reflected 
in conversations and behaviors conducted with great 
respect and professionalism. The operational leaders 
made explicit the values that were expected of team 
members, with the intention that such personal values 
would be used collectively to guide actions and 
decisions made by all team leaders and individual 
volunteers. Emphasis was placed on the safety of 
personnel and clear communications between leaders 
and team members. Information gathered from the 
field was recognized for its importance and was used 
to improve the quality of the plan, which led to the 
success of the recovery operation. 
Throughout the operation many people made flawless 
decisions and displayed remarkable leadership, 
demonstrating the integrity of the individuals involved. 
While they were in East Texas and Louisiana, NASA
personnel came to understand how important the Space 
Shuttle Program was to the local area volunteers. Many 
personal sacrifices were made, and the overwhelming 
dedication and motivation of all involved was 
astounding. Out of tragedy came greatness. 
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  Mishap Investigation Team
Medical Efforts for Crew Recovery 
and Identification 
Philip C. Stepaniak, Michael R. Chandler, and Robert Patlach 
The Space Shuttle Program established procedures for 
the Columbia Mishap Investigation Team (MIT) with 
the purpose to gather, guard, and preserve all evidence 
pertinent to the incident; the MIT was not responsible 
for determination of the cause. Team members included 
a NASA flight crew surgeon. This chapter describes the 
NASA flight surgeon’s relationship to the Columbia 
MIT and the team’s efforts to complete the recovery 
of crewmember remains, identify the crewmembers, 
establish accurate communication with the crewmembers’
families, and assist the forensic teams.
Background 
During the advent of the Space Shuttle Program, the
flight surgeons of the Medical Operations Branch at the
Johnson Space Center (JSC) in Houston worked together
with the emergency medical services (EMS) personnel
at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida, and the
Department of Defense (DOD) Manned Space Flight
Program Support Office (DDMS) at Patrick Air Force
Base (AFB), Florida, in preparation for a spacecraft
mishap that could occur during launch or landing.
After the Challenger accident in 1986 the JSC Space
Life Sciences Directorate provided an internal report
on the cause of death of the Challenger crewmembers.
The lessons learned included the determination that the
crew should be protected from the possibility of rapid
decompression and have a means for bailout.
The Medical Operations Branch assisted the Space 
Shuttle Program in upgrading crew egress, escape, 
and bailout equipment and procedures. For return to 
flight after the Challenger accident, these modifications 
involved the use of a launch and entry partial pressure 
suit and the addition of an emergency mode procedure 
for crew bailout. In 1994, NASA began using the more 
capable fully pressurized advanced crew escape suits that 
were worn by the STS-107 astronauts. 
These additional upgrades in equipment and procedures 
required further training for EMS personnel during 
launch and landing activities. As a result, the Medical 
Operations Branch provided a training course that began 
in 1988. This course was originally taught at JSC; but in 
response to student feedback, the course was later moved 
and taught at each of the primary landing sites within 
the United States. The course was also taught at military 
bases in Europe that supported the Transoceanic Abort 
Landings at the following air bases: Moron or Zaragoza 
in Spain; Istres, France; Ben Guerir, Morocco; or Banjul, 
The Gambia. The primary reason for the change was to 
provide more specific, detailed training that was needed 
for each particular site. 
Since the Medical Operations Branch had additional 
responsibilities related to spacecraft contingency 
operations, they decided to consolidate these efforts 
into a single Contingency Medical Group (CMG) that 
was formed in January 1998. The CMG, serving under 
the direction of the JSC Space Medicine Division of 
the Space Life Sciences Directorate, selected a group 
of flight surgeons involved in space flight operations 
to develop contingency plans and responses, and to 
investigate any NASA aviation or spacecraft mishaps. 
In May 1998, the Aerospace Medical Association 
(AsMA) held its annual conference in Seattle, 
Washington. During this conference, a panel presentation 
and discussion was held on the 1996 crash of TWA
flight 800 (Boeing 747) in the Atlantic Ocean. The panel 
members specifically discussed the medical and legal 
challenges of the mishap investigation and the interaction 
of the many federal and local agencies involved. 
Participants in this discussion were members of the 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the FBI, 
the US Coast Guard, the US Navy, and New York State 
authorities from the Suffolk County medical examiner’s 
office. The Joint Committee on Aviation Pathology of the 
Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) provided 
detailed forensic analysis. At this lecture they discussed 
the recovery of wreckage and human remains from the 
ocean, processing of remains, and DNA identification 
of fragmented and decomposed tissues. Members of the 
CMG attended this session and were impressed by the 
efforts that had gone into the TWA 800 investigation, 
recognizing their relevance to space flight operations. 
Upon hearing of the efforts of the AFIP after the TWA 800
crash, the CMG brought this information to the attention
of the Medical Operations Branch, which subsequently
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arranged a tour of the AFIP Port Mortuary at Dover AFB,
Delaware, in 1999. NASA flight surgeons, an astronaut
representative, contingency personnel from both JSC and
KSC, and medical personnel from the DDMS attended
this meeting, which included the Office of the Armed
Forces Medical Examiner (OAFME) and the Office of
Mortuary Affairs at Dover AFB.
During this visit, CMG personnel toured the facilities
in which the processing of human remains occurred
as well as areas where the deceased were prepared for
burial. Over the course of the visit, discussions with
the AFIP included spacecraft contingency scenarios
that could occur during launch, on orbit, and during
reentry and landing, and how such scenarios could be
handled with the resources at the OAFME. Services
discussed included air transportation of remains to
Dover AFB, postmortem examinations, reprocessing of
remains, and air transportation to a location designated
by the next of kin or other legal authority. JSC’s Space
Medicine Division would provide all support materials
including medical, dental, and DNA records as well
as radiographs and consent forms. Although no formal
written agreements were produced at this meeting, oral
agreements were reached to include the assistance of
the AFIP in the case of a space-related disaster. At the
same time, contingency medical team members were
able to coordinate their efforts and skills to develop an
enhanced approach for any future spacecraft mishap. 
The Mishap – Initial Activation of the MIT 
On February 1, 2003, the Mission Control Center 
(MCC) in Houston lost the signal from Columbia 
at 08:59:32 a.m. CST during its reentry over Texas. 
Shortly thereafter, the entry flight director had the 
MCC secured and in lockdown. All calls from inside 
the MCC to outside lines were disabled, but incoming 
calls were allowed. Richard McCluskey, MD, was the 
flight surgeon on console in the MCC at the time of the 
mishap. Members of the CMG reported to the Action 
Center in the MCC, where the Space Shuttle Mission 
Management Team (MMT) was meeting, to quickly 
begin preparations to activate the MIT for search and 
recovery efforts led by David Whittle. The atmosphere 
at that meeting was solemn, with conjecture regarding 
the mishap very much present. As the formal meeting 
began, managers called for an end to speculation, 
requesting that all involved focus instead on the 
recovery of the crew and the vehicle. It was at this time 
that team members officially learned that the crew had 
perished during the high-altitude breakup of the orbiter 
Barksdale Air Force Base, home of the Eighth Air Force, was the 
strategic site for the Columbia Mishap Investigation Team. 
Columbia over Texas. Exact details of the altitude, speed 
of the breakup, and location of the debris field were later 
provided by the Department of Defense (DOD). 
During this initial meeting of the MMT, managers 
discussed potential staging of the recovery operation 
at various locations in Texas and Louisiana. Multiple 
locations around the debris field were discussed, with 
security and transportation constituting the major 
concerns. Staffing of the MIT was also discussed and 
decisions had to be made, particularly regarding the 
choice of the medical support team members. Standard 
operating procedure called for the primary and deputy 
mission crew surgeons (Smith Johnston, MD, and 
Stephen Hart, MD), the physicians assigned to the crew 
throughout their training, to act as the primary medical 
members of the MIT. However, these physicians were 
at KSC with the crew families at the time of the mishap 
and were occupied by caring for family members in the 
wake of the disaster. Since these physicians were well 
known to the families and had close personal bonds 
with the crew, the Space Life Sciences Directorate 
recommended that these physicians remain at KSC with 
the crew relatives. Instead, members of the CMG, Philip 
Stepaniak, MD, NASA flight surgeon, and Michael 
Chandler of Wyle Laboratories Inc., Houston, space 
flight medical contingency coordinator, were appointed 
as medical representatives to the MIT. Space Medicine 
Division management, with concurrence from the 
Space Life Sciences Director, provided a single point 
of contact to disseminate information to all levels of 
management, thus releasing the flight surgeon at the 
MIT location to focus on recovery and identification. 
By 11:30 a.m. CST, the MMT decided to stage recovery
efforts at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. This location was
north of the main debris field, but was selected as the
best choice because of its security and capabilities for
rapid air transportation in multiple types of aircraft.
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Medical members of NASA MIT at Barksdale Air Force Base confer with military officers of the DDMS. 
At the same time, NASA established a Disaster Field
Office (also called the Tactical Command Center,
headed by astronaut James D. Wetherbee) in Lufkin,
Texas, for the recovery of human remains because
of its proximity to reports of remains in the area.
By 3:30 p.m. CST that day, the advance MIT members
were flying from Ellington Field in Houston to
Barksdale AFB. During the flight to Barksdale AFB,
Stepaniak and Chandler carefully reviewed the
contingency action plans for space operations while
preparing for the recovery effort ahead. The 2nd Bomb
Wing Vice Commander, Col. Charles McGuirk, met
with the MIT members around 4:30 that afternoon.
Despite concurrent operations at the base, specifically
ongoing preparations for an international conflict
with Iraq, Col. McGuirk informed the MIT that the
base would offer full support for their efforts.
Barksdale AFB personnel immediately provided
resources for the establishment of MIT operations,
including office space, transportation, local lodging,
communications, and computers.
The MIT medical representatives were next introduced 
to members of the Barksdale Flight Surgeons Office, 
US Air Force flight surgeon Col. Jerry Owens and the 
Squadron Services Mortuary Affairs Officer, Maj. John 
Ogden. Representatives from the NTSB and OAFME 
flight surgeon US Navy CAPT Douglas Knittel, MD, 
were also present for assistance, given the extreme 
nature of the accident and the extensive debris field. The 
medical representatives discussed the operational plan 
with these individuals, particularly regarding personnel, 
equipment, procedures, and communications. These 
discussions took place amid a nearly continuous stream 
of incoming calls from the Lufkin Disaster Field Office 
and JSC, as team members at these locations raced to 
establish an operational plan. 
One of the first challenges faced was the designation 
of a hierarchy, particularly as medical team members 
were acutely aware of the need to control the flow of 
information regarding human remains recovery. Jeffrey 
Davis, MD, the director of the JSC Space Life Sciences 
Directorate, became a single point of contact for the 
medical teams, to avoid confusion and the inadvertent 
release of private crew-related information. Throughout 
this period, local citizens made multiple calls about 
possible human remains and toxic debris sightings. 
It was quickly realized that search and recovery 
team members and civilians alike would need clear 
information about procedures for handling both human 
remains and toxic debris. 
On the evening of February 1, Dr. McCluskey, NASA
flight surgeon and pathologist, and Robert Patlach, 
space flight medical contingency coordinator, deployed 
to Lufkin. They met with astronaut physician Dafydd 
(Dave) Williams, MD, and FBI Evidence Response 
Team members at the office of local pathologist James 
Bruce, MD. Bruce’s office became the initial collection 
point for all recovered Columbia crewmember remains. 
Facility security was provided by the Texas Department 
of Public Safety, the US Marshals Service, and the 
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DOD Criminal Investigative Service. Plans called for 
remains recovered in the field to be transported to the 
collection point in Lufkin. After preliminary review 
and assignment of tracking numbers, the remains were 
transported to Barksdale AFB. The Batesville Casket 
Company, Batesville, Indiana, donated caskets for 
crewmembers, and the Carroway–Claybar Funeral 
Home in Lufkin donated hearse services. 
Crew Remains Recovery 
As the news media presence grew exponentially the
next day, Barksdale AFB established enhanced security
measures at the base to maintain privacy and allow
operations to proceed unhindered. Simultaneously the
number of MIT personnel numbers increased since
team members had arrived late the night before. The
atmosphere at the morning operational meeting was
increasingly intimidating as high-ranking members
of federal and local government agencies arrived
to oversee operations. The Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), and the NTSB provided
a number of personnel to support NASA’s recovery
efforts. The lead of the MIT, David Whittle, began the
meeting by stating that the primary mission of the field
teams was to collect all human remains, vehicle debris,
and evidence for transport to the MIT at Barksdale AFB
and from there, to final locations for analysis.
As the meeting concluded, medical team members 
gathered with all personnel participating in human 
remains recovery activities. This medical assembly 
consisted of personnel from the AFIP; DOD; NTSB; 
EPA; FEMA; FBI; KSC Security; the Barksdale Flight 
Surgeon’s Office, Mortuary Affairs Office, Security 
Office; JSC Public Affairs Office, Legal Affairs Office, 
Photography, and Aircraft Operations. This initial 
meeting served the important purpose of ensuring that 
all team members were known to one another for the 
difficult operation ahead. Working with the Lufkin 
Tactical Command Center, Stepaniak defined the 
plan for the recovery of crew remains in the field and 
transportation of the remains to an initial collection 
post in Lufkin, then to a temporary morgue facility at 
Barksdale AFB for identification, and finally to Dover 
AFB for analysis and for release of remains to the 
crewmembers’ families. 
Afterward, the day was filled with multiple activities 
needed to prepare Barksdale AFB for the receipt of 
remains. First, Stepaniak contacted the JSC Flight 
Medicine Clinic to request the crewmembers’ medical, 
dental, and DNA records that were essential for 
February 2, 2003 – First recovered remains transfer from Lufkin, 
Texas, to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana. 
This facility at Barksdale Air Force Base served as the
temporary morgue. 
identification; these records were delivered to the 
Barksdale AFB Mortuary Affairs Office for safekeeping. 
Later that afternoon, two Blackhawk helicopters 
provided by the Texas National Guard transferred the 
initial set of remains from the Lufkin collection point to 
Barksdale AFB. These helicopters arrived at Barksdale 
AFB about 5:00 p.m. CST on February 2, with the 
remains being escorted by the OAFME advance team 
under the lead of US Navy CDR Craig Mallak, MD, 
Armed Forces Medical Examiner, and accompanied 
by US Navy CDR James Caruso, MD. A military 
honor guard protocol was instituted for the transfer of 
these remains to the temporary morgue facility. 
All subsequent remains were transported by ground 
convoy with a security escort from Lufkin to Barksdale 
AFB at the conclusion of each search day. Stepaniak 
also met with Dr. James Bagian, the medical consultant 
to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, who 
was briefed on NASA MIT medical operations. Bagian, 
together with Wetherbee, later revised the plan for 
locating and recovering the crewmember remains. 
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Public Misconceptions 
On the evening of February 2, Whittle and other senior
management of the MIT told Stepaniak that they had
received a call from the Governor’s Office of the State
of Texas about concerns that remains had not yet been
recovered, requesting an explanation for the apparent
delay. It became known that the Governor’s Office
was receiving numerous calls from citizens regarding
their willingness to help with recovery efforts. The
Governor’s office was concerned that these reports
did not seem to generate an immediate response
from NASA officials. It was clear that the public was
unaware of the scope of the operation. Because the
initial debris field included an area of about 10,000
square miles with dense foliage and hazardous terrain,
recovery team efforts were simply dwarfed by the
magnitude of the mission.
At the same time in various offices, misunderstandings
occurred about the nature of the mishap, with concern
that foul play or acts of terror were involved in the
orbiter’s destruction. NASA was forced to recognize
the need for better distribution of information, and set
about reassuring the public that Columbia had been
destroyed because of a mechanical accident with no
acts of terror involved, and that recovery teams were
exerting every effort to promptly and appropriately
recover all remains and debris while ensuring the safety
of those searching. 
Recovery and Identification of 
Human Remains 
The primary mission of the MIT medical team was to
receive, identify, preserve, and transport human remains
to the AFIP at Dover AFB. At the same time, the recovery
of initial remains gave significant insight into the nature
of the accident and provided some understanding of
the forces involved in the crewmembers’ deaths. First,
it was noted that none of the remains were recovered
with any donned life-support equipment, such as their
reentry suits. From this observation, it became clear that
the shear forces involved at the speed and altitude of the
breakup caused all life support equipment to be torn away
from the bodies.
Patterns of injury were observed, including multiple-
force trauma. It was later determined that these patterns 
Crewmember remains and life-support equipment were found within a corridor in East Texas that was approximately 30 statute miles long 
and 2 statute miles wide. 
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were caused by seating arrangements on the two decks 
of the crew compartment, with crewmembers being 
exposed to certain types of injuries according to their 
location within the compartment. It was also noted that 
all remains had a pachydermic appearance, indicating 
exposure to the severe thermal insults and low pressure 
conditions of extreme altitude during reentry. 
All crewmembers were identified by dental forensics 
and DNA analysis. Through the use of dental records 
provided by the JSC medical clinic, the remains of five 
crewmembers were formally identified by February 4. 
A sixth crewmember was formally identified by dental 
records on February 11, and the final crewmember 
was formally identified on February 12, 2003. All 
identifications of disassociated crew remains were 
confirmed by the use of DNA analysis conducted at the 
OAFME Rockville, Maryland facility. 
Throughout the recovery and identification of human
remains, it became apparent that the contingency medical
group required additional personnel. Peter Bauer, MD,
NASA flight surgeon, Mark Swann, space flight medical
contingency coordinator, Wyle, and Richard Pettys,
advance projects engineer, Wyle, provided operational
and data management support. 
Providing Information to the Families 
Family members returned to Houston from KSC the
afternoon of the mishap, and awaited information
about their loved ones. The MIT medical representative
provided identification information to the mission crew
flight surgeons, who had close bonds with both the
crewmembers and their families. These mission crew
flight surgeons, Drs. Johnston and Hart, coordinated
with the Casualty Assistance Calls Officers (CACOs),
astronauts assigned to assist the family in the case of a
disaster. To prepare for this exchange of information,
on February 3, the MIT medical lead and the OAFME
lead held a teleconference with Johnston and Wetherbee
to discuss the duties of the CACOs and the flow of
information to the families. These conferences were
repeated daily, and information was provided to the
crew flight surgeons and CACOs, who ensured that the
families had the most accurate and complete information
available regarding recovery efforts and dispelled any
rumors reported by the media or the general public. 
As crewmembers were identified, the mission crew 
flight surgeons along with the CACOs notified the 
families. Once OAFME completed the forensic analysis 
of the remains, the Dover Mortuary Affairs Office 
coordinated with family members, again with the help 
of the crew flight surgeons and CACOs, to prepare 
the remains for burial or cremation and return them 
to their families. A unique approach was required for 
Ilan Ramon, the Israeli astronaut, to respect cultural 
sensitivities and religious preferences. An Israeli flight 
surgeon and rabbi, Col. Ahron Zwi Black, MD, arrived 
at Barksdale AFB on February 3 to observe MIT-
OAFME operations and to ensure that cultural and 
religious customs were followed. US Navy CAPT Rabbi 
Harold Robinson assisted Black, who later accompanied 
the remains when they were transported by aircraft to 
Dover AFB and oversaw the final disposition of this 
crewmember’s remains. 
Transfer of Remains 
Multiple challenges were involved in the transfer of 
human remains from Barksdale AFB to Dover AFB. 
First was the issue of timing since the OAFME staff at 
Dover AFB needed to receive the remains and tissue 
samples as quickly as possible to assist with their 
forensic analysis before valuable evidence was lost to 
degradation. At the same time, it was important that the 
remains be transported with dignity, honor, and respect, 
for the families’ sake, in as few shipments as possible. 
Pathologists provided tissue samples taken from all 
recovered remains, and the samples were flown on a 
NASA T-38 to Andrews AFB for immediate delivery to 
OAFME at its Rockville, Maryland, facility for DNA
analysis. The first shipment occurred on February 3. On 
February 5, seven transfer cases containing the majority 
of the recovered remains were sent with military honors 
by an Air Force C-141 aircraft to Dover AFB. These 
transfer cases were accompanied by Dr. Black; US Air 
Force Col. Rex Walheim, NASA astronaut; and Craig 
February 5, 2003 – Seven transfer cases containing Columbia 
crewmember remains were transported to Dover Air Force Base. 
Israeli Col. Rabbi Black and US Navy CAPT Rabbi Robinson provided 
a blessing for the fallen astronauts. 
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 Honor guard protocol for the Columbia crewmembers at Barksdale 
Air Force Base. 
Fischer, MD, from JSC Space Life Sciences Directorate, 
along with the OAFME advance team. OAFME 
provided duplicates of all reports and photographs on 
a compact disc to the JSC medical MIT. Astronauts 
US Navy CAPT Barry Wilmore and US Navy CAPT
Kenneth Ham escorted the subsequent transfers to 
Dover AFB on February 11 and 12, respectively. 
In addition to the remains, search teams found debris
from parts of crewmembers’ reentry suits that they had
been wearing. Debris included helmets, suit parts such
as wrist rings, suit oxygen bottles, and radios and other
equipment. All equipment had identification numbers
that associated each piece with a particular crewmember.
This crew life-support equipment was kept with the crew
remains and transferred to Barksdale AFB and then to
Dover AFB. JSC engineers from the Crew and Thermal
Systems Division initially reviewed this hardware at
Barksdale AFB and then traveled to Dover AFB for
comparative analysis of the hardware to provide a better
understanding of the crewmembers’ injuries.
In addition, the Air Force sent an experienced former 
NASA flight surgeon, Maj. Hernando (Joe) Ortega, 
to Dover AFB to assist with the forensic analysis of 
the human remains and the crew life-support
equipment. The JSC engineers also provided a
complete reentry suit (advanced crew escape suit)
to OAFME as well as technicians and engineers to
assist with the functional analysis.
Terminating Operations 
Twelve days after the mishap, all crewmembers had
been identified and the medical team began the transition
toward the termination of recovery operations and the
initiation of a sustainable long-term support plan. The
MIT management and the JSC Director of Space Life
Sciences approved a final long-term plan developed by
the MIT medical representatives, which was subsequently
distributed to all members of the MIT. This plan also
established procedures for the handling of commingled
remains that might be discovered with orbiter debris
shipped to KSC. The official search for human remains
terminated on February 13, 2003. Through the JSC
Emergency Operations Center, the CMG supported
recovery of human remains until February 22.
Barksdale AFB information technology personnel, in 
coordination with FEMA personnel, erased all pertinent 
data from the base medical computers. The MIT medical 
lead provided updated schematics of crewmembers’
remains to the Lufkin Disaster Field Office so that they 
would have adequate information in case more remains 
were found. The medical team returned to JSC the 
following day to brief JSC management on the status of 
the medical operations and crew recovery efforts. 
Summary: Medical Mishap Investigation
Team Mission Objectives at Barksdale 
Air Force Base 
The mission objectives at Barksdale AFB were divided 
into primary and additional issues. This division became 
obvious as personnel were working in the field and 
determined that multiple items needed to be addressed 
by the team. These items needed to be coordinated to 
keep members of the team informed and management 
satisfied with the team’s efforts. The primary (#1) and 
additional objectives were as follows: 
1. Receive, analyze, identify, and transport human 
remains to the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology 
at Dover AFB. 
2. Provide assistance in the human remains 
recovery efforts to the prime Disaster Field Office 
at Lufkin, Texas. 
3. Brief the astronaut CACOs and the crew surgeons for 
the STS-107 mission daily so they could inform the 
families with the latest recovery details. 
4. Provide information, plans, and guidelines for 
medical concerns and occupational health care issues 
associated with spacecraft toxic substances to the 
search teams, local physicians, and civilians. 
5. Receive, store, and transport crew life-support 
equipment to Dover AFB for analysis. This equipment 
eventually was transported to Kennedy Space Center. 
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6. Receive, store, and transport biological payloads from 
STS-107 to the Kennedy and Johnson Space Centers. 
7. Develop long-range plans for human remains 
recovery and transport after departing the base of the 
MIT operations at Barksdale AFB. 
Lessons Learned 
Personnel 
Due to the nature of the mishap, it was appropriate
to have the mission crew flight surgeons remain with
crewmembers’ families for medical and psychological
support rather than reassigning them to investigative
and recovery roles. Personnel in the CMG proved
uniquely suited to act as members of the MIT. Initial
operations were marked by a significant lack of
necessary support personnel needed for operational
assistance, record keeping, and similar activities. The
identification of contingency teams before a mishap
occurs, with associated training of team members,
could alleviate much of the burden placed on the MIT
medical representatives by providing adequate support
for initial operations. Personnel with expertise in 
computerized mapping and plotting of recovered human 
remains and crew equipment would have provided great 
benefit for a more efficient search. 
The introductory medical team meeting held at Barksdale
AFB for all individuals involved in human remains
recovery proved to be extremely valuable. Not only
did this meeting provide an opportunity to establish
responsibilities for early, clear coordination of efforts, but
it also allowed all team members to meet other parties
involved and understand their roles, leading to smoother
operations once recovery efforts were underway. 
It was noted that many of the MIT personnel turned to 
the MIT medical representatives for routine medical 
advice. Although this was an understandable occurrence, 
the primary mission of the MIT medical team was 
recovery of human remains, not provision of medical 
care to other team members. Future medical teams must 
consider the health of team members and identify local 
medical care facilities, providing this information to 
their team members. 
Equipment 
Barksdale AFB personnel were extremely helpful in 
providing adequate work space and supplies for the 
initial operations, but it would be desirable in the 
future for team members to deploy with equipment and 
supplies sufficient for the first few days of an operation. 
In particular, dedicated and secure cell phones, a secure 
computer, and adequate office supplies are essential 
to early activities. FEMA provided many of these 
supplies later in the operation, but such supplies are 
needed from the start. 
Procedures 
The serendipitous meeting of the JSC CMG and
the OAFME and AFIP at Dover AFB in 1999 was
extraordinarily valuable. This meeting established
familiarity among the various organizations and
helped to develop an initial concept of operations. In
retrospect, however, specific protocols for the handling
of vehicle debris, crew and personal equipment, human
remains, and other biohazardous material were lacking.
In particular, the type of personal protective gear
needed in any recovery operation and how it will be
provided should be established so that clear protocols
and appropriate equipment can be provided to the
team. Contingency medical personnel who may need to
respond to a similar future mishap should be aware that
they will be part of an integrated team that will include
professionals experienced in photographing, coding,
and identifying GPS coordinates of any recovered
debris or remains.
Chain-of-custody procedures should be well established
and controlled. This is important both at field operations
collection points and at temporary morgue facilities.
Transport of all human remains to the forensic analysis
facility needs to occur as soon as possible to prevent
tissue decay and loss of toxic materials by off-gassing,
so that accurate data can be obtained. Further, procedures
should be established for the handling of commingled
human remains discovered within spacecraft debris.
Honor and respect guided the coordination of 
religious and cultural provisions for the international 
crewmember, and such efforts were greatly appreciated 
by both the family and the international community. 
Similarly, the use of an honor guard protocol for the 
transfer of human remains provided dignity, honor, and 
respect to crewmembers. 
Transitional and long-term plans were carefully
considered toward the end of the recovery efforts.
These plans proved to be quite useful and will be
useful in the future, since additional remains will
almost invariably be discovered after search and
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recovery operations are terminated. These plans should
be coordinated with all members of the MIT and
supporting agencies. 
Communications 
It was extremely useful to have identified a single 
point of contact in the management chain who was 
responsible for the appropriate dissemination of 
information. This point of contact relieved field team 
members of the responsibility of reporting to multiple 
individuals, ensured that data were not misconstrued 
or distributed to inappropriate parties, and allowed the 
team to focus on recovery tasks. 
Daily briefings with the Lufkin Tactical Command 
Center, the mission crew surgeon, and CACOs enabled 
an effective flow of information to the families provided 
by individuals whom the families knew and trusted. 
This process rallied the families and provided comfort 
in the knowledge that they were receiving accurate and 
verified information directly from the field. 
During the TWA 800 discussion at the AsMA
conference in 1998, a panelist was asked to identify
the greatest detriment to the investigation of the
accident. The panel member responded with the
memorable statement that political grandstanding
led to the distribution of unsubstantiated information
as certain individuals fought for their turn in the
media spotlight. This false information led to great
emotional disturbance for family members and the
public at large, and made the distribution of accurate
data even more challenging in an already difficult
situation. This lesson was well heeded by the MIT
medical team, and they made a considered decision
to make information available first to the families to
protect privacy and trust. NASA as a whole worked
tirelessly to ensure that no false or unsubstantiated
information was ever reported to the media during the
search and recovery efforts. 
Communications were a continuing issue for the 
individuals working in the cauldron of a major public 
mishap such as the Columbia accident. Under these 
stressful conditions, a good rule was to never promise 
anything that could not be personally delivered. The 
MIT medical team received multiple questions from 
the media, senior government officials, and political 
officials—all wanting immediate answers to questions 
about the identification and disposition of the crew. 
The MIT flight surgeon relied on NASA senior 
managers, such as the Director of Space Life Sciences, 
and NASA Public Affairs officials to interact with these 
questioners. This need to make accurate information 
available while working to recover and identify 
crewmember remains was difficult. One must always 
remember to be flexible yet realistic, balancing the need 
to accomplish objectives with the need to deal with the 
perception of how well the recovery is going by those 
in authority who may attempt to inject politics into the 
accident investigation process. 
Conclusions 
As long as humans continue to fly in space, mishaps 
will occur. The monumental risks inherent in space 
flight guarantee that tragedies, though deplorable, 
cannot always be prevented. A team involved in search, 
rescue, recovery, and investigation efforts must have 
appropriate personnel who are trained to conduct this 
mission. The coordination of these efforts before a 
mishap occurs will provide for more efficient operations 
in the event of a disaster. 
Mishap preparations for a spacecraft disaster should
include, at a minimum, coordination among NASA,
its international partners, the DOD, the NTSB,
FEMA, EPA, the FBI, and the Federal Aviation
Administration. Medical and legal experts should
provide guidance in the coordination of both recovery
and communication efforts. Communications must be
carefully controlled to ensure appropriate release of
accurate and reliable information.
Tragedies of this magnitude impart extreme stress to
those involved, yet those who respond are capable of
remarkable feats in such times. After the Columbia
mishap, the MIT and the medical team demonstrated
efficiency and determination, using the lessons learned
from the TWA 800 accident and the Challenger disaster
to better respond to this contingency. The lessons
learned from the Columbia disaster will provide
guidance for future operations. It is our responsibility
to ensure that the sacrifices made and the knowledge
gained by all involved will be available for use by
those conducting this type of response in the future.
“We don’t rise to the level of our expectations, we fall 
to the level of our training.” 
Archilochus, Greek Soldier, Poet, c. 650 BC
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Mishap Response and Lessons
Learned: The Role of the Office of the Armed 
Forces Medical Examiner and the Armed Forces 
Institute of Pathology 
Craig Mallak 
The Columbia accident presented a difficult situation
for pathologists, because of the unexpected nature of
the high-altitude breakup of the space vehicle and the
large area in which crewmembers’ remains could have
been found. East Texas was a difficult terrain in which to
manage recovery operations, and methods to ensure an
efficient and highly proficient evaluation were necessary.
Complicating matters was the issue of chemical toxicity
(propellants) as well as the hazards of the spacecraft
debris. This chapter is the story of how NASA and
the Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner
(OAFME) worked together to recover and identify the
crew remains. This team had methods that worked, to
make sure the families of the STS-107 crewmembers
received a dignified yet accurate accounting of the deaths
as well as to provide the information to NASA and the
external investigation teams for an understanding of the
mishap. The lessons learned will benefit future space
flight accident investigations. 
Capabilities of the Armed Forces 
Medical Examiner and the Armed Forces 
Institute of Pathology 
At the time of the incident, the OAFME was a branch of 
the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP), which 
was disestablished as part of the 2005 Base Realignment 
and Closure Act. OAFME is now a separate agency 
within the Department of Defense, known as the Armed 
Forces Medical Examiner System. The mission of the 
OAFME, which was established in 1988, was to conduct 
scientific forensic investigations for determining the 
cause and manner of death of members of the armed 
forces and, under special circumstances, civilians in the 
United States and overseas. In 1999, the jurisdiction of 
the office was defined by 10 US Code 1471 to include 
assisting other federal agencies by way of agreement 
or through requests to the Department of Defense. 
Before 1988, the AFIP consisted of a forensic science 
The Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner. 
department and an aerospace mishap department that 
worked in a consulting capacity for military mishaps. 
With the formation of an Armed Forces Medical 
Examiner System, these departments were enveloped by 
the larger system. 
In addition to performing multiple autopsies every
year, the OAFME is further responsible for conducting
medicolegal investigations, particularly regarding
medical, dental, forensic, toxicological, laboratory,
and DNA analyses. The staff of the OAFME consists
of pathologists, anthropologists, investigators,
photographers, toxicologists, DNA scientists, and
other scientific and administrative personnel. Forensic
pathologists are active-duty members of the US
Air Force, US Navy, and US Army, and are board
certified in anatomic, clinical, and forensic pathology.
Many staff members have a variety of other skills
in veterinary medicine, legal affairs, and hyperbaric
42 SECTION 2 – THE RESPONSE
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
The Army Medical Museum located in Washington, DC, 
from 1887 to 1955. 
The Army Medical Museum, now named the Armed Forces Institute 
of Pathology, on the grounds of Walter Reed Army Medical Center, 
1955 until it was closed in 2011. 
medicine, together with expertise in combat, aviation,
and water-related deaths. On the whole, the OAFME
was well suited to manage the forensic investigation
resulting from the Columbia mishap. The Columbia
disaster was not the first time that NASA interacted
with the OAFME, as previous generations of military
medical examiners investigated the Apollo 1 and
Challenger fatalities.
The AFIP was a US government institution concerned
with diagnostic consultation, education, and research in
the medical specialty of pathology. It was founded
in 1862 as the Army Medical Museum and was located
in Washington, DC, on Independence Ave until it
moved to the grounds of Walter Reed Army Medical
Center in 1955. 
The unique character of the AFIP rested in the 
expertise of its civilian and military staff of diagnostic 
pathologists whose daily work consisted of the study of 
cases that are difficult to diagnose owing to their rarity 
or their variation from the ordinary. 
Contingency Planning Between NASA 
Flight Surgeons and AFIP – OAFME 
In 1998 the AFIP presented a panel discussion at the 
Aerospace Medical Association Annual Conference in 
Seattle, Washington, on the 1996 TWA 800 in-flight 
mishap, one of the deadliest US aviation accidents of all 
time, which occurred in August over the Atlantic Ocean 
near Long Island, New York. This panel discussed the 
lessons learned by the recovery and response teams 
involved in that accident. The lead pathologists of the 
Joint Committee on Aviation Pathology of the AFIP
chaired this discussion. Members of NASA’s Space 
Medicine Division were impressed by the lessons 
learned presented by this panel and, as a direct result, 
wanted to put in place a medical contingency plan for 
use in case of a NASA spacecraft mishap in the future. 
In 1999, members of the Johnson Space Center (JSC)
Contingency Medical Group, the Kennedy Space
Center (KSC) Aerospace Medicine and Occupational
Health Branch, and the Department of Defense (DOD)
Manned Space Flight Support Office (DDMS) visited
the AFIP facility at the Port Mortuary at Dover Air
Force Base (AFB) in Delaware. The purpose of this
visit was to outline procedures for the handling of
crewmember remains after any spacecraft mishap in
the future. The visit included a site tour, particularly
of the unique fatality processing and autopsy facilities.
Dover AFB is the only medical examiner’s office that is
designed for a multidisciplinary approach that includes
an onsite Explosives Ordinance Disposal clearing area,
FBI disaster identification component, and radiological
and dental identification capability. The team also met
with their experts and toured the Mortuary Affairs
section of the facility where the deceased are prepared
for disposition, including burial and cremation. At this
meeting no formal agreement between the OAFME
and NASA was put into place; however, a discussion
did occur regarding the informal procedure that would
be followed in case another spacecraft accident should
occur. In 1999, NASA and the OAFME reaffirmed that
casualties resulting from the loss of a spacecraft would
be ultimately examined by the AFIP at Dover AFB.
Recovery Operations 
On February 1, 2003, the STS-107 Columbia accident
occurred. Following the loss of signal from the
Columbia spacecraft, the medical organizations at both 
JSC and KSC scrambled into action. At 10:00 a.m. EST
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The Dover Port Mortuary is located at Dover Air Force Base, Delaware. In October 2003, the Charles C. Carson Center for Mortuary Affairs 
replaced this 48-year-old facility that had been in use since 1955 to identify and process the remains of more than 50,000 service members and 
many victims of numerous fatal incidents of federal interest, as well as the crew of the Space Shuttle Columbia. In 2011 the national mass fatality 
campus was completed at Dover Air Force Base including the reassignment of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner System and the US Personal 
Effects Depot, all within a secured compound at the base. 
the medical team at OAFME assembled and engaged
in a telecommunication consultation with DDMS
representatives from Patrick AFB, Florida, and
NASA’s medical team from the Space Life Sciences
Directorate at JSC. During the initial conversations
it was unknown whether any human remains would
be recovered because of the extreme altitude of the
incident, the speed at which the vehicle was traveling,
and various forces that would have been applied to the
crew. For this reason, operations were suspended at
noon while team members awaited further information.
By 4:00 p.m. EST, JSC officially requested on-site
assistance from the OAFME as reports of significant
human remains in the extensive debris field began to
emerge. Immediately, OAFME sent an advance team
to the primary Disaster Field Office managed by the
Tactical Search Director, at Lufkin, Texas, to begin
the preliminary examination of recovered remains. At
the same time OAFME sent a pathologist to Barksdale
AFB, Louisiana, to work with the Columbia Mishap
Investigation Team (MIT). 
The first remains found were temporarily held in a local 
pathologist’s office in Lufkin, Texas, and this became 
the main collection point for human remains found at 
all the search sites. A preliminary review of the remains 
was completed at this Lufkin facility. 
In order for the OAFME staff to complete a preliminary 
identification, as well as cataloging and initial 
evaluation of the injuries suffered by the crewmembers, 
a temporary morgue was set up at Barksdale AFB. The 
pathologist detailed to Barksdale AFB worked with 
base leaders to find a space suitable for the work that 
had to be done. In a matter of a few hours a facility 
was identified, and with the assistance of base staff 
was prepared for receiving and evaluating the remains. 
The Barksdale AFB temporary morgue had sufficient 
space, lighting, water, electricity, medical support from 
a local military medical treatment facility, security, 
and availability for air transportation. This temporary 
morgue was available within 24 hours of occurrence of 
the mishap and was fully operational by the time the 
first human remains arrived at the base on February 2. 
The MIT from NASA immediately began to coordinate 
with the Flight Medicine Clinic at JSC to obtain all 
crewmembers’ medical, dental, and DNA records. 
The MIT flight surgeon, Philip Stepaniak, MD, also set 
up daily evening dialogues with the crew flight surgeon, 
Smith Johnston, MD, Casualty Assistance Calls Officers 
(CACO) from the JSC Astronaut Office, an experienced 
mortuary affairs officer from the Air Force, and the 
Tactical Search Director, James Wetherbee, at Lufkin 
Disaster Field Office. The early coordination of these 
assets proved vital for ongoing operations. 
Recovered remains were temporarily held at the office of a local 
pathologist in Lufkin, Texas. 
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Challenges for OAFME and NASA 
Once the OAFME was called into action certain
challenges became evident. These challenges
included jurisdiction; organization and logistics;
recovery, analysis and identification of remains; death
certificates; and international issues. Initially it was
assumed that remains of the crew might be difficult to
locate because the accident occurred at high altitude
and speed. This type of accident had never occurred
before, and considering the nature of the forces and
large debris field, the expectations were that not many
remains of the crew would be recovered. However, this
was not the case. 
Jurisdiction 
The initial challenge was determining who would
have jurisdiction over the remains. The medicolegal
jurisdiction is dictated by where death is pronounced.
The involvement of the states of Texas and Louisiana,
with their numerous counties and municipalities,
created a legal challenge. However, the President of
the United States federalized the recovery efforts and
thus the local authorities ceded jurisdiction to the
OAFME, which lessened the burden of negotiations
with multiple local medical examiners.
Organization and Logistics 
The team that had assembled in Lufkin, Texas,
on day 1 (February 1) moved with the remains to
Barksdale AFB, providing a full scope of investigative
personnel. A team of forensic odontologists and an
FBI fingerprint specialist arrived at Barksdale AFB
the next day to supplement the team members
already in place. A military epidemiologist came
on February 4 to catalog and analyze the growing
amount of material. This epidemiologist greatly
assisted the recovery of the remaining crewmembers
by triangulating the coordinates of recovery sites
and by plotting and extrapolating geographic data
to identify recovery zones. Finally, as the Columbia
mishap involved Israeli astronaut Ilan Ramon,
a representative of the Israeli Defense Forces,
Col. Ahron Zwi Black, a medical doctor and rabbi
with forensic experience, came to Barksdale AFB as
part of the investigative team. 
Recovery, Analysis, and Identification 
of Remains 
The primary objective at the Barksdale AFB facility was 
to identify crewmembers before their remains were sent 
to the forensic center at Dover AFB. After the remains 
were transported to Dover AFB, the OAFME assigned 
a pathologist to remain at Barksdale AFB on a rotating 
basis through the remainder of the formal search and 
recovery effort. NASA transported all recovered remains 
to Dover AFB for the OAFME evaluations. The Port 
Mortuary Affairs Office provided the arrangements for 
disposition of remains in accordance with the wishes of 
the families. 
Recovery 
The recovery of crewmember remains involved the 
tireless efforts of members of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, NASA personnel, local police, emergency 
medical services personnel, and volunteers from across 
Texas in a well-coordinated search and recovery process. 
Initially, recovery efforts were made in response to calls 
made by civilians reporting potential sightings of human 
remains. Findings on the ground led to concentric search 
patterns in the area, but this approach proved to be more 
cumbersome than necessary, and a more sophisticated 
pattern was developed as insight was gained into the 
sequelae of the vehicle breakup. The best approach 
was to have field personnel recover anything that might 
be considered human, with analysis performed by 
forensic professionals for definitive identification. The 
consequence of this decision was that eight nonhuman 
specimens arrived at Barksdale AFB and Dover AFB for 
every recovered human portion. Although this decision 
resulted in extra hours of work, it was necessary to 
ensure that the greatest possible representation of the 
remains of the crewmembers was recovered and all 
crewmembers were identified. 
Analysis and Identification 
All remains recovered in the field were sent to the
Lufkin collection point and then were escorted by
security to Barksdale AFB for further examination
by the OAFME investigation team. This team
photographed all remains, charted them by recovery
location, and provided anatomical schematic outlines
of each crewmember. Initial screening of disassociated
remains included first an examination by a forensic
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anthropologist to evaluate whether the remains were
human and to determine the part of the body recovered.
Any portion of the hands or feet was triaged to the FBI
for identification. Likewise, fragments of the jaw or
teeth were evaluated by the forensic odontologists on
the team. The pathologist took samples from the tissue
and bone for DNA analysis. These tissues were flown
almost on a daily basis by NASA aircraft to Andrews
AFB and then sent to the facilities of the OAFME at
Rockville, Maryland, for DNA identification. Most
tissue samples were identified within 24–48 hours
after their arrival at the Rockville facility. This timely
and rapid identification through mitochondrial and
nuclear DNA analysis assisted NASA in the search
and recovery process. When nuclear DNA was
not available from the tissue, OAFME technicians
performed mitochondrial DNA analysis. Mitochondrial
DNA helped analysts segregate nonhuman tissue
from human tissue and bone. At least one portion of
each crewmember was positively identified by dental
forensics at Barksdale AFB.
During this process, a question quickly arose regarding 
how long remains should stay at Barksdale AFB. The 
OAFME requested that all remains be transferred to 
Dover AFB as soon as possible for a more detailed 
forensic analysis as there were concerns that tissue 
decomposition could cause valuable data to be lost if 
the remains were not evaluated in a timely manner. 
In response, the MIT made arrangements with the 
Barksdale AFB Mortuary Affairs Office and the US Air 
Force Mortuary Affairs Department to coordinate rapid 
transfer of all remains. The initial formal transfer from 
Barksdale AFB to Dover AFB occurred on the morning 
of February 5, with full military honors for the remains 
in transit. Two other formal transfers were made on 
February 11 and 12. 
The KSC Medical Operations team coordinated with 
the Barksdale AFB mortuary team concerning any 
commingled human remains found with the vehicle 
and crew compartment, which were shipped to KSC 
for evaluation of the orbiter debris. Processing of 
these remains underwent the same procedures that 
were conducted by the MIT at Barksdale AFB, ending 
with the established protocol for transfer of all human 
remains to Dover AFB. 
Once the remains of the Columbia crew arrived at Port 
Mortuary, Dover, initial processing of remains began 
with a screen for any hazardous or toxic items. As 
tissues were declared safe for processing, subsequent 
procedures called for the collection and review of 
relevant documents such as casualty or investigative 
reports provided by the field teams at Barksdale AFB 
and the Lufkin facility. Photographs were made of all 
remains, with assignment of barcodes for tracking. 
This was followed by postmortem processing of 
finger- and footprints with comparative pre- and 
postmortem analysis as well as a dental record review 
and analysis of dental imaging. Body imaging and 
skeletal surveys followed, and x-rays were reviewed 
for basic injuries and the presence of any foreign 
metallic objects or identifying features. Next, an initial 
external examination was conducted, with careful 
documentation of injuries. Technicians collected the 
appropriate specimens for toxicology findings together 
with a complete examination of internal organs. 
A forensic anthropologist assisted with triage and 
reassociation of any dissociated remains, performed 
by comparison of DNA profiles as much as possible to 
account for all recovered tissues. The anthropologist 
was also instrumental in separating the human from the 
nonhuman material that arrived daily at Barksdale AFB 
and Dover AFB. All of the remains and personal effects 
were then transferred to the Mortuary Affairs section 
for disposition. Mortuary Affairs coordinated with the 
families for determination of funeral arrangements 
according to the family’s wishes. The families received 
all crewmember personal effects at this time. The 
whole operation for the Columbia crew, from search 
and recovery to transport, autopsy, and burial, was 
completed and accounted for through this process. 
Issue: Determination of Injury Patterns 
As of 2003, studies had determined that previous
techniques used to evaluate injury patterns in aircraft
mishaps were less than scientifically sound. Thus, the
team could not use their previous experiences with
aircraft to determine the factors leading to loss of crew
life. The OAFME staff decided that such speculative
analyses could not be provided given the now-known
lack of accuracy and precision of such opinioned reports.
A major complication was the breakup of the orbiter
at high altitude, which involved a variety of forces,
including the destruction of a highly complex vehicle
with metal, glass, and other materials interacting with the
astronauts’ bodies in the most extreme of environments.
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The OAFME decided not to provide conclusions about
the cause and timing of injuries because they would have
been speculative and inappropriate.
Recovery and Analysis of Life-
Support Equipment 
Crew life-support equipment such as helmets and 
reentry suit oxygen bottles, and suit hardware like wrist 
rings and suit emergency radios, that were found in the 
debris field were also sent to the temporary morgue at 
Barksdale AFB. Members of the JSC Crew and Thermal 
Systems Team (the organization that is responsible 
for all crew-worn equipment) initially evaluated the 
equipment at Barksdale AFB and then sent it to Dover 
AFB for further analysis of injuries sustained. At the 
request of NASA, the Department of Defense also 
sent an experienced, NASA-trained military USAF 
flight surgeon, Maj. Hernando (Joe) Ortega, to Dover 
AFB for additional consultation. The JSC Crew and 
Thermal Systems team and the military flight surgeon 
reassociated the life-support equipment and remains 
recovered, providing valuable information used to 
understand the nature of injuries that occurred at altitude 
under such extreme conditions. 
Death Certificates
Another challenge was the processing of the death 
certificates. The location of death and municipalities 
where the death certificates should be filed were 
debated. The JSC legal team, with the recommendations 
of the OAFME, resolved this process with the 
municipalities of Texas and Louisiana. Also, the JSC 
Flight Medicine Clinic needed to collect additional 
information that was required for the certificates from 
the crewmembers’ families. The death certificates 
were prepared at Barksdale AFB and sent to Texas for 
processing and certification. The recorded cause of 
death on the certificates issued by the State of Texas 
was “blunt force and thermal injuries in association with 
exposure to extreme altitude with underlying cause of 
spacecraft mishap.” 
International Affairs 
International issues were another factor to consider as an
Israeli astronaut was a member of the crew of STS-107.
Special religious customs and autopsy procedures needed
to be honored and respected. This process was handled
with dignity by making sure Israeli flags and proper
transfer cases were available during the transfer of the
remains. Also, NASA’s medical MIT arranged to have a
US Navy rabbi and an Israeli flight surgeon rabbi present
at Barksdale AFB and Dover AFB to oversee handling of
the Israeli astronaut’s remains.
Termination of Recovery Efforts 
OAFME and the NASA MIT terminated the formal
medical operations at Barksdale AFB on February 13
after consultation with the Tactical Search Director at
Lufkin, Texas. NASA and the US Air Force Mortuary
Affairs Office developed a long-term recovery plan
to be implemented for remains recovered after the
termination of formal search efforts. OAFME and
the AFIP concurred. According to this plan, any crew
remains recovered within the debris field after the
termination of recovery efforts would be sent to
Dover AFB for analysis and disposition. For several
years, biological remains found in the debris field
were sent to the OAFME facility at Dover AFB for
evaluation. The probability of subsequent recoveries
was discussed with the families of the crewmembers,
and each family controlled the eventual disposition
of any scientifically identified remains. This included
whether they wished to be notified about such
identification of remains and how they wished them
to be handled by the Port Mortuary. This backup
plan is still in effect today and the families have the
opportunity to change their wishes at any time.
Lessons Learned
Lessons learned from the Columbia disaster were 
developed to make improvements in the response, 
search, recovery, and investigative process. The main 
lessons learned for the OAFME and the AFIP during the 
Space Shuttle Columbia mishap were the following: 
1. The preplanning by NASA with the Department 
of Defense Manned Space Flight Support Office 
(DDMS) and the OAFME before the accident 
contributed to strong communication and 
familiarity among the groups, which prepared 
them for this mishap. 
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2. Having single points of contact with the Tactical 
Search Director at the primary Disaster Field Office 
site, Lufkin, Texas, and NASA’s medical MIT site 
at Barksdale AFB, during the search, recovery, and 
transport of remains prevented miscommunications 
up the chain of command and helped to create a sense 
of trust among those who were in charge within the 
field of operations. 
3. Having a temporary morgue available at the NASA
MIT site with all available equipment to do a 
preliminary evaluation and preservation of remains 
within 24 hours after the accident contributed to the 
timely identification of remains. 
4. Having medical and dental records including DNA
cards from NASA’s Flight Medicine Clinic available 
contributed to the timely identification of remains. 
5. Having a means of rapidly transporting remains 
with military honors to the Port Mortuary at 
Dover AFB enabled the team to preserve valuable 
toxicology evidence. 
6. Having daily situation reports with NASA’s medical 
MIT that included passing along accurate information 
to the search teams and the CACO representatives for 
the crewmembers’ families created a sense of trust 
and confidence. 
7. Recognizing the needs to respect and honor the 
customs of crewmembers from other countries 
by having representatives present prevented any 
misunderstandings by the crewmember’s family or 
the international partner country. 
NASA launched a return-to-flight mission, STS-114, 
in July of 2005. Before this launch, several visits and 
exchanges of ideas were coordinated between NASA
and the OAFME. It was of specific interest that a written 
memorandum of understanding be developed to detail 
any future involvement and responsibilities of each 
party in the event of a future spacecraft mishap with loss 
of crewmember life. Aeromedical and legal teams at 
NASA and the OAFME coordinated the details of this 
agreement. This memorandum is reviewed annually and 
remains in effect today, and OAFME and NASA teams 
meet regularly to update plans for responding to any 
future fatal mishaps. 
The Findings 
NASA’s initial expectation from the OAFME and AFIP
was that these offices would provide a formal and 
in-depth forensic analysis on the factors involved in 
the loss of crew life during the STS-107 breakup. This 
expectation was not met for multiple reasons. The first 
was that reductions in OAFME/AFIP budget and staff 
occurred in the years before the incident. In addition, 
the OAFME staff was making preparations for the US 
military to be potentially engaged in a conflict with Iraq 
that ultimately began within 2 months of the Columbia 
mishap. This potential conflict required significant 
efforts on the part of the OAFME and the AFIP to 
prepare for casualties of war from a major military 
operation, and these efforts required the full support of 
its staff. Most importantly, resolution of many issues 
that NASA was interested in learning about was beyond 
the state of the science at the time and would have 
been mere speculation, especially considering that 
this very unique mishap occurred at high altitude with 
aerodynamic and thermal effects. 
Although specimens of tissue such as lung, liver, heart,
and bone were sent to other departments at the AFIP
for evaluation, these consultations proved of little
assistance in further defining the effects on the human
body of exposure to the conditions that occurred during
the breakup of Columbia. As a result, NASA outsourced
the development of the detailed forensic analysis to a
private contractor to provide additional insight needed
to clarify the source of the injuries and the forces that
the astronauts sustained during a high-altitude, high-
speed thermal event.
Future Recommendations and Summary
The actions taken in response to future spacecraft 
mishaps will be dictated by the nature of the accident. 
Preparations and planning for mishaps occurring 
during launch, on orbit, or during reentry or landing are 
essential for guiding the actions of response, rescue, 
recovery, and investigation teams. Many commercial 
companies are now in the arena of space travel together 
with the military services and NASA. The details of 
who will be involved and responsible in handling a 
mishap need to be predetermined, particularly regarding 
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The Wall of Fallen Heroes greets each visitor as they walk into the Charles C. Carson Center for Mortuary Affairs, Dover AFB, Delaware. 

Each tragedy is engraved into the glass for remembrance of the date and the number of fallen heroes, including Space Shuttle Challenger and 

Space Shuttle Columbia.
 
the authority of each office or agency involved, such 
as the Federal Aviation Administration, National 
Transportation Safety Board, Department of Defense, 
private space flight company, or NASA. An analysis 
of the causes of any accident must be given priority, 
to gain insight that can ultimately enhance the safety 
of vehicles, crews, and space flight as a whole. At the 
same time, expectations for medical evaluation and 
analysis must be realistic and within the boundaries of 
objectivity to best serve the space flight community. 
During this time of national tragedy, the OAFME and 
AFIP proudly conducted this difficult investigation with 
honor, dignity, and respect for the fallen crewmembers. 
It was a great privilege for the OAFME and the AFIP to 
assist NASA during the Columbia mishap. All members 
of the OAFME and the AFIP were dedicated in their 
efforts to complete their mission, and conducted their 
work in remembrance of the crew of STS-107. 
This panel from the Wall of Fallen Heroes at the Charles C. Carson 

Center for Mortuary Affairs includes the Space Shuttle Columbia. 
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Johnson Space Center Space 
Life Sciences Response
and Crew Survival Investigation 
Jeffrey R. Davis 
The United States, Texas, and NASA flags, in front of the Johnson Space Center’s (JSC) Project Management Facility (Bldg. 1), fly at half-staff in 
memory of the seven Space Shuttle Columbia crewmembers who lost their lives on February 1, 2003. 
At the time of the STS-107 flight, the Space Life
Sciences Directorate (SLSD) at Johnson Space Center
(JSC) was engaged in human space flight operations and
research. The directorate worked with the Space Shuttle
Program as well as the International Space Station. The
directorate included the Space Medicine Division and
the Medical Operations Branch, which had responsibility
for astronaut health, and this included working with the
astronauts before, during, and after their space flight.
The flight surgeons assigned to the flight were the
crewmembers’ advocate for all issues related to health.
Besides keeping the astronauts healthy, the directorate
set standards and requirements for astronaut selection
and retention, and provided behavioral health support
for the astronauts and their families. Each flight had
two crewmembers trained to provide medical care
on orbit, and the SLSD provided such training and
supplied the medical kits for each flight. Other support
efforts included establishment of aeromedical flight
rules, ground rules/constraints such as the wake/sleep
cycles, and providing 24/7 support for the mission in the
Mission Control Center. Furthermore the directorate set
standards and monitored air and water quality and crew
consumables such as food. For the STS-107 mission
the directorate provided coordination with the scientific
payload community including in-house investigators.
The directorate was also responsible for occupational
health for JSC and had expertise in toxicological hazards.
The purpose of this chapter is to identify all the major
phases of activities and interfaces after the STS-107
mishap that involved the SLSD at JSC in Houston,
Texas. The discussion is divided into the phases of
support for the accident.
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Acute Phase, Initial Response 
to the Accident 
On the morning of February 1, 2003, after NASA
learned that the Space Shuttle Columbia broke up
over the skies of Texas, representative members of
the SLSD – Charles Stegemoeller, Associate Director
of SLSD, and Sam Pool, MD, Assistant Director of
SLSD, attended the Space Shuttle Mission Management
team meeting at the Action Center of the Mission
Control Center at JSC. The Mission Management Team
activated their Mishap Investigation Team (MIT).
Immediately, SLSD activated its Contingency Action
Plan (CAP) for Space Flight Programs. The SLSD CAP
for Space Flight Programs reflects the directorate’s
response activities and key personnel who would be
involved in the event of a space flight contingency.
The plan defines the responsibilities and procedures
used by SLSD personnel for taking initial action in
the event of a mission contingency such as a mishap,
investigating and reporting mission failure, accidents,
or incidents under the directorate’s jurisdiction. The
Director of the NASA Johnson Space Center, General
Jefferson Howell, USMC (retired), supported this
investigation along with NASA headquarters Chief
Health and Medical Officer, Richard Williams, MD.
The SLSD assigned several key individuals to the MIT. 
Generally, these members would be the crew flight 
surgeons for the mission. However, the crew surgeons 
were with the crewmembers’ families at the Kennedy 
Space Center (KSC) Shuttle Landing Facility, where 
Columbia was to have landed. Thus, SLSD appointed 
members from the Medical Operations Branch: NASA
flight surgeon Philip Stepaniak, MD, and the support 
contractor (Wyle) contingency coordinator, Michael 
Chandler. They were deployed the afternoon of 
February 1, 2003, the day of the mishap, to the strategic 
MIT site at Barksdale Air Force Base (AFB), Louisiana, 
leaving from Ellington Field, Houston, Texas, and 
arriving by 4:30 p.m. CST. The purpose of their mission 
was to gather, guard, preserve, and identify all human 
remains evidence for analysis of the incident. 
At 10:30 a.m. CST the day of the accident, SLSD,
through the DOD Manned Space Flight Support Office
(DDMS) at Patrick AFB, Florida, had discussions
with the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP),
Rockville, Maryland, to determine how to recover
and identify crew remains if any were found. Initially
the assumption was made that very small amounts of
human remains would be recovered because of the
altitude and speed of the breakup. Therefore NASA told
the AFIP to stand down for deployment until further
notice. Later that afternoon, because members of the
public reported significant human remains in the debris
field, SLSD recalled the AFIP team to organize the
support needed for recovery and identification of the
crew. That day an advance team from the AFIP Office
of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner (OAFME) went
to Lufkin, Texas, as that was the tactical site of the
primary Disaster Field Office responsible for the crew
recovery. The OAFME also sent a pathologist to the
MIT strategic site at Barksdale AFB.
Within hours of the Columbia loss, the NASA
administrator, Sean O’Keefe, formed the Columbia 
Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) under the 
leadership of Admiral Harold Gehman, USN (retired). 
The CAIB also contacted a former astronaut, James 
Bagian, MD, who had provided the medical support for 
the Challenger accident investigation. Bagian became 
the medical consultant and chief flight surgeon for the 
CAIB. By February 2 Bagian was at the search and 
recovery sites in East Texas to understand those efforts 
and began the overview of the impacts of the accident 
on the crewmembers. 
During this initial phase, SLSD together with members 
of the JSC toxicology working group, directed by John 
T. James, PhD, provided guidelines for the collection 
of Space Shuttle material in the debris field. The 
Columbia orbiter had toxic propellants associated with 
the various propulsion and power systems. The toxic 
compounds that were potentially present included the 
hypergolic propellants nitrogen tetroxide and hydrazine. 
The SLSD toxicology group provided guidance for 
the safe detection and handling of these propellants. 
NASA personnel worked with members of local, state, 
and federal law-enforcement agencies including fire, 
medical, and emergency medical services, US and Texas 
forest services, the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, and the Environmental Protection Agency. 
The guidelines given by NASA personnel included 
information on what to do when encountering hazardous 
or potentially hazardous materials and procedures for 
collecting Space Shuttle materials. 
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MIT Recovery Phase 
Over the next 2 weeks the medical members of the
MIT at Barksdale AFB worked with the Columbia
crew flight surgeons, Smith Johnston, MD, and Stephen
Hart, MD, who interfaced with the Casualty Assistance
Calls Officers (CACOs) to provide accurate and timely
information to the families of the crewmembers about the
recovery efforts and identification of the crew. The SLSD
always kept the family needs first in their objectives.
The SLSD enlisted the services of the JSC Behavioral
Health and Performance group to provide psychological
support to family members and to NASA civil servants
who were involved in the collection of human remains.
Crewmember remains were later sent with military
honors from Barksdale AFB to Port Mortuary, Dover
AFB, Delaware, for further analysis and preparation
for eventual burial. During this time, SLSD staff also
interacted with the payloads community regarding
disposition of the recovered biological payloads,
and SLSD worked with KSC on crew compartment
components and possible commingled human remains.
Initial Analysis Phase 
The CAIB requested the formation of the Crew Survival
Working Group (CSWG) to provide needed input to the
investigation. General Howell commissioned the CSWG,
which was managed by SLSD Director Jeffrey Davis,
MD, and Laurie Hansen from the JSC Engineering
Directorate. NASA flight surgeon Rainer Effenhauser,
MD, US Air Force Lt Col Donald White, and James
Bagian, MD, provided medical support to the CSWG.
The CSWG initiated a crew-centric investigation of
the Columbia mishap. Their charter was to define the
fate of the crew module and the crew. Craig Stencil
from SLSD led organizational meetings that were
attended by representatives of medical forensics, flight
crew operations, safety, flight crew equipment, vehicle
engineering, flight dynamics, and video analysis. Their
results were eventually published in a one-page crew-
centric summary in the CAIB report that was published
in August 2003. The CSWG published their final report,
authored by James Bagian, MD, and Lt Col Donald
White, in CAIB Volume 5: Other Significant Documents,
Appendix G.12 in October 2003. 
Final Analysis Phase 
The SLSD director worked to expand this initial
CSWG-CAIB report, to have a much more complete
analysis that was needed to enable NASA to determine
ways to build better spacecraft to mitigate crew risks
in the event of a vehicle accident. After its funding
was established, the CSWG became the Spacecraft
Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team (SCSIIT),
formed in 2004. The leadership of the SCSIIT
consisted of project manager Greg Hite, who chaired
the team, astronaut Pam Melroy, who served as
cochair and was involved with operations and vehicle
components, and Craig Fischer, MD, SLSD pathologist,
who was involved with medical forensics. Robert
Banks, MD, and his team from Biodynamic Research
Corp., in San Antonio, Texas, provided the major
contribution to the SCSIIT report. The task list for the
SCSIIT was the following: 
1.		 Review the CAIB reports. 
2.		 Establish subject expert working groups to locate 
and analyze all data related to the Challenger and 
Columbia mishaps. 
3.		 Reconstruct the breakup sequence of the Columbia 
forward fuselage/crew module complex. 
4.		 Establish a comprehensive archive for manned 
spacecraft accidents, involving both data and 
artifacts, for all mishaps both foreign and domestic. 
5.		 Determine the atmospheric pressure, thermal 
environment, and acceleration forces that 
the Columbia and Challenger crews experienced. 
6.		 Determine the cause of death of the Columbia crew. 
7.		 Develop lessons learned for application to future 
spacecraft designs. 
8.		 Develop lessons learned for application to future 
mishap investigations. 
9.		 Educate managers, engineers, and physicians 
who support manned space flight (government and 
civilian) about mishap survival. 
10. Periodically review and assess manned space 
flight projects to make sure that survival goals 
are addressed. 
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Crew Team and Consultants for Spacecraft Crew Survival 
Integrated Investigations Team (SCSIIT) 
Crew Team Crew Team Consultants 
NASA Johnson Space Center 
Jeffrey R. Davis, MD, MS 
Craig L. Fischer, MD 
Sara Margerum, MS 
National Space Biomedical Research Institute 
Jonathan B. Clark, MD, MPH 
College of Engineering and School of Medicine,
Stanford University 
Gregory Kovacs, MD, PhD 
Armed Forces Institute of Pathology,
Rockville, Maryland 
Glen Sandberg, MD 
Science Applications International Corporation,
Houston, Texas 
Dennis Pate, MS 
Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner 
(OAFME) 
Craig Mallak, MD 
James Caruso, MD 
Scott Kornman, MD 
Jerry Hodge, MD 
Elizabeth Rouse, MD 
William Ramirez, PhD 
Bob Veasey 
Forensic Toxicology Laboratory, OAFME 
Eric Shimomura, PhD 
Barry Levine, PhD 
Scientific Laboratories, AFIP, Rockville, Maryland 
José Centeno, PhD 
Linda Murakata, MD 
Florabel Mullick, MD 
Chemistry Unit, FBI, Washington, DC 
Mark LeBeau, MS 
Biodynamic Research Corp., San Antonio, Texas 
Robert Banks, MD 
Richard Harding, PhD 
Harry Smith, PhD, MD
Boeing Corp., Huntington Beach, California 
Duke Tran 
Forensic aviation medical consultants 
Robert McMeekin, MD, JD 
Charles Stahl, MD 
Charles Rheule, MD 
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To accomplish these assigned tasks, the SCSIIT was
organized into the following discipline teams: crew,
crew operations, crew equipment, crew module,
vehicle, video analysis, and concept evaluation
laboratory. Each team was given specific tasks to
accomplish. For example, the specific tasks of the crew
team were to determine the following:
1. During the mishap, what was the crew 
situational awareness? 
2. What actions if any did the crew take? 
3. How did the crew equipment perform? 
4. What was the cause of death? 
The medical portion of the SCSIIT report contained
substantially more technical data than are normally
found in an aviation mishap report. The SCSIIT
report not only concentrated on crew event
awareness and crew actions and response to events,
but also on the sequence of crew exposures that led
to the potential lethal events. The SCSIIT collected
the objective data that included forensic medical
findings, onboard recorded data, telemetry, ground-
based and recovered video data, air-to-ground
communications, and data from examination of
debris and materials testing. Analysis also involved
derived data from ballistics, thermal analysis,
aerodynamic analysis, shock-wave interactions, flail
modeling, thermal injury mapping, simulations,
structure analysis, and systems analysis.
The SCSIIT’s reported goal was to identify
problems to aid current and future spacecraft
designers in developing safer vehicles and systems
and aid in the development of a medical protocol for
investigating spacecraft accidents. NASA published
the final SCSIIT report in December 2008 for a
target audience that included NASA administration,
personnel involved in spacecraft design, NASA
flight crews, NASA spacecraft operations personnel,
space medicine physicians, spacecraft accident
investigators, researchers, commercial space flight
operators, spacecraft safety professionals, aerospace
academics, and members of the US Congress and
the general public. 
Summary and Lessons Learned 
The Columbia accident investigation required
preparation and coordination of operations at the
directorate level across many technical disciplines of 
the SLSD, and required effective work with many
teams at NASA, the CAIB, and state and federal
agencies. The initial key to success was having a
contingency action plan that enabled the deployment
of a rapid-response team for search, rescue, recovery,
and identification of crewmembers, a team that had
the appropriate personnel trained in these operations.
Equally important was the provision of psychological
support to family members.
Communications in real time with the multiple medical 
organizations from local, state, and federal agencies 
to define responsibilities and goals produced a team 
effort in accomplishing the recovery and identification 
of the crew. Contingency mishap planning requires 
negotiations with these organizations to produce a clear 
agreement on roles and responsibilities that results in 
a written memorandum of understanding. Any future 
mishap will require the work of a multidisciplinary team 
to provide a thorough forensic investigation that should 
enhance crew safety for future spacecraft missions. 
The SLSD team served professionally in all phases 
of the mishap and believes that its contributions will 
provide the spacecraft requirements and personnel 
training necessary for future generations that participate 
in human space flight. 
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Kennedy Space Center 
Operations – Commitment to
Safety and Preparedness 
Philip J. Scarpa 
The Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) is one of the largest buildings in the world. It was originally built for assembly of Apollo/Saturn vehicles and 
was later modified to support Space Shuttle operations. High Bays 1 and 3 were used for integration and stacking of the complete Space Shuttle 
vehicle. High Bay 2 was used for external tank (ET) checkout and storage and as a contingency storage area for orbiters. High Bay 4 was also 
used for ET checkout and storage, as well as for payload canister operations and solid rocket booster contingency handling. 
Kennedy Space Center (KSC), located on the central
east coast of Florida, hosted all the Space Shuttle
launches and a very high percentage of the landings.
Launch and landing support teams at KSC were
well aware of the potential for aeromedical
contingencies during a Shuttle mission. For this
reason, they implemented procedures for safe
launches and landings, and prepared and practiced
for medical contingencies. However, on the morning
of February 1, 2003, no one was thoroughly prepared
for what was to come. KSC responded immediately
and became a part of the major recovery of Columbia
and consequential analysis of the Columbia debris.
This chapter describes what KSC personnel did and
what they learned about this accident.
Description of KSC Medical Support for 
Space Shuttle Launches and Landings 
Initially the future site of KSC was near a US military 
base, the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, known for 
its remoteness, minimal inhabitation, security, year-
round summer weather, accessibility by waterways, 
proximity to the Earth’s equator, and access to a chain 
of Caribbean islands that provided for a network of 
downrange monitoring stations over the ocean. KSC 
developed, next to this base, into a large complex for 
space flight launches and landings along with a large 
surrounding community of cities and tourist attractions. 
A medical emergency could occur at any phase of a Space
Shuttle mission, including on the launch pad, during
launch, on orbit, reentry, or during landing. Potential
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sources of injuries included burns, blasts, toxic exposures,
deceleration, impact, hypoxia, and hypothermia. For
this reason, every launch and landing of the Shuttle
was monitored closely by mobile triage forces staged
throughout the space center, ready to respond to any
potential Shuttle emergency. These triage forces included
dedicated fire and rescue responders, environmental
health teams, medical personnel (including physicians,
nurses, and paramedics), logistics and transport, along
with communication personnel. At their disposal were
fire decontamination trucks, a supply van, ambulances,
helicopters, an all-terrain vehicle, Hagglunds BV 206
Bearcat, and several M-113 armored personnel carriers
used for hazardous escape. US Department of Defense
physicians, Patrick Air Force Base (AFB) paramedic
jumpers, helicopters, as well as crew surgeon(s) from
Johnson Space Center (JSC), and community medical
personnel further augmented the triage forces. Medical
personnel and equipment were also staged at the KSC
clinic, biomedical offices, Shuttle Landing Facility (the
KSC runway, known as the “SLF”), Environmental
Health Facility, KSC fire stations, and logistically
throughout the space center for visitor support.
Medical personnel staged in the biomedical offices 
served as liaisons to area support hospitals, supported 
the astronaut crew quarters, and provided preflight 
and postflight medical examinations and experiment 
data collection. All of these forces were directed by 
the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Coordinator, 
located in the KSC firing room of the Launch Control 
Center and assisted by a biomedical engineer. During 
launches, the JSC deputy crew surgeon coordinated 
closely with this team. 
Mission preparation of all aspects of the KSC EMS 
plan began months in advance with hospital readiness 
checks, distribution of completed astronaut physical 
examinations, participation in medical operations 
readiness reviews, a medical and equipment briefing to 
physicians and paramedic jumpers, and preparation of 
a personnel coverage schedule for all EMS positions 
during all scheduled launch, landing, and mission days. 
During normal launches, triage forces were positioned 
by the EMS Coordinator in a strategic location for 
maximum geographic coverage response. Crew 
surgeons and KSC medical personnel provided any 
needed medical assistance for the crewmembers at the 
astronaut quarters during quarantine, which began about 
3 to 4 days before launch, through crew examinations 
on launch day. On launch day, medical monitoring 
began at the time the astronauts were instrumented 
in crew quarters before they donned their spacesuits, 
and monitoring continued during all activities on the 
launch pad and normal launch phases. If the launch was 
canceled, the EMS forces would monitor crewmembers 
until they returned to the crew quarters. 
During landing operations, EMS forces would again
perform a readiness check of all planned medical
components before landing day. A few hours before a
scheduled landing, triage forces would be strategically
placed around KSC to provide coverage concentrated
at the Shuttle landing runway. KSC medical personnel
would be located in the Crew Transport Vehicle with the
crew surgeons, in a convoy on the runway, to provide
additional support for returning astronauts.
Upon landing normally, the crew would egress from 
the Shuttle crew compartment into the Crew Transport 
Vehicle or down the Shuttle stairs. Most crewmembers 
chose to then perform an inspection walk around the 
orbiter while it was positioned on the runway. After this 
brief excursion, the crew would be transported by the 
Crew Transport Vehicle or the astronaut van to the KSC 
astronaut quarters. Triage forces deployed for landing 
were released only when astronauts were safely 
returned to quarters. At this time, returning astronauts 
were able to visit briefly with their families and then 
were directed through the Baseline Data Collection 
Facility to undergo postflight medical examination and 
procedures required for flight experiments. The crew 
would complete their examinations within a few hours 
of landing and, after a brief press conference, would 
spend the rest of the day with their families offsite or in 
crew quarters. Generally, crewmembers returned to JSC 
in Houston the day after landing. 
Emergency Planning 
For any Shuttle emergency, KSC EMS forces were 
trained to respond with four essential elements: mode 
declaration, rescue, triage, and medical evacuation. The 
first element, mode declaration, identified the nature 
and location of the emergency and initiated a particular 
response. For Space Shuttle operations there were 
eight predetermined modes: four for launch and four 
for landing. The four launch modes consisted of those 
that could occur during prelaunch contingencies on the 
launch pad. The four landing modes could occur during 
any landing contingency or even during postlaunch 
contingencies such as launch aborts, return to launch 
sites, abort after one complete orbit around the Earth, or 
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bailouts over the ocean. Launch or landing emergency 
modes were ranked from low numbers to high numbers 
by the difficulty of egress and rescue execution and by 
the potential number of victims involved. 
Rescues included the egress of any victims and their
transportation to the triage forces, emergency teams
located closest to and upwind of the Shuttle contingency.
Egress could be assisted by fellow non-injured
crewmembers, the Shuttle closeout crew, and fire and
rescue personnel. Transportation could be provided
by launch pad egress systems, ground vehicles, or
helicopters. Transportation by helicopter could also
bypass triage forces and deliver victims directly to a
hospital if this was determined to be the best option for 
the victim. In the case of a medical contingency, the 
medical response plan called for triage forces in the field 
to receive and evaluate the victim, decontaminate any 
victim exposed to potential toxins, and provide initial 
medical stabilization and treatment. Medical evacuation 
could be provided, if needed, by ground or helicopter to 
local area hospitals or to the KSC onsite medical clinic 
as determined by the Triage Officer at the triage site and 
the EMS Coordinator at the launch control center. 
Final disposition of any victim would be influenced 
by multiple factors, including the specific injuries 
sustained, the urgency of the medical case, accessible 
transportation, and resources available. Flight crew and 
non-flight crew fatalities would be managed by the KSC 
Medical Code Zero Plan, completed in 1999 with the 
cooperation and assistance of the DOD Department of 
Mortuary Affairs and the DOD Armed Forces Institute 
of Pathology. Psychological care was available on site 
and could be provided as needed for victims, families, 
and KSC employees through trained Critical Incident 
Stress Debriefing (CISD) employee assistance program 
(EAP) counselors. 
KSC Mishap Response: Support on 
Landing Day 
The Plan 
The day before STS-107 was to land, the KSC medical
team rehearsed and choreographed normal Shuttle egress
procedures and medical personnel coverage for postflight
experiments scheduled in both the crew transport vehicle
and in the Baseline Data Collection Facility. STS-107
was a dedicated science mission, and as such it had
multiple experiments on board and an exceptionally
full postflight experiment data collection schedule.
Special considerations were discussed with the primary
investigators: for example, four crewmembers required
recumbent positioning for appropriate data collection
after landing. These special needs were incorporated
into a meticulously planned medical schedule for
the returning crew. The scheduled landing was on a
weekend; as a result, only essential medical personnel
would have been scheduled to be on site at the time of
the landing. However, because of the busy post-landing
test schedule and the large number of experiments on
board this particular flight, several additional medical
personnel were on site and available for the landing.
In retrospect, this simple coincidence was particularly
fortuitous, as each of these medical personnel became
essential for the ensuing mishap support. 
NASA mission managers were aware of the vehicular 
debris strike during the launch phase of Columbia’s 
flight. This debris strike had been discussed a few days 
before the scheduled landing and it was ultimately 
determined not to be a significant issue to the mission; 
as a result, landing preparations were normal. On the 
day of landing, KSC medical forces took position on site 
about 90 minutes before landing. According to standard 
practice, all support hospitals were contacted and 
confirmed ready, and EMS forces took their positions to 
await Columbia’s return. 
The Response
At 8:59 CST on the morning of February 1, 2003, loss
of signal occurred and no further communications
were received from Columbia. Within moments,
a contingency was declared and KSC initiated
emergency operation procedures. Medical personnel
immediately began readying medical kits for rapid
response by mishap investigation teams that might
be needed for deployment. As information began to
reach personnel at KSC, it became clear that there
was no local crash scene at which medical responses
would be concentrated, and the immediate primary
concern became refocused on the astronaut families
and KSC employees. At this time, KSC activated
the psychological triage support plan. This plan was
relatively new, identified as a need during the STS-
95 mission in 1998. The plan covered the delivery of
psychological support after contingencies to astronauts
and their families and friends, as well as to employees,
visitors, and witnesses. It called for the establishment of
a Psychological Triage Officer to provide CISD within
72 hours of an incident, and to provide additional CISD
if needed in the case of a larger disaster. 
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As soon as KSC knew that a mishap had occurred, 
medical personnel assisted in the relocation of the 
astronauts’ immediate families from the landing site to 
the crew quarters as well as the simultaneous relocation 
of the astronauts’ extended families and friends to 
the KSC training auditorium. KSC medical staff also 
provided medical treatment for the families and friends 
as needed. By the early afternoon, KSC staff escorted 
the families in ground vehicles to air transport at the 
nearby Cape Canaveral Air Force Station for return 
to their homes in Houston. CISD was made available 
by EAP personnel for families, friends, and all KSC 
employees within 24 hours of the accident. 
Recovery Efforts and Occupational 
Medicine, Environmental and 
Medical Support 
Recovery field operations began within hours of the 
loss of the orbiter. A rapid response team of about 40 
personnel, many from KSC, went to Barksdale AFB 
in Shreveport, Louisiana, to begin debris search and 
recovery efforts. At the peak of the recovery effort, a 
total of about 25,000 recovery personnel, including 
1,000 KSC employees, participated at several debris 
recovery sites. The debris search lasted 3 months and 
was, to date, the largest organized recovery effort, 
in terms of both geographic area and number of 
participants, ever conducted in the world. 
The KSC medical team had immediate concerns about
adequate and coordinated occupational medicine,
environmental health, and medical services for the
recovery teams, considering the tremendous number
of recovery team members and numerous potential
hazards of this operation. There were no physicians
or environmental health specialists in the initial
response team, and medical capabilities were minimal
at best. Work conditions for the recovery teams were
not optimal, often including physically demanding
outdoor conditions of rough terrain and inclement
weather. Team members labored for prolonged work
days (typically 12 to 16 hours) over several weeks
and months, without interruption for rest or diversion.
In addition, there was a reasonable degree of concern
about toxic exposure and injury from debris discovery
and handling. As is typical for such extreme operations,
the urgency in dispatching personnel to the field sites
dictated that few to no medical screening exams were
performed before deployment, raising concerns about
the physical capabilities of those sent to the sites.
Columbia recovery personnel working in central East Texas. Work 
conditions were a concern. 
KSC medical personnel worked with JSC counterparts, 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the 
Environmental Protection Agency, and the Texas 
A&M Forest Service to deliver adequate occupational 
medicine and environmental health services. Policies 
and procedures were written for the recognition and 
handling of materials discovered in the field, with 
associated levels of personal protective equipment. 
NASA provided a hazard operations briefing tailored to 
the recovery activity for KSC employees before they left 
KSC, then again in the field. Eventually, sufficient work 
rotations and change-outs occurred to limit excessive 
work times and chronic fatigue. Although medical 
screening and certification were not performed before 
deployment of personnel in the recovery effort, NASA
team members completed a self-administered medical 
screening questionnaire. The plan for EMS services was 
limited but sufficient. It called for first-aid kits or a visit 
to the Barksdale AFB Medical Clinic for minor injuries, 
and reporting to the local 9-1-1 EMS provider or to one 
of the local hospitals for major illnesses and injuries. 
During the recovery operations, two major incidents
occurred. In the first, a KSC employee lost consciousness
and was sent to the local hospital for a cardiac
evaluation. His evaluation was ultimately negative,
but he was placed on limited duty in the Barksdale
AFB hangar and subsequently returned to Florida for
rest and recovery. The second incident involved two
KSC employees and one Texas A&M Forest Service
worker who were seriously injured in a helicopter crash
that killed two other Forest Service workers. The two
injured KSC employees had chest injuries with resultant
pneumothorax (punctured lung), and shoulder and pelvic
trauma. A local hospital provided treatment to the injured
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personnel and after several days they were stable enough
to return home to Florida in a fully pressurized medical
evacuation aircraft.
KSC and JSC EAPs provided psychological counseling,
but some recovery personnel reported that if they had
any sadness or depression, the search and recovery
work seemed actually “therapeutic.” Many reported
that what happened to the vehicle and crew did not
seem to truly become real for them until they returned
home and had time to reflect, indicating that significant
compartmentalization of the grieving process occurred
during recovery operations.
Columbia Reconstruction:
Overview of Scope and Process in 
Reconstruction Hangar
Soon after the first recovery teams arrived at the debris
field, they began locating orbiter debris. These teams
recorded the coordinates and sent the decontaminated
debris to a local field center for collection. Debris
was then sent to Barksdale AFB for cataloging and
preparation to send it to the NASA collection and
reconstruction site, and it was subsequently shipped by
truck to KSC. The first shipment from Barksdale AFB to
KSC arrived on February 12, 2003.
The Reusable Launch Vehicle Hangar, located just off
the Shuttle landing runway, was relatively new and
unoccupied at the time of the mishap. As a result, KSC
designated it as the primary collection and reconstruction
site of the Columbia accident investigation. KSC
organized and prepared the Columbia Reconstruction
Hangar, as it was renamed, for use by February 7, 2003.
Columbia Reconstruction Hangar at the NASA Kennedy Space 
Center, Florida. 
Handling the Debris from the Orbiter 
Each truck carrying items from Barksdale AFB stopped 

in front of the Columbia Reconstruction Hangar for 

removal of the items, with monitoring for toxic off-

gassing. Then employees brought these items inside 

the hangar for careful cataloging, with photography, 

barcoding, categorization, and identification. Next the 

items were analyzed and ultimately placed on organized 

shelves for storage, or on the floor grid, on a wing-tile 

grid table, or in a mockup wing display.
	
Crew effects and cabin debris were handled and
	
assessed separately from the rest of the vehicle to better
	
understand the accident’s effects on the cabin and crew.
	
The crew cabin work analysis was performed in a secure,
	
walled-off corner of the hangar to maintain privacy.
	
NASA evaluated the payload items for potential science
	
return. KSC had strict hangar security access with item
	
tracking and release procedures in place.
	
A total of 150 individuals worked in the reconstruction 

hangar, 2 shifts per day, 6 days per week. In total, 

27 truckloads of debris items were delivered from 

February 12 to May 6, 2003. Ultimately 83,013 

items and 84,900 pounds (39% of the vehicle) were 

received, cataloged, and analyzed. The KSC staff laid 

out about 2,800 pieces on the hangar floor grid during 

reconstruction phases of the analysis. 

Medical Involvement: Screening for 
Human Remains 
Remains from all seven crewmembers were recovered
in the field and shipped to the Armed Forces Institute
of Pathology (AFIP) for post mortem analysis.
However, some of the crew remains were never
recovered. For this reason it was thought prudent
to inspect any debris in the field or delivered to the
reconstruction hangar for evidence of human remains
and, if any suspected human remains were present,
to send such items to AFIP for analysis. NASA
instituted a system with designated points of contact
and a logic flow diagram for handling and disposition
of these items. In the field, NASA instructed local
law enforcement agents to ship all suspected items
directly to AFIP. On request, the KSC Medical Office
provided written guidance to the recovery teams on
handling biological specimens in the field. At the
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Inside the Columbia Reconstruction Hangar. Clockwise from top: debris floor grid, wing tile grid table, mockup wing display. 
reconstruction hangar, for any item in question the remains, in which case the delivery to AFIP was
KSC medical officer, Dr. Philip Scarpa, or his designee performed by astronaut escort. Guidance for evaluation
assessed and evaluated it, especially for evidence of of the biological and human remains was provided by
potential human remains and, if such evidence was NASA JSC, the Federal Aviation Administration, the
apparent, sent it to AFIP. Biological items not obviously National Transportation Safety Board, and AFIP. All
of human origin or belonging to the scientific payload, packing and shipping followed AFIP recommendations
but possibly from the Shuttle, were also sent to AFIP. and each shipment was coordinated with the US Air
The team sent these items to AFIP by Federal Express Force Department of Mortuary Affairs.
next-day shipping unless the item was obvious human
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Initially, the field recovery team
sent the debris of biological
interest that was recovered in
the field, mostly from payload
experiments, to JSC for storage.
Through the course of the recovery
activities, the decision was made
that this debris, as well as any
future debris, should be sent to the
reconstruction effort at KSC. JSC
shipped two debris containers to
KSC for disposition and analysis.
A designated team inspected all
incoming debris of biological
interest as it arrived at the hangar
from the shipping trucks. This
team enabled the expedited sorting
and hazard evaluation of material
from a biological standpoint. The
team consisted of a KSC physician
and personnel from the Astronaut
Office, Vehicle Integration Test
Team Office, Payloads Office, and
KSC Environmental Health.
KSC received a total of 370 items
that were evaluated for potential
biological interest or concern for
potential human remains. Of the 370,
KSC sent 15 items in 6 shipments
(1 by astronaut escort) to AFIP for
further analysis over an 8-week
period, but none of the samples
tested positive for human remains.
KSC received the final truckload
of debris from Barksdale AFB on
May 6, 2003, and it contained no
items of biological interest.
Protection of Hangar Personnel 
Several occupational medicine and environmental
health concerns for the personnel in the reconstruction
hangar required specific attention. These included
adequate lighting, indoor air quality, toxic exposure,
friable debris, fiber inhalation, sharp edges, lifting
concerns, and impact trauma. KSC implemented hangar
personal protective equipment (PPE) policies for
prevention of hazards associated with these concerns.
KSC used a team approach to meet and inspect all incoming debris of biological interest 
entering the Columbia Reconstruction Hangar. 
Hangar personnel wearing personal protective equipment. 
As in the recovery effort, the potential for hangar
personnel to be emotionally affected by handling of the
debris was great. The KSC clinic offered counseling to
them as requested.
Early in the reconstruction, hangar personnel were
concerned with two biomedical issues: exposure to
blood-borne pathogens and discovery of unexpected
human remains. KSC medical management quickly
and adequately provided blood-borne pathogen
and PPE training, and implemented procedures for
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Unlike the Challenger accident debris, the Columbia debris is accessible for investigation and research. 
screening all items of biological interest that entered
the reconstruction hangar. The screening protocol
proved very useful because first, it allowed the control
of all toxic or biohazardous materials entering the
hangar, limiting unnecessary biohazardous handling.
Similarly, the protocol provided a point at which all
debris could be screened for any potential human
remains overlooked in the field. Screening aided
in the reconstruction efforts by providing proper
categorization of items, particularly by providing
the opportunity to isolate crew cabin items from the
main flow of debris recovery and reconstruction. The
screening protocol also allowed the recovery of payload
experiment items for their potential science yield. 
Long-Term Recovery Efforts 
With the conclusion of the recovery efforts and
the last major shipments of debris to the Columbia
Reconstruction Hangar in May of 2003, NASA
management established a long-term plan to respond
to the occasional small shipments received, usually
from local residents who might find an unidentified
item within the debris field. At first, KSC received
about one or two items per week, but that quickly
tapered off, and the last known items were received
in November of 2005. After the hangar operations
concluded, the KSC Medical Office maintained the
capability to evaluate and ship to AFIP any received
items that it deemed necessary.
The debris from the Challenger accident in 1986 is 
buried and inaccessible, but NASA decided to honor 
the Columbia astronauts by allowing the Columbia 
debris to be readily accessible for investigation and 
research. In October of 2003, NASA put into effect a 
plan for long-term storage, designating secure facilities 
within the KSC Vehicle Assembly Building for the 
storage and management of recovered items. Columbia 
items may be loaned to scientific, research, academic, 
and government entities with an approved justification 
for use. Scientific studies of the debris have benefited 
NASA’s remaining Shuttle fleet operations and the 
design of future spacecraft. 
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Columbia Memorial Service at the KSC Shuttle Landing Facility, February 7, 2003. This is the site where Columbia was to land. 
Memorials 
In a tribute to both the crew and the vehicle that so 
many KSC employees loved and maintained over their 
careers, KSC conducted a memorial service at the 
Shuttle Landing Facility on February 7, 2003. There, 
with the powerful symbolism of the Shuttle’s landing 
runway, the memorial allowed NASA employees to 
mourn collectively. 
In honor of the recovery and reconstruction efforts 
and before its closing, employees and their families 
were invited by NASA to walk through the Columbia 
Reconstruction Hangar in July 2003 and personally 
witness the debris and the reconstruction efforts. 
Medical first aid and private counseling were available 
on site as needed. About 11,000 persons passed through 
the hangar during the 1-week period in a solemn 
demonstration of respect. 
Lessons Learned 
Immediately after the mishap, it became clear that 
communications were compromised because of the 
demands of multiple simultaneous inquires and a 
saturation of critical phone lines and cell phone service. 
As a result, NASA established dedicated lines of 
communication for use only by medical personnel and 
included communication priorities, with the flow of 
information limited to a need-to-know basis. Dedicated 
cell service in the aftermath of disaster is difficult to 
achieve, but cordless communication at KSC has since 
been instituted in an effort to provide increased mobility 
and privacy in the event of another contingency. 
After the loss of signal from Columbia, those at KSC
had limited situational awareness of the event, and
their initial information about the event was sought
only from NASA data feeds and communications.
Awareness improved when commercial news services
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made available reports of the mishap that were
streaming in from civilian witnesses in the field.
Non-NASA information resources are now available
on site for NASA personnel, even in the Launch
Control Room and other restricted operational sites.
These resources include regularly updated television
news feeds, Internet, social media, and other channels
of communication.
Though KSC carefully prepared and practiced
emergency response plans, a real contingency event
added layers of complexity and unanticipated stress
that is difficult to recreate in training scenarios. Many
parts of the response plan that are most often practiced,
such as the mode, rescue, and medical evacuation
procedures, did not apply to the Columbia scenario at
hand. Therefore, several elements of the KSC EMS
operating procedures, though they had been practiced,
did not need to be executed. Instead, the emotional and
mental health of the astronaut families and KSC visitors
became the highest priority, yet only a few medical care
providers (EAP personnel) were on site and prepared to
support such psychological stress.
Extra personnel would have been reassigned from
existing staff already on site, but this option was limited
because of the reduced weekend staffing at the time of
the scheduled landing. It was great good fortune that
extra medical personnel were present on site preparing to
support the busy post-landing experiment data collection
process; these individuals immediately made themselves
available for assistance where needed, and it was only
with their efforts that it was possible to fully cover the
level of medical support needed after the mishap.
In retrospect, it has become clear that multiple
alternative contingency possibilities must be
considered, with careful planning and incorporation
of all potential scenarios into training and medical
planning. Further, it is crucial to anticipate and plan for
the need of more support than is generally available
in normal scenarios. The KSC Medical Office has
subsequently added both non-emergent medical
care and the disposition of crewmembers with non-
survivable injuries to all training and exercise scenarios.
The Medical Office has also strengthened its on site
and on-call personnel lists during off-hour and weekend
mission support. As the provision of psychological
counseling was of utmost importance, and was one of
the most limited aspects of the contingency response
due to a lack of available personnel, all KSC medical
care personnel are now provided with CISD training.
In addition, JSC Medical Operations now provides
behavioral health specialists to accompany astronaut
families for every NASA astronaut launch and landing.
Finally, although agreements, plans, and procedures
regarding flight crew fatalities occurring at KSC
were in place several years before the accident, after
the accident further technical exchanges with the
DOD Department of Mortuary Affairs and the DOD
AFIP substantially improved KSC’s preparations for
responding to an astronaut fatality.
Recovery Support and Reconstruction 
Lessons Learned 
The massive recovery effort after the Columbia
accident quickly placed large amounts of personnel
and assets into the field with limited planning for
safety and health. Unfortunately, illnesses, injuries,
and fatal accidents occurred during the recovery
operations. In an ideal world, responders should never
become victims, and support responses should always
emphasize safety and health with careful planning and
coordination. Adequate emergency medical services,
occupational medicine, environmental health, medical
screening, pre-deployment and in-field training, post-
recovery debriefing, and return-to-work examination
and counseling should be made available for all remote
assignments or assignments with limited support and
exceptional work demands. Routine post-recovery
debriefings and return-to-work fitness examinations
were not instituted for the Columbia search and
recovery effort but might have benefited returning
recovery workers. This should be considered for any
future operation of this kind.
Infrastructure (policies, plans, and procedures) for safe 
operations in the reconstruction hangar did not exist 
before the accident and was created during the mishap 
response. Hangar personnel had significant concerns 
about biological exposures; this had an impact on 
initial reconstruction operations. KSC immediately put 
training and safety measures for potential exposure to 
blood-borne pathogens into place for all screening of 
biological items. This both reduced concerns and aided 
medical personnel in identifying biological material 
coming into and existing in the reconstruction hangar. 
64 SECTION 2 – THE RESPONSE
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conducting several separate assessments of the
same biological item became cumbersome and
inefficient; as a result, a team approach was used
whenever potential biological material arrived at the
reconstruction hangar. The team consisted of a KSC
physician and representatives from the Astronaut
Office, Vehicle Integration Test Team (VITT) Office,
Payloads Office, and KSC Environmental Health
Department. Representatives of the Astronaut Office
and VITT Office determined whether any crew
cabin or crew items were present, and the Payloads
Office representative identified the payload items.
The physician determined whether the material was
biological, belonging to Shuttle components, and
whether suspected human remains were present. The
environmental health specialist assessed the potential
for toxic exposure from the items. Many payload
items were identified at this time, allowing recovery of
useful science. For example, in one instance a payload
experiment involving live worms was recovered intact.
To improve the likelihood of receiving biological
material sent from the field, NASA provided training
for field personnel to recognize such items and KSC
medical personnel pre-screened transmitted images
of items sent from the field. Despite plans being
in place, new issues would sometimes arise that
required innovative solutions. It was realized that
biomedical support needed to stay flexible, and be
continually learning and adapting to provide the best
support possible. Biomedical support was a process in
continual evolution. 
The recovery and reconstruction activities, like many 
accident investigations, had high visibility and were the 
object of great public interest, both within and outside 
of NASA. The potential existed that hangar operations 
could become distracted or interrupted by the pressures, 
influences, and sensitivities of political, media, or 
societal entities. Simple awareness training provided to 
hangar personnel concerning these potential influences 
could help future operations from being affected by any 
of these social influences. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The KSC medical response to the Space Shuttle 
Columbia accident was multifaceted and tested KSC’s 
capabilities and readiness. In contrast to the commonly 
practiced contingency scenarios, the mishap did not take 
place at KSC, was not lifesaving in nature, and included 
mental health concerns and primary care support to 
astronaut families and site visitors that were not fully 
anticipated. The KSC biomedical support was needed 
for recovery, not rescue. Occupational medicine and 
environmental health support were more important in 
support of this event than providing emergency medical 
services. A need was identified to maintain safety and 
health in all operations that involve NASA employees 
whose work places them in harm’s way. As the center 
with the largest NASA workforce exposed to work-
related hazards, KSC will continue to make such factors 
a primary concern and responsibility. 
KSC employees and their families, whether or not they 
were directly involved in the event, suffered emotionally 
from the loss of the crew and the vehicle. Although the 
needs were outside the scope of the practiced operations, 
the KSC medical community performed admirably by 
providing psychological resources for large numbers 
of people over a prolonged period of time during the 
grieving process. 
Plans and infrastructure must be in place to provide 
biomedical support when it is needed, but it is equally 
important to remain flexible for necessary changes, 
continually learning and adapting to provide the best 
possible support. The lessons learned from this accident 
should never be forgotten; it is now our responsibility 
to apply these lessons to future space flight programs to 
honor and respect the crew and all those who have been 
touched by the loss of Columbia. 
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Crew Medical and Psychological
Support Operations
Smith Johnston and Christopher Flynn 
Collection of flowers, balloons, flags, signs, and other remembrance items placed at the Johnson Space Center sign at the main entrance. 
Background 
At the time of the initial Columbia STS-107 mission 
assignment in July of 2000, the Johnson Space Center 
(JSC) Medical Operations Branch consisted of 15 
certified operational flight surgeons, qualified to act 
as primary care physicians to a mission-assigned crew 
and their family members. These physicians have two 
primary responsibilities. First, they maintain a doctor-
patient relationship with each crewmember, providing 
medical guidance and expertise in both normal training 
and emergency situations. Second, the physicians act as 
medical representatives for Space Shuttle operations. 
This includes both recognizing and resolving medical 
concerns that may have an impact on the mission, 
and also acting as an advocate for their crewmembers 
throughout training and flight. As a result, many crews 
become quite close to their flight surgeons throughout 
the course of their training. For each Shuttle mission, 
a lead crew surgeon and a deputy crew surgeon were 
assigned about 9 months before launch to ensure that 
all the crewmembers were physically and mentally 
prepared for their mission responsibilities. 
The behavioral health and performance group at the
Johnson Space Center (JSC) worked closely with
both the Astronaut Office and the Medical Operations
Branch in 2003. This group included highly trained
psychologists and psychiatrists who were well
integrated with training and flight activities. Even during
normal operations, psychological stress can affect a
crew or their families. The behavioral health team
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The STS-107 crew poses in front of the entry into Space Shuttle Columbia during Terminal 
Countdown Demonstration Test activities on the pad. Kneeling in front are (left to right) Payload 
Specialist Ilan Ramon (the first Israeli astronaut), Pilot William “Willie” McCool and Mission Specialist 
David Brown. Standing in back are (left to right) Payload Commander Michael Anderson, Mission 
Specialist Kalpana Chawla, Commander Rick Husband and Mission Specialist Laurel Clark. 
offers crewmembers emotional
preparation and support for
handling their mission. The team
also becomes a valuable asset
for family members as they learn
to cope with both the stress of
the upcoming mission and the
inevitable celebrity and attention
that accompanies flight. 
Medical Operations
for the Columbia 
STS-107 Mission 
The Columbia STS-107 mission 
was unique. It was dedicated 
to research, and crewmembers 
conducted multiple scientific 
experiments and used specialized 
onboard laboratories in the 
SPACEHAB located in the 
payload bay. From a crew 
surgeon’s perspective, the mission 
was particularly challenging 
because crewmembers were 
assigned to it earlier than to most 
other missions. The extended 
time commitment and additional 
training to perform scientific 
experiments was integrated 
into the usual training and 
preparations for the mission. The 
crew flight surgeons acted as 
liaisons between the crew and the 
investigators who had proposed 
and designed the experiments, 
working closely with the mission 
scientists (John Charles and David 
Liskowsky) and the international 
scientific community to ensure 
that experiment and technical 
procedures were appropriately 
addressed in the crewmembers’
training. Crew flight surgeons focused on safety issues 
related to the science and worked to ensure smooth 
communication between the mission control surgeon 
console, the investigators, and mission control directors. 
They facilitated the logistics and interfaced with the 
investigation teams in coordination of timeline planning. 
The STS-107 SPACEHAB Research Double Module
was filled with scientific equipment and experiments.
To fully prepare for the mission, the crew required
intense preflight training and simulation time as
well as multiple trips to the Kennedy Space Center
(KSC) for familiarization with the module and unique
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Shuttle payloads. Of particular interest, multiple life
science experiments, with organisms from bacteria
and mosses to nematodes to rodents, were part of the
flight’s science payload, requiring a sensitive and
humane understanding of experiment procedures as
well as extensive coordination with the scientists
and veterinarians responsible for these payloads.
The crewmembers served as subjects in human
research experiments, which required collection of
data before, during and after flight. Data collection
sessions required practice for the investigators and
participation by the crew flight surgeons. Landing-
day operations for the scientific mission were equally
complicated because of various experiment protocols
that had to be followed. These details were extensively
outlined and coordinated before the mission, and the
crew and investigators participated in simulations
involving facilities, equipment, and support personnel.
Further, post-landing operations required crewmember
participation at the KSC baseline data collection
facility before they returned to their families. This
added a psychological component to the challenges of
the landing timeline. 
Finally, because of the nature and amount of scientific
experimentation, the crew was required to perform
round-the-clock monitoring and activity during
the mission. This necessitated extensive timeline
development, circadian sleep-cycle planning, and
the use of isolated sleep stations to ensure that the
crewmembers could receive enough rest. To coordinate
such an intense research schedule, the crew was
split into two teams, Red and Blue, that would work
opposing shifts to best utilize their time in orbit.
The crew surgeon developed these sleep-shift plans
and worked with the crew, the investigators, and
mission operations teams to ensure optimization of
the mission activities.
Left to right: Mission Specialist Laurel Blair Salton Clark, Commander Rick D. Husband, and Mission Specialist Kalpana ‘KC’ Chawla, all red team 
members, peer out at the world from the comfort of their sleep compartments on orbiter Columbia’s middeck. 
Updated:  May 20, 2002
GRAPHIC:  3/25/13
STS-107 Circadian Adjustment Lighting Schedule
                                                      
                                                         
68 SECTION 2 – THE RESPONSE
                         
                    
Example of STS-107 Circadian Adjustment Lighting Schedule 
Time, 24 hours 
EST 
Sunlight JSC 
Sunlight KSC 
0 1 0 2 0 3 0 4 0 5 0 6 0 7 0 8 0 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 3 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 1 0 2 0 3 0 4 0 5 0 6 0 7 0 8 0 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 3 0 0CST 
L-8 
L-7 
L-6 
L-5 
L-4 
L-3 
L-2 
L-1 
L-0 
FD 2 
FD 3 
FD 4 
FD 5 
FD 6 
FD 7 
FD 8 
FD 9 
FD 10 
FD 11 
FD 12 
FD 13 
FD 14 
FD 15 
FD 16 
FD 17 LANDING - 02/01/03 
Time: 
EST = Eastern Standard Time 
CST = Central Standard Time 
L-1, etc. = Days before launch 
FD = Flight days 
MELATONIN 
(Taken 30 mins. before 
bedtime as sleep aid) 
Red Team Sleep Schedule 
Blue Team Sleep Schedule 
BRIGHT INDOOR LIGHT 
SUNLIGHT 
GOGGLES (or dim light indoors) 
LANDING 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
LAUNCH 
Ti
m
e 
in
 D
ay
s 
LAUNCH - 01/16/03 
On the ground, 24-hour activities required increased 
support, in both personnel numbers and longer hours, 
from physicians and biomedical engineers. The work 
was dynamic and timelines changed daily, and all 
ground teams had to be fully qualified and capable 
to support the medical and scientific experiments on 
orbit. The entire ground support team worked diligently 
to develop many unique mission-specific flight rules 
that were needed for payload hazardous materials, 
SPACEHAB life-support requirements, and contingency 
responses unique to the altered payload configuration. 
Training specific to the medical support team included 
SPACEHAB payload instruction and multiple integrated 
simulations before launch. In particular, medical 
safety was important. Blood draws and training in 
performing blood draws were required for physiological 
experiments. Twenty-four-hour operations required that 
ground teams, as well as the crew, participate in sleep-
shifting to ensure that the crew had constant support 
from mission control. 
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Team Cohesion 
As discussed in previous chapters, the launch of STS-107
was significantly delayed because of Shuttle technical
issues and pressures to complete the International
Space Station. As a result, the crew, the scientists,
the flight control team, all training personnel, and the
crew surgeons had worked and trained together for
nearly 3 years by the time of the launch. Commander
Husband had set a tone of constant team cohesion and
camaraderie, both during work and after. Crew spouses
interacted daily, including setting up biking and camping
trips, and crewmembers and their families shared
holidays and other social gatherings with family, friends,
and their Casualty Assistance Calls Officers (CACOs)
and crew flight surgeons. Many of the crewmembers’
children were of similar ages and became playmates and
good friends. The multifaceted backgrounds and diverse
cultures of the families seemed to complement each
other, and the crewmembers and their families became
extremely close as a result. 
Casualty Assistance Calls Officer (CACO) 
The CACOs are members of the NASA astronaut 
corps and are charged to render assistance 
needed to settle the personal affairs of a 
deceased astronaut or to support a seriously ill or 
seriously injured astronaut. Their duties include 
assisting the family and next of kin in making 
all necessary decisions to deal with a fatality. 
This includes making arrangements for handling 
the remains, making funeral arrangements, 
collecting death gratuities, filing for benefits and 
entitlements, and sorting out other day-to-day 
and personal affairs during the period immediately 
after the death. 
The integration of the medical team into this social
circle occurred naturally. The flight surgeons and
physicians were often included in after-work activities
Crew during their preflight training at the National Outdoor Leadership School. First row, left to right: William McCool, Ilan Ramon, Laurel Clark, 
Kalpana Chawla; back row, left to right: David Brown, Richard Husband, Michael Anderson. 
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and social events. Some behavioral health and
performance team members worked closely with the
families to prepare them for the mission. Also, two
members of the crew, David Brown and Laurel Clark,
were former Navy flight surgeons themselves with
significant medical training and experience, further
deepening the bond between the crew and their
flight surgeons. Clark’s husband had also been a
Navy flight surgeon and at the time of the mission was
a certified NASA flight surgeon in the JSC Medical
Operations Branch.
Mishap Response 
At the time of the mishap, the crew flight surgeons 
were at KSC waiting with the crew families for the 
return of their loved ones. As the scope of the disaster 
was realized, the mood rapidly shifted from one of joy 
and anticipation to sudden and crushing devastation. 
Crew surgeons were notified of Columbia’s destruction 
and were faced with the responsibility of sharing that 
information with the families. There was a mixture of 
emotions among the clinicians, including tremendous 
loss, dread, and guilt that NASA actions, or the lack 
thereof, may have contributed to the tragedy. 
Even as they tried to process these emotions, the flight
surgeons and the psychological team immediately
began to assess available resources to care for the
families and close friends, many of whom had been
at KSC for the landing. Thankfully, a number of
psychological specialists were also present who
were already known to the families: two operational
psychologists, two operational psychiatrists, and
one child psychiatrist had already become trusted
consultants. Still, providers were forced to try and
balance their own grief with the need to help. They
quickly developed a response strategy based on the
concept that the families could not be abandoned at
the worst time of grief. Though words seemed utterly
inadequate to meet the horror of the losses, the hope
was that the presence of the support team would
provide some measure of comfort and sympathy to the
families to help restore trust and reduce fear. 
Providing Psychological Assistance 
The providers knew that they would not be able to 
answer, technically or existentially, the inevitable 
question of “why.” Technical details were slow to 
arrive, and as they did they often led to more questions, 
as it was simply impossible to comprehend the nature 
of the disaster from the confusing early details of the 
investigation. This amplified the grief and the stress 
of both the flight surgeons and the behavioral health 
providers, but at the same time their role became 
perfectly clear: they would need to find other ways to 
assist the families in their time of suffering. In finding 
other ways, the CACOs were instrumental as each 
had authority to request actions and information from 
NASA, allowing them to become powerful advisors 
for both the families and the medical team. Further, 
each had been chosen individually by the families, and 
as a result they became the most trusted advisors to 
the family members after the accident. They advised 
the behavioral health providers on scheduling visits to 
provide emotional support, ensuring that visits were 
only helpful and never disruptive. The CACOs and 
designated NASA flight surgeons were the liaisons 
between each family’s needs and the organization’s 
response; through them, the medical and psychological 
support teams could act as skilled assets available when 
the families most needed them. 
As the families trusted the flight surgeons and 
psychologists enough to share their grief, the providers 
were determined to be patient, to listen, and to speak 
honestly—not in platitudes. Providers sought out 
indications of how each family member could be best 
helped through the grieving process. Coordination 
with additional community mental health providers 
was established so that families could transition from 
Agency-related care, if desired. Connections to other 
supportive relationships were encouraged, including to 
family members, friends, co-workers, and clergy. The 
support team looked for ways to ensure that there were 
always familiar faces nearby and that no family member 
would ever feel alone when they needed help. 
The constant public and media interest added challenges 
to the grieving process. Providers learned not to allow 
the appearance of a family member “in public” to 
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define how much support he or she might actually 
need “in private.” Occasionally, the support team 
offered medications to ensure sleep and to reduce 
overwhelming anxiety. As time progressed, the children 
in the families expressed their own questions and fears, 
and the clinicians held group and individual meetings 
in response. The support team encouraged a family’s 
verbal communication and physical contact (including 
hugging and holding by parents and trusted adults) as 
the most helpful soothers for children. 
As expected, there were times when a family member’s 
anger would lead that person to distance him- or herself 
from the medical or psychological providers for a time. 
Some families did not request or allow psychological 
support visits after the first few sessions. However, the 
overwhelming sentiment was that simply talking about 
the loss of the crew, with someone who truly understood 
that loss through “living the mission” with them, was 
uniquely helpful after the tragedy. For families who 
were suffering so greatly, providers were aware that 
they could only offer consistent efforts to build a solid 
connection of support that would be trustworthy, honest, 
and thoughtful. 
The timeline of grief is personal, as each grieving
individual searches for meaning to the loss in his or her
life. It is a painful but necessary process, made even
more challenging because it must occur during a very
dark emotional time. It was the goal of the medical
and psychological support team to act as guides and
companions through this process, no matter how long it
might take. Sadly, NASA had experienced this process
previously, after the Challenger disaster, and that tragedy
brought the wisdom to ensure that prolonged care was
available for the families. The grief process for a high-
profile death is unique, as it is staged first by an extreme
reversal of fortune as families in a state of elation over
an event such as a crew’s homecoming suddenly are
faced with disaster and horror. This extreme pendulum
swing of emotion only adds to the anguish. Families are
also regularly reminded of their loss as the world holds
ceremonies and honors anniversaries for the fallen crew.
With this in mind, the support team actively sought to
be available to the families for continued familiar and
trusted counsel during these times. 
Lessons Learned 
The medical and psychological support teams
searched for insight from their mishap response.
First and foremost, a recognition of the depth of the
challenges facing the grieving family was necessary
before providers could truly be helpful. Each member
of the medical team was acutely aware that their
association with NASA could cause them to be less
than welcomed into a family’s grieving process. It
would have been a natural response for families to
direct anger by affiliation and classify any NASA
employee as one of the perpetrators of the disaster
rather than someone offering help. However, all
families graciously accepted the support of the medical
team during the initial days of grieving. 
The precoordination and integration of medical and 
psychological support assets before the mission were 
exceedingly valuable for the response to the disaster. 
It would have been terribly difficult for the families to 
accept help from personnel brought in only after the loss 
of the crew. The trust and friendship built over the years 
of association allowed the flight surgeons, behavioral 
health team members, and CACOs to empathize with 
the loss as well as truly understand how best to support 
the grieving families. 
It became clear that the ability to keep the families
isolated from the press was both necessary and
relieving. Constant media presence is extremely
disruptive to the grieving process, as those in the
spotlight feel the need to suppress emotions and
provide a “public face” to the cameras. At the same
time, media presence can heighten negative emotional
responses such as anger and blame. One of the most
powerful lessons learned by support personnel was
a recognition of the great extent of misinformation
surrounding families and how much it influenced the
families’ grieving and the organization’s responses.
Families became frustrated by the wildly diverse
mishap “facts” (of questionable reliability) that
circulated constantly. The “latest” information
was rarely the most accurate information about the
catastrophe. This created an uncomfortable frustration
between families, who were hungry for any information
about the mishap, and NASA officials, who could
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The Houston Astros honored the crew of Columbia on April 1, 2003, the opening day of the season, by having simultaneous first pitches thrown 
by family and friends of the Columbia crew. 
offer updates only when information was absolutely
confirmed. The most effective way to respond to these
concerns was to establish daily, scheduled CACO
and flight surgeon meetings with the Astronaut Office
leadership. Early on, these meetings became the
primary source of information for the families about
the investigation, providing a source of confirmed
and complete information that could be trusted by the
family members. 
The CACOs were instrumental in providing a direct
line of communication to and from the families.
They acted as a single point of contact, minimizing
miscommunication, and further coordinated with
the search and recovery teams to make sure the
families would receive the best information and that
all questions could be answered. One of the most
difficult aspects of communication was to ensure the
equivalent flow of information to all families. The
CACOs provided a means to this end, preventing
miscommunications that could otherwise have led
to resentment and a breakdown of the relationship
between the family and the support team. 
It was extremely important that the families did not feel 
that those around them were hiding details, including 
mistakes. The more honest and open the support team 
was, the more the family could embrace the team as 
trusted advisors. Mistakes are inevitable, and providers 
took the intentional approach of admitting to all 
mistakes while actively working to solve the problem. 
The families expressed great appreciation for the 
honesty and integrity of the support team providers in 
the wake of the disaster. 
Families should never be made to feel abandoned by
those around them after a loss of this magnitude. The
medical and psychological team recognized this and
continued to provide emotional and psychological
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The Patricia Huffman Smith Museum, Remembering Columbia, 
opened in Hemphill, Texas, in February 2011. In addition to telling the 
story of Columbia, the museum highlights the efforts of local citizens 
during the recovery of Columbia and its crew. 
support even years after the disaster. After such a public
mishap, momentous occasions may reopen emotional
wounds. Memorials, birthdays, anniversaries, and
similar occasions might be recognized as difficult for
the family for years to come. However, these events
also offer them an opportunity to develop closure
and confirm a sense of pride in the fact that their
family members are being honored. Maintaining close
relationships between the providers and the families
has enabled the support process to continue throughout
these emotional challenges. 
The response to the disaster was not perfect. One
of the challenges faced by the providers was the
management of their own grief. In most cases, the
support team compartmentalized their own emotions
to focus instead on caring for the families. Requiring
the support team, including the CACOs, crew flight
surgeons, and even the psychological providers, to
receive some degree of counseling themselves would
have been helpful. As was done for the astronauts
participating in field recovery efforts, establishing
a requirement for psychological decompression
visit(s) would have reduced feelings of inadequacy
or embarrassment for those desiring help. Even those
responsible for helping others grieve must recognize
and accept the need to care for themselves. 
The medical and psychological providers felt a
deep sense of privilege in being allowed to respond
to the needs of the families of the STS-107 crew.
By describing our goals and methods here, it is our
hope that the lessons we learned may someday lessen
the pain felt by others experiencing such devastating
loss. It is important that these lessons are not lost to
history, but that instead we may learn from this
tragedy and the sacrifices made by the STS-107 crew
and their families. 
A monument on Sabine Street in Hemphill, Texas, honors the 
astronauts who perished in the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster. 
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Section 3 – The Investigation
 
Columbia Accident Investigation Board
Medical Operations and
Crew Survivability Working Group 
The Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report:
The Five Potentially Lethal Events and Crew Survivability 
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Columbia Accident Investigation
Board Medical Operations and
Crew Survivability Working Group 
James P. Bagian 
The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB)
appointed advisors to the chair to assist in the focus
and management of the investigations. These advisors
included a chief flight surgeon (CFS) and medical
consultant, James Bagian, MD, former astronaut and
lead medical investigator for the Challenger accident
that occurred in January 1986. This chapter tells the
story of the CFS-led efforts to provide NASA with
insight into crew recovery and identification as well
as the events that led to the crew deaths. Included
are descriptions of the efforts undertaken to ascertain
the impact of different stages of the accident on the
crew module, review of the pertinent engineering
data and information about the crew equipment, and
determination of what equipment or procedures might
have kept the crew alive. These efforts concluded with
the issuance of the CAIB Report Volume V, Appendix
G.12 Crew Survivability Report.
	
Within hours of the STS-107 mishap, hundreds of
	
personnel converged on East Texas and Louisiana to
begin the process of gathering information to assist
in the investigation of the mishap. NASA’s Mishap
Investigation Team (MIT) medical members and the
Barksdale Air Force Base (AFB) medical staff set up a
temporary space to receive crew remains that might be
recovered. Individuals from the Johnson Space Center
(JSC) Medical Operations Branch and the Astronaut
Office arrived at Barksdale AFB the day of the accident,
February 1. On February 2, Philip Stepaniak, MD,
NASA flight surgeon and the medical lead for the MIT,
met with the CFS to discuss aspects of the investigation
related to recovery, initial identification and transfer of
the crewmember remains to the Armed Forces Institute
of Pathology at Dover AFB, Delaware for further
forensic analysis and final disposition. 
Challenges 
As with any large accident investigation, organization 
and communication were challenges, and the 
Columbia accident investigation experienced many 
of these issues. Compared to the Challenger mishap 
investigation, the Columbia investigation went 
more smoothly with respect to providing the ability 
to recover evidence and to develop and implement 
a mature plan of action. Even so, many obstacles 
were encountered related to logistics, organizational 
responsibility and authority, chain of command, 
technical capability required to allow the investigation 
to proceed, and pressure to block the release of the 
final report regarding crew related information (CAIB 
Report, Volume V, Appendix G.12). Overcoming 
these obstacles required a number of actions in order 
for the CAIB to be successful in determining what 
had happened to the crew and in discerning and 
communicating the lessons that could be gleaned from 
the mishap that would support and improve future 
space flight-related activities. 
As in many field operations, communication of 
the various parties with each other was often difficult. 
In addition, even when communication was possible, 
the ability to conduct secure communication, when 
required, was initially non-existent. As a result, it 
was necessary for key personnel involved with the 
recovery of human remains to have face-to-face 
communication with each other to promote the most 
efficient and effective recovery of these materials. 
Because the debris field was very large and the initial 
recovery operations difficult, access to various forms 
of transportation including helicopters was essential 
to facilitate communication, understanding, and 
direction of the operations. 
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Columbia Accident Investigation Board Background 
For mishaps the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration uses the agency contingency action 
plan (CAP) for space operations (SO), which states, 
“in the case of a high-visibility, mission-related 
SO mishap the NASA administrator may activate 
the independent ISS and Space Shuttle Mishap 
Interagency Investigation Boards (the Board). Board 
activation is anticipated for events involving serious 
injury, significant public interest, and other serious 
mishaps. For mishaps that involve loss of crew or 
loss of vehicle, a Commission will be formed.” 
The Commission’s membership consists of 
the following: 
Board Chair − Appointed by the NASA Administrator 
Board Members 
Commander, Naval Safety Center 
Representative, USAF Materiel Command 
USAF Chief of Safety 
Department of Transportation Director, Aviation 
Safety Division 
Federal Aviation Adminstration Office of Accident 
Investigation 
Representative, USAF Space Command 
NASA Field Center Director 
The Board was supported by the following personnel: 
Standing Board Support Personnel 
Ex officio member: NASA Chief Safety and Mission 
Assurance Officer 
Executive Secretary: NASA Chief Engineer 
Contracts and Procurement Specialist to be 
designated by the Assistant Administrator for 
Institutions and Management 
Additional Personnel Support 
The Board may designate consultants, experts, or
other government or nongovernment individuals to
support the Board as necessary. The Department of
Justice Litigation Team provided document control.
In addition, the Board may substitute non-NASA
personnel as Executive Secretary at the discretion
of the Board chair. The Board appointed an
aeromedical advisor to the chair, James P. Bagian,
MD, astronaut retired, who acted as a medical
consultant and chief flight surgeon.
The Board responsibilities are the following: 
1.   	Conduct activities in accordance with the policies 
and procedures adopted by the Board. 
2.   	Schedule Board activities, interim Board reports, 
and submission of the final Board report as the 
Board deems appropriate. 
3.   	Determine the facts, as well as the actual or 
probable causes of the mishap in terms of 
dominant and contributing root causes and 
significant observations and recommend 
preventive and other appropriate actions to 
preclude recurrence of a similar mishap. The 
investigation will not be conducted or used to 
determine questions of culpability, legal liability, 
or disciplinary action. 
4.   	Use the established NASA support structure of 
working groups, NASA field center support, and 
supporting facilities to conduct the investigation, 
as the Board deems appropriate. The Board may 
use non-NASA support as it deems appropriate. 
5.   	Activate the working groups appropriate to 
the mishap. 
6.   	Obtain and analyze whatever facts, evidence, 
and opinions it considers relevant by relying upon 
reports of studies, findings, recommendations, 
and other actions by NASA officials and 
contractors or by conducting inquiries, hearings, 
tests, and other actions the Board deems 
appropriate. In so doing, the Board may take 
testimony and receive statements from witnesses. 
All elements of NASA will cooperate fully with the 
Board and provide any records, data, and other 
administrative or technical support and services 
that may be requested. 
7.   	Impound property, equipment, and records to 
the extent that the Board considers necessary. 
8.   	Release mishap information and mishap 
investigation reports as the Board deems 
appropriate. 
9.   	Develop recommendations for preventive 
and other appropriate actions. A finding may 
warrant one or more recommendations or it 
may stand alone. 
10. Provide a final written report at such time and in 
such manner as the Board deems appropriate 
which upon its completion will be immediately 
released to the public. 
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Initial Operations of Crew Recovery 
Starting almost immediately after the mishap on 
February 1, multiple individuals from the JSC Flight 
Medicine Clinic, as well as others who would later 
officially be part of the CAIB began to assure that 
human remains were collected and brought to the 
temporary morgue facilities at Barksdale AFB. Many of 
the pivotal individuals involved with the location and 
recovery of crew remains were from the astronaut office 
and had personal familiarity with the deceased crew. 
With regard to human remains, the problem in the field
was figuring out where to find the remains. Initially,
NASA did not think that there would be any appreciable
amount of remains that would have survived the
mishap. By the afternoon of the accident the physical
evidence that was immediately recovered demonstrated
that this was absolutely not true. This necessitated steps
being put in place to deal with locating and recovering
crew remains. Close work between the CFS and the
Search and Recovery Team in East Texas at Lufkin
ultimately resulted in a more timely location of the
crew remains than would otherwise have occurred. This
was the result of the CFS having the ability to examine
debris as it arrived at Barksdale AFB, having access
and ability to examine and view recovery operations in
the field, and integrating this information to help predict
where additional crew remains might be located.
These discussions and decisions were guided by actual
physical findings on the ground, not the myriad of
theories proffered by individuals in the field.
The CFS conducted the fact-finding and analytic
activities primarily on February 3rd and 4th. The CFS
reviewed the information regarding where the remains
were recovered and correlated that with other debris
and its location. This analysis generated an evidence-
based plan that was aimed at locating the crew remains
which had not yet been found. Due to the lack of secure
and reliable communication links, the CFS flew to
Lufkin to meet with Search and Recovery Operations
Director (astronaut James Wetherbee, Captain USN), on
February 4. This meeting led to a revision to the plan
for locating the remaining crewmember remains. 
The CFS created and supplied to the Search and
Recovery Operations Director a coded way by which
they could discuss ongoing operations and plans through
the existing non-secure communication links while
maintaining security. This code prevented revealing to
searchers and the public where specific crew remains
were found. The new plan resulted in a more methodical
search based on concrete information rather than poorly
founded conjectures given to the search and recovery
team from well-meaning disparate personnel in the field.
This resulted in the search for crew remains changing
from a “hasty search” to a more rationally based
systematic search. Thus, the Operations Director changed
the search areas from the northwest to the southeast.
Over succeeding days the Operations Director continued
to communicate with the CFS the results of their search
operations and these efforts led to the recovery of the
remains of all crewmembers by February 12. 
CAIB Operations 
In the first few days after the mishap, the CAIB was 
in the process of getting organized, and many of the 
activities that were undertaken by CAIB members 
and others were based on individual initiative rather 
than a well-coordinated and planned response. Despite 
the potential challenges stemming from an ill-defined 
processes and command structure, operations went very 
well, being aided by those involved recognizing the 
need to clearly communicate needs and actions to the 
wide variety of entities involved. 
On the evening of February 5, CAIB operations – 
including the CFS – relocated from Barksdale AFB to 
Houston to have access to facilities and personnel at 
JSC. The CAIB and associated staff set up their work in 
the Regency Park office complex that was just outside of 
the gates to JSC. This location allowed ready access to 
JSC technical experts and information that was needed 
to conduct the investigation. 
On February 6, the CAIB chair was briefed by CFS
about the extent of the crew remains that had been
recovered and how their condition indicated that the crew
were not immediately killed at the time of loss of signal,
as many had incorrectly initially presumed to be the case.
The CAIB chair understood that the nature and condition
of the crew remains recovered indicated that the crew
compartment of Columbia may have stayed intact for
a significant time and that the crew was probably alive
after the time of loss of signal. The condition of the
remains also implied that valuable information might
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 The Columbia Accident Investigation Board 
Left to right: first row, G. Scott Hubbard, James N. Hallock, PhD, Sally T. Ride, PhD, Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr, (retired), Steven B. Wallace, 
John M. Logsdon, PhD, Sheila E. Widnall, PhD. Back row: Roger E. Terault, Major General John L. Barry, Rear Admiral Stephen A. Turcotte, 
Brigadier General Duane W. Deal, Major General Kenneth W. Hess, Douglas D. Osheroff, PhD. 
exist that could increase the likelihood of crew survival
in future Space Shuttle operations and be applied to the
design of future vehicles.
The original focus of the CAIB and JSC personnel was 
“why the wing came off.” NASA furnished the CAIB 
a single point of contact (POC) who was responsible 
for providing the technical information requested by 
the CAIB. Initially, the POC provided only information 
that he felt was directly related to “why the wing came 
off” regardless of whether the CAIB requested it or not. 
However, this narrow focus obstructed the CFS efforts 
to address crew survivability and the related engineering 
and processes so as to elucidate the physical/cognitive 
environment that impacted the crew and other 
information that would contribute to understanding 
lessons for the future. This meant that the CFS was 
denied access, by the NASA POC, to important 
information because it was deemed not directly related 
to the root cause of the accident. The CAIB chair had to 
repeatedly intervene to remind the NASA POC that his 
job was to get the information that was requested by the 
CAIB, not to determine whether it should be supplied. 
During this rocky period the CFS used informal 
channels to obtain the information needed to carry out 
his investigation. While this created a real obstacle in 
the beginning, it was eventually rectified through the 
continued efforts of the CAIB chair. 
Early on, the CFS contacted Jeffrey Davis, MD,
Director of the Space Life Sciences Directorate (SLSD)
at JSC to discuss the CAIB’s plan related to the crew-
related portion of the investigation and how it would
be handled including the various ways the CAIB and
NASA would be required to cooperate to facilitate the
investigation. From this point forward, Davis and the
CFS engaged in frequent communications to make sure
the crew-related investigation moved forward in a timely
manner. Davis’ active cooperation and collaboration
was an essential element in the ultimate success of
the CAIB efforts regarding crew survivability. On
February 6, Davis also assigned a flight surgeon from the
Medical Operations Branch, Rainer Effenhauser, MD,
to be the liaison to the investigation group to facilitate
the acquisition of any medical information required.
The CFS also approached Frank Benz, Director of
Engineering Directorate at JSC, who provided a similar
liaison, Lauri Hansen, to facilitate support from the
engineering personnel at JSC and other centers and
entities concerning crew survivability.
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Because of the sensitive nature of the crew-related 
investigation, this effort was handled in a discreet 
manner between the CFS, the CAIB chair, and certain 
other CAIB members during the formative stages of 
the investigation. Once the crew-related investigation 
clarified its findings, the results were shared by the 
CFS with all the CAIB members, and the findings and 
recommendations were included as part of the initial 
part of the official CAIB report released in August 2003. 
Crew Survivability Working Group 
Organization and Communication 
The CAIB requested the formation of the Crew
Survivability Working Group (CSWG), which was
subsequently commissioned by JSC Center Director,
General Jefferson Howell. The CSWG was operational
by February 21. The group, chaired by the CFS, was
comprised of personnel from SLSD, Engineering
Directorate, Flight Crew Operations, Mission Operations,
and the CAIB, including Donald White, Lt Col, USAF.
The CAIB chair tasked the CSWG with a limited 
charter: First, to determine the cause of death of the 
crew; second, to determine the “survival gap” (what 
equipment or procedures might have kept the crew 
alive); third, to pass the results to the CAIB. The CSWG 
investigation was managed solely by the group itself, 
which allowed it to be agile in making decisions. 
The CSWG performed aerodynamic, thermal, and 
structural analysis on individual debris items and an 
intensive study of the crew helmets, suit hardware, 
and seats. In the process, team members made several 
trips to Kennedy Space Center to view debris that had 
been recovered including portions of the crew module, 
crew-worn equipment including helmets, and seat 
debris. The CSWG developed a timeline that was 
consistent with the official CAIB timeline to derive 
the sequence of crew survival events from the data. 
It became evident that the expertise needed to make 
the most effective use of all the evidence that had 
been recovered was not entirely present within NASA. 
For that reason the CFS contacted the FBI laboratory 
facilities at Quantico, Virginia, and the Armed Forces 
Institute of Pathology (AFIP) at Rockville, Maryland, 
to provide additional forensic support. AFIP functions 
are now part of the Office of the Armed Forces Medical 
Examiner System. The inputs from these organizations 
helped to reinforce and complement the information that 
was available from more traditional sources. The AFIP
had been involved with the Challenger investigation 
in 1986, and had an established relationship with the 
NASA Medical Operations Branch. 
The CSWG kept the CAIB chair aware of major 
developments and decisions and was essentially 
autonomous. The CAIB chair deliberately set up the 
scope of authority in this decentralized manner to 
facilitate timely action and mission success. 
Scope of the Analysis 
The analysis of crew compartment debris was 
pivotal to understanding the environment that the 
crew module experienced and more importantly the 
environment to which the crew was subjected. The 
analysis from an engineering perspective yielded far 
more information than that gleaned from the crew 
remains alone. Information from the condition of 
items worn by crewmembers, such as helmets and 
suit hardware, as well as debris related to the crew 
compartment and the location on the ground where 
they were recovered, allowed a better understanding of 
where in the trajectory the crew module experienced a 
catastrophic structural failure and total dispersal. It also 
allowed the determination of crew positions at the time 
of crew module failure and the manner in which the 
crewmembers used their crew equipment. The analysis 
of this physical information was made possible through 
the expertise and superb support of the JSC Engineering 
Directorate, which was engaged in the CSWG activities 
from the outset and without whose efforts the ultimate 
findings and conclusions would not have been possible. 
All analyses were completed as data became available. 
Prevent Bias 
It is important to note that from the outset many
theories were circulating as to what caused the mishap
and what transpired with respect to the dispersal
of the crew module and the cause of death of the crew.
The CFS made a deliberate decision early on that
the people working on the crew-related investigation
would not engage officially or informally in discussing
hypotheses relating to potential scenarios that would
account for the loss of Columbia and the crew. This
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approach was taken to try to minimize as much
as possible the impact of confirmation bias on the
activities of the investigation. Confirmation bias is
always a concern, as there is a decided tendency
for individuals to give greater credence to pieces of
information that support their theories and conjectures,
and to explain away information that does not support
their theories, often calling the non-supporting
information “outliers.”
By essentially banning the discussion or formulation
of scenarios in the earlier parts of the investigation, the
group placed their emphasis on collecting all relevant
physical evidence and then figuring out how all of it fit
together and generating hypotheses at that time. Using
this method meant that any hypothesis about what
happened to the crew had to incorporate all information
and was formulated only after the physical data was
collected and available. It also meant that the initial
discussions about scenarios did not occur until more
than 2 months after the mishap itself. Members of the
CSWG believed then and in retrospect that this was
vital to the success of the CSWG’s activities. 
Engineering Analysis 
All of the engineering-related information and analysis
was available by the end of the summer of 2003. The
CSWG undertook a number of initiatives to uncover
information that likely would have been otherwise
ignored, such as proof that the crewmembers were in
their normal shirt-sleeve environment (1 atmosphere of
pressure and room temperature) from the time of loss
of signal for at least another 32 seconds and then for
at least another 15 seconds during which accelerations
of the crew module were trivial, and that this benign
environment probably continued until orbiter breakup.
The CSWG evaluated four types of data—aerodynamic,
orbiter, forensic hardware, and forensic medical.
By June 24, 2003, the CSWG had enough data to
prepare their initial report for the CAIB. These data
demonstrated that the initial loss of the orbiter wing did
not immediately cause death. 
Human Forensic Analysis 
After the crew remains were recovered in the field, 
they were transported to Dover AFB for final forensic 
analysis. Tissue samples were also sent to the FBI for 
additional analysis. The Office of the Armed Forces 
Medical Examiner is the department within the AFIP
that was responsible for determining the cause and 
manner of death of the crew of Columbia. The AFIP
had been a valuable partner during the Challenger 
investigation in 1986. While they possessed a wealth of 
experience that they ably, effectively and aggressively 
brought to bear during the recovery, identification and 
disposition of the Columbia crewmember’s remains, 
their input was not timely and did not meet the 
expectations for a medical forensic report. 
Eventually the AFIP provided medical evidence
that showed death was caused by blunt trauma and
hypobaria, which further demonstrated that the crew
module failure and death of the crew occurred at a
time substantially later than the loss of signal. 
Release of the Findings from the CSWG 
The CSWG reported their initial findings in the CAIB
Report, Vol. 1, of August 2003 and planned to release a
more in-depth final report several weeks later. 
Ensuring that the full CSWG report would be released
was considered to be extremely important to avoid
repeating the experience regarding the handling
of crew survival-related information during the
Challenger mishap investigation. In the Challenger
mishap, the crew survival investigation was controlled
by NASA, and the details of the investigation into
what happened to the crew were never allowed to be
officially placed in any report and resulted in lessons
learned being either lost or not widely communicated.
The CFS, who had been an investigator for the
Challenger mishap, discussed this concern with the
CAIB chair at the outset of the CAIB activities and
they agreed that no such outcome would take place
with the CSWG findings. 
During the initial stages of the CAIB investigation,
the Director of JSC Flight Crew Operations Directorate
(the Directorate where the astronauts are organizationally
located) had strongly expressed concern about how the
investigation into the fate of the crew could hurt the
families and this had initially slowed the investigation
process. In order to anticipate and mitigate these possible
objections to release of the CSWG report, the CFS had
directly furnished the families, through their POC – one
of the crew spouses (Jonathan Clark, MD) – also at
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Crew Survival Working Group Findings Published in CAIB Report, August 2003, page 77 
The CSWG provided this timeline, which shows where the module failure and decompression started. This timeline was slightly revised 
in future investigations and more details were published with the Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report, 2008. The forensic 
evaluation of all recovered crew module and forward fuselage components did not show any evidence of over-pressure or explosion. 
This conclusion was supported by both the lack of forensic evidence and a credible source for either sort of event. The failure of the 
crew module resulted from the thermal degradation of structural properties, which resulted in a rapid, catastrophic sequential structural 
breakdown rather than an instantaneous “explosive” failure. 
GPC – Orbiter’s General Purpose Computer – critical for flight
ORSAT – Object Reentry Survival Analysis Tool – NASA computer code for predicting reentry survivability
LOS – Loss of Signal from Columbia
EI – Entry Interface – begins at 400K feet 
At the Boardʼs request, NASA formed a Crew Survivability 
Working Group within two weeks of the accident to better un-
derstand the cause of crew death and the breakup of the crew 
module. This group made the following observations. 
Medical and Life Sciences 
The Working Group found no irregularities in its extensive re-
view of all applicable medical records and crew health data. The 
Armed Forces Institute of Pathology and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation conducted forensic analyses on the remains of the 
crew of Columbia after they were recovered. It was determined 
that the acceleration levels the crew module experienced prior 
to its catastrophic failure were not lethal. The death of the crew 
members was due to blunt trauma and hypoxia. The exact time 
of death – sometime after 9:00:19 a.m. Eastern Standard Time 
– cannot be determined because of the lack of direct physical or 
recorded evidence. 
Failure of the Crew Module 
The forensic evaluation of all recovered crew module/forward 
fuselage components did not show any evidence of over-pres-
surization or explosion. This conclusion is supported by both 
the lack of forensic evidence and a credible source for either 
sort of event.11 The failure of the crew module resulted from the 
thermal degradation of structural properties, which resulted in a 
rapid catastrophic sequential structural breakdown rather than 
an instantaneous “explosive” failure. 
Separation of the crew module/forward fuselage assembly from 
the rest of the Orbiter likely occurred immediately in front of 
the payload bay (between Xo576 and Xo582 bulkheads). Sub-
sequent breakup of the assembly was a result of ballistic heating 
and dynamic loading. Evaluations of fractures on both primary 
and secondary structure elements suggest that structural failures 
occurred at high temperatures and in some cases at high strain 
rates. An extensive trajectory reconstruction established the 
most likely breakup sequence, shown below. 
The load and heat rate calculations are shown for the crew mod-
ule along its reconstructed trajectory. The band superimposed 
on the trajectory (starting about 9:00:58 a.m. EST) represents 
the window where all the evaluated debris originated. It ap-
pears that the destruction of the crew module took place over a 
period of 24 seconds beginning at an altitude of approximately 
140,000 feet and ending at 105,000 feet. These figures are 
consistent with the results of independent thermal re-entry and 
aerodynamic models. The debris footprint proved consistent 
with the results of these trajectory analyses and models. Ap-
proximately 40 to 50 percent, by weight, of the crew module 
was recovered. 
The Working Groupʼs results significantly add to the knowledge 
gained from the loss of Challenger in 1986. Such knowledge is 
critical to efforts to improve crew survivability when designing 
new vehicles and identifying feasible improvements to the exist-
ing Orbiters. 
Crew Worn Equipment 
Videos of the crew during re-entry that have been made public 
demonstrate that prescribed procedures for use of equipment 
such as full-pressure suits, gloves, and helmets were not strictly 
followed. This is confirmed by the Working Groupʼs conclu-
sions that three crew members were not wearing gloves, and one 
was not wearing a helmet. However, under these circumstances, 
this did not affect their chances of survival. 
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that time a NASA flight surgeon, a draft version of the
report so that the family members had an opportunity
to understand what was in the report and why it was
included. The families were also informed by the CFS
that if they had concerns surrounding any facts that
were included, the CFS would be glad to entertain their
concerns but that the decision for inclusion would be
the decision of the CFS and the CSWG. The families
were comfortable with this arrangement and after
reviewing the draft report responded that they did not
want anything changed. 
By the early fall of 2003, all the information was
available to produce the final report of the CSWG.
The day before the report was to be issued the Office
of the NASA Administrator directed the CFS and
CAIB that the report not be released due to their
concerns for the families. This intention to block
the release of the final report was strenuously
opposed by the CFS who then informed Jon Clark of
NASA’s intention to block the release of the report
and suggested that if Clark and the families wanted
the report released that they write the CAIB Chair,
Admiral Harold Gehman, to make the families’ wishes
clear, an action that they did take.
The CSWG report with the final findings and
recommendations was ultimately published as intended
in Volume V, Appendix G.12 of the CAIB Report in
October 2003. This chain of events raises the question
that had the CAIB not been established as an independent
part of NASA’s investigation that the CSWG final
report may not have been released which would have
prevented the Agency and the aerospace community
from gaining the maximal amount of learning from the
tragic loss of the Columbia and its crew. 
-----Original Message-----
From: CLARK, JONATHAN B. (JSC-SD2) (NASA) <jonathan.b.clark@nasa.gov>

To: GEHMAN, HAROLD (JSC-MA) (NASA) <harold.gehman-1@nasa.gov>; BARRY, JOHN

(JSC-MA) (NASA) <john.barry-1@nasa.gov>; WHITE, DON (JSC-MA) (NASA)

<don.white-1@nasa.gov>; BAGIAN, JIM (JSC-MA) (NASA) <jim.bagian-1@nasa.gov>

CC: ‘Jim Bagian (James.Bagian@med.va.gov)’ <James.Bagian@med.va.gov>
Sent: Fri Oct 17 00:15:05 2003 
Subject: CAIB Crew Survival Section 
Gentlemen,

First of all let me offer my profoundest admiration for the tremendous work

on the Columbia Accident Investigation. This has been a trying time for us

all and the thoroughness of your efforts have been a great comfort to us.

The STS 107 families will be sending the CAIB a statement concerning the

report and have had much to deal with in the aftermath of the investigation.
 
I have had discussions with the Crew Survival Working Group concerning the 1

page section dealing with crew survival in the CAIB Report volume 1 (Page

77) to ensure that it would not be distressful to the Columbia spouses. The

Columbia spouses met tonight and I discussed that a follow on section on

crew survival would be coming out with more detail than Volume 1. The draft

of this has been vetted of any crew specific issues and I believe that it is
an accurate representation of the facts concerning crew issues in the final
moments. In discussion with the Columbia spouses we were entirely unified in
our desire to ensure that all the lessons learned from this mishap be
applied to prevent this type of accident from happening again. We discussed
the crew survival section and our desire is to ensure this information is
made available to learn all we can from it. A fundemental aspect of every
aerospace mishap investigation is the understanding of crew survivability
issues and there is much still to learn about survival during upper
atmospheric reentry. As sensitive as this issue is, it is essential that the
facts related to crew survival be disseminated to ensure the next generation
of spacecraft are afforded the maximum protection. This is particularly
apparent with the upcoming Orbital Space Plane and future commercial
spacecraft. Perhaps the greatest legacy of the Columbia crew will be these
enduring lessons applied to future human space endeavors.
Jonathan B. Clark M.D., M.P.H.
Neurologist/ Flight Surgeon
Space Medicine Office 
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Lessons Learned & Recommendations 
Relative to the Challenger mishap investigation, the 
Columbia investigation went much more smoothly. 
However, there were a number of lessons learned 
or reinforced from past experiences that should be 
considered when planning for similar activities in the 
future that are summarized below: 
• The accident investigation board should be independent
of NASA to mitigate inappropriate personal and
political influence on the operation and to mitigate
potential bias in the final findings and recommendations
that the board is charged with producing. 
• Team leads and principal investigators of the
accident investigation board should not be current
NASA employees. This requirement would
mitigate real or apparent conflicts of interest; they
could be former employees, as their specialized
knowledge and experience could be invaluable to the
success of the investigation. In any case, members
with no previous NASA connection should balance
the board’s membership. 
• Any human space flight mishap investigation team
should include a group that performs the function
that was provided by the CSWG. Because the fate
of the crew will usually be subject to inordinate
scrutiny, it is desirable to have a CSWG-like group
operate as a semiautonomous unit within the overall
mishap investigation team, in order to provide
independence and a greater ability to maintain
appropriate confidentiality and minimize interference
with their activities. 
• Both the Challenger and the Columbia activities to
recover the crew remains involved participation by
astronauts from the crew office at a very intimate level
including the handling of crew remains. Although
these individuals are very capable, bring many
valuable assets to the table, and were responsible
for much of the timeliness and effectiveness of the
operations, it is probably ill-advised to have close
associates of the deceased participate in the material
recovery of the remains from the standpoint of
their own future welfare. Although critical stress
debriefings were offered to these individuals during
the Columbia mishap operations, this is a secondary
prevention mechanism; it is better to develop
alternative methods to obviate the need to subject
 
them to these stressors.
 
• Communication was often difficult among personnel
who were planning or performing recovery
operations. This was true of both open and secure
communication capabilities. In planning for mishap
response, adequate provision should be made for both
open and secure communication. 
• Every human space flight mishap investigation board
should include an individual who has an aeromedical
background. In addition, it is highly desirable for this
individual to have technical knowledge of the aerospace
platform being investigated and it is even better for
 
the individual to have an engineering background as
 
well. If one person with all of these characteristics
cannot be appointed, then an additional person with an
engineering and systems-based background should be
teamed with the aeromedical specialist.
• NASA should identify appropriate internal and 
external resources to provide the various types of 
technical expertise needed to perform a thorough and 
credible investigation. Identification and assurance of 
the availability of the required experts before a mishap 
occurs would preclude the potential reduced efficiency, 
effectiveness, and timeliness that can occur if the 
board is forced to identify and locate experts after the 
incident has happened. 
• The capacity and competency of the identified internal 
and external experts and organizations that would be 
relied upon to participate in a mishap investigation 
need to be periodically evaluated to ensure that they 
are still competent, able, and available to furnish the 
desired services. Failure to do this resulted in problems 
during the CAIB investigation when it was incorrectly 
assumed that the AFIP could perform critical 
pathological evaluations based on past experience 
with their performance during the Challenger mishap 
investigation. Unfortunately, it became apparent that 
in the intervening years, the AFIP had changed their 
emphasis away from aerospace mishap investigations. 
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Conclusions 
The activities of the CAIB, and the CSWG in
particular, ultimately produced a thorough report.
This was accomplished through outstanding
commitment and tireless effort by the CAIB, the
CSWG, as well as a multitude of people both within
and outside of NASA. While the ultimate product
accomplished its intended goal it should not have been
so difficult. Better prior planning would have made it
possible for the investigation to have been completed
in an even timelier manner and not have necessitated
the reliance on individual initiative instead of a well-
planned and implemented system to produce a thorough
and timely report.
Finally, and most importantly, absolute independence
of the CAIB and CSWG from NASA was of paramount
importance to ensure that the release of information
could not be readily blocked as occurred in the
Challenger mishap investigation and was attempted in
the case of the CAIB and CSWG. Had the CAIB not
been independent of NASA, it is quite possible that a
loss of critical information, as occurred in the Challenger
investigation, would have occurred again. 
“The right to search for the truth implies also 
a duty; one must not conceal any part of what one 
has recognized to be true.” 
Albert Einstein 
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The Columbia Crew Survival 
Investigation Report: The Five Potentially 
Lethal Events and Crew Survivability 
Nigel J. Packham, David J. Pogue, and Pamela A. Melroy 
At the conclusion of their deliberations, the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) made multiple
recommendations to NASA for the improvement
of systems and processes. However, they made no
recommendations regarding improvements that could
specifically address crew survival. In their report (which
was published in August of 2003 and can be found
at http://caib.nasa.gov), the CAIB did identify one
observation (CAIB Report Observation 010.2-1) that reads 
Future crewed-vehicle requirements should 
incorporate the knowledge gained from the 
Challenger and Columbia accidents in assessing 
the feasibility of vehicles that could ensure crew 
survival even if the vehicle is destroyed. 
The Space Shuttle Program recognized the importance
of capturing the lessons learned from the loss of
Columbia and its crew to benefit future human
exploration, particularly future vehicle design.
In October 2004, the Program commissioned the
Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation
Team (SCSIIT). The SCSIIT was asked to perform a
comprehensive analysis of the accident, focusing on
factors and events affecting crew survival, and
to develop recommendations for improving crew
survival for all future human space flight vehicles.
To do this, the SCSIIT investigated all elements of
crew survival, including the design features, equipment,
training, and procedures intended to protect the
crew. The investigation relied on data in the form of
vehicle telemetry (while Columbia was still intact and
transmitting data), video (both from the general public
and the news media), recovered debris, and medical
findings, each supplemented with modeling and
Visual Representation of the Breakup Sequence 
This simulation represents the Orbiter just before loss of control.	 The Catastrophic Event (CE) was a period of time during which the 
orbiter vehicle was undergoing a major structural breakup. At this 
time, the accelerations on the forebody were estimated to be 3.5 Gs. 
The breakup sequence progressed over several seconds. Analysis of 
ground-based video of the event established the first detectable signs 
at GMT 14:00:18. 
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analyses when needed. The SCSIIT used these data to
identify all events with lethal potential (even those that
occurred after the crew was deceased) during reentry
into Earth’s atmosphere so that threats to crew survival
could be described and methodically approached in
future designs. In the course of the investigation, five
events with lethal potential were identified.
The analysis proved to be extremely difficult for 
many reasons. First, recovered debris items from 
adjacent locations inside the vehicle (the middeck 
floor, for example) showed highly variable degrees 
of thermal damage. Developing a failure scenario 
based on just one piece of debris could result in 
incorrect conclusions, so failure scenarios needed 
to be developed taking into account all recovered 
debris items. Second, it was difficult to model the 
reentry dynamics of the separated forebody because 
no aerodynamic models existed for that one section 
of the Space Shuttle orbiter (an aerodynamic model 
did exist for an intact orbiter). Third, a large set 
of well-understood data from civilian and military 
aircraft accidents exists, but data from spacecraft 
accidents at very high altitude and velocity/acceleration 
environments did not exist; this lack of data hampered 
Definition of Greenwich Mean Time 
Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), also known as
Greenwich Meridian Time, is measured from the
Greenwich meridian line at the Royal Observatory
in Greenwich, England. It is the place from where
all time zones are measured. Even though the
term GMT is used frequently in documents, the
actual time used in space flight is Coordinated
Universal Time (UTC). 
the team. Finally, many members of the team knew 
the crew personally, so the investigation of the final 
moments of the crewmembers’ lives was emotionally 
difficult and occasionally resulted in periods of 
“burnout” for some members of the team. 
Some conclusions were purely factual, drawn from 
hard data recovered from telemetry, such as the exact 
timing of the forebody separation from the rest of the 
orbiter. Conclusions drawn from analytical techniques 
other than vehicle telemetry were associated with 
varying degrees of certainty. In general, the team defined 
its conclusions along a continuum of certainty, using 
This simulation represents the orbiter just after the catastrophic event. 
The three main items in this view are the payload bay doors, the 
forebody, and the main portion of the orbiter. The left wing has already 
departed from the orbiter and is not visible in this view. 
Based on engineering analysis, the CE is thought to have started with 
the compromise of the payload bay doors, exposing the payload bay 
longeron sill to entry heating. The skin splice between the midbody and 
the Xo 582 ring frame bulkhead area, aft of the starboard x-link, failed 
due to a combination of mechanical and thermal loads. The forebody 
rotated away from starboard to port, causing the port x-link to fail due 
to bending loads. As the forebody separated from the midbody, various 
power, data, and Environmental Control Life Support Systems lines 
failed and the crew module was free to move forward and strike the 
inside of the forward fuselage. 
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The Catastrophic Event is depicted in these three frames of video that cover 0.1 second. There is no change in the magnification/zoom factor. 
The third frame represents GMT 14:00:18.30 
“possible,” “likely,” or “probable” to define increasing 
levels of confidence. 
Once the team completed its investigation and 
deliberations, the findings, conclusions, and 
recommendations were documented in the “Columbia
Crew Survival Investigation Report” (NASA/SP-2008-
565, available at http://history.nasa.gov/columbia/ 
columbiacrewsurvival.pdf). The report also includes the 
highly technical data that were used in the development 
of those findings, conclusions, and recommendations. 
The exhaustive data were included because of 
difficulties finding relevant technical data from the 
previous Challenger accident; the investigation team 
believed that it was important to include all data in one 
location for future investigators to easily reference. 
NASA disseminated this report publicly in the hope 
that the world’s spacefaring organizations (government-
sponsored and commercial) could benefit from the 
findings and incorporate into their spacecraft designs to 
maximize crew survivability. 
The report identified the five potentially lethal events
that the crew experienced during the mishap. For each
of the five events, the report addressed whether current
technology existed that could have precluded the
lethality of the event. It is important to note that the
crew of Columbia was exposed to all five of the events,
and that the Columbia accident was not survivable. 
The five events with lethal potential will now be
discussed at a high level along with some key
recommendations associated with each one and a brief
discussion of how NASA’s Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle
(MPCV) program is addressing the recommendations.
For more details or a deeper technical understanding of
the events surrounding the Columbia accident from the
crew survival perspective, the reader is referred to the
“Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report.”
The following were the five potentially 
lethal events: 
1. The first event with lethal potential was 
depressurization of the crew module, which started at 
or shortly after the breakup of the orbiter vehicle. 
2. The second event with lethal potential was the 
exposure of unconscious or deceased crewmembers 
to a dynamic rotating load environment with non-
conformal helmets and a lack of upper-body restraint. 
3. The third event with lethal potential was separation of
crewmembers from the crew module and the seats, with
associated forces, material interactions, and thermal
consequences. This event is the least understood,
because of limitations in current knowledge of
mechanisms at this Mach number and altitude. Seat
restraints played a role in the lethality of this event.
4. The fourth event with lethal potential was exposure 
to near vacuum, aerodynamic accelerations, and 

cold temperatures. 

5. The final event with lethal potential was ground impact.
1. Cabin Depressurization 
Description of the event 
The Space Shuttle Columbia crew module was not
recovered intact. In fact, the crew module debris footprint
was more than 50 miles long, indicating that the crew
module broke up at altitude. Obviously, a cabin breach
occurred at some point during the orbiter crew module
breakup sequence. The SCSIIT concluded that the
Columbia crew module cabin pressure was nominal
(14.7 pounds per square inch absolute) and the crew
was capable of conscious actions up to the beginning of
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the orbiter breakup. The crew module depressurization
began at or shortly after the orbiter breakup (when the
vehicle was at about 180,000 ft altitude), and was caused
by cabin breaches above and below the middeck floor.
Impact on the crew 
Evidence indicates that the crew was aware of the
vehicle loss of control (which began 41 seconds before
the vehicle breakup) and was responding to failures
of orbiter systems before the vehicle breakup. The
pressure suit helmets that Space Shuttle crewmembers
wore included a pressure visor that could be lowered
quickly to protect crewmembers in the event of a cabin
depressurization. However, analysis of recovered suit
components indicates that none of the crewmembers
lowered their helmet visors. The accelerations acting
on the crewmembers during this time were not
severe enough to preclude this action. Therefore, the
depressurization rate was high enough to incapacitate
the crewmembers within seconds so that they were
unable to perform actions such as lowering their visors.
Once the depressurization occurred, the crewmembers
were rendered unconscious or deceased and were
unaware of the subsequent events. Given the level of
tissue damage observed in the remains, crewmembers
could not have regained consciousness even if the cabin
could have been repressurized. At this point survival
was possible but would not have been likely, even
with immediate and extensive medical intervention.
Although respiration would have ceased after
depressurization, circulatory functions can exist for a
short period without respiration. 
Survivability using today’s technology 
After the Space Shuttle Challenger accident in 1986,
all Space Shuttle crewmembers wore pressure suits
during ascent and reentry. The pressure suits and
their attached emergency oxygen system could protect
the crewmembers from a cabin depressurization.
However, the pressure suits were added to the Space
Shuttle after the vehicle was designed, and this
retrofit resulted in some operational inefficiencies
and incompatibilities. For example, the deorbit
preparation period of Shuttle missions was so busy
that crewmembers often did not have enough time
to complete the deorbit preparation tasks (putting on
their pressure suit, helmet, gloves, parachute, and other
equipment, strapping into the seat, and so on) before
the deorbit burn. Suit debris evidence indicates that
three of the seven Columbia crewmembers did not
finish putting on their suit gloves for reentry. One
of these three crewmembers did not have the helmet
donned at the time of the vehicle breakup.
Additionally, as mentioned above, none of the
crewmembers lowered their helmet pressure visors, so
none of the pressure suits provided protection against the
Image from Apache video showing the crew module debris and the 
orbiter’s three main engines. Based on engineering analysis, the crew 
module catastrophic event is thought to have started with the failure of 
the forward fuselage. Once the forward fuselage began to break away, 
the exposed crew module rapidly failed due to the combined effects 
of the high G-loads, aerodynamic forces, and thermal loads. The flight 
deck maintained structural integrity longer than the middeck. 
Image is from the Apache video. Dotted circle indicates area where 
the crew module debris was last visible. The three points in the lower 
right are the orbiter’s three main engines. The forward fuselage and 
crew module fragmented into pieces quickly and became too small to 
detect by ground-based video. At approximately GMT 14:35:00, the 
crew remains and the majority of the crew module debris completed 
the free fall to the ground. 
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Overall Timeline 
Phase 1 
(~4.3 hours) 
Phase 2 
(~15.5 minutes) 
Phase 3 
(46 seconds) 
Phase 4 
(35 seconds) 
Phase 5 
(17 seconds) 
Phase 6 
(~35 minutes) 
Start Deorbit Prep Deorbit Burn Entry Interface at 400,000 ft LOS CE CMCE TD Ground Impact 
(~9:25:30) (13:15:30) (13:44:09) (13:59:32) (14:00:18) (14:00:53) (14:01:10) (~14:35:00) 
This timeline represents the best fit to known and inferred data, but it is subject to some inherent uncertainty. 
It is divided into six phases, based on key events. Each phase of the timeline is addressed in sequence. 
Phase 1 (GMT 09:15:30 to entry interface (GMT 13:44:09.): The deorbit preparation timeline begins 4 hours 
prior to the deorbit burn. After the burn, the orbiter descends in altitude until atmospheric drag effects become 
noticeable, roughly an altitude of 400,000 feet and approximately 4,300 nautical miles from the landing site, 
traveling in excess of Mach 24. 
Phase 2 (GMT 13:44:09 to GMT 13:59:32): Loss of signal (LOS) is the loss of voice and real-time data 
transmissions from Columbia. 
Phase 3 (GMT 13:59:32 to GMT 14:00:18): From LOS to the Catastrophic Event (CE). The CE is defined as the 
initiation of the orbiter breakup into the primary subcomponents of the forebody, midbody, and aftbody. 
Phase 4 (GMT 14:00:18 to GMT 14:00:53): From the CE to the Crew Module Catastrophic Event (CMCE). The 
CMCE is defined as the initiation of the forebody breakup. 
Phase 5 (GMT 14:00:53 to GMT 14:01:10): From the CMCE to Total Dispersal (TD). TD is defined as the time 
when the crew module was substantively broken down into subcomponents and was no longer visible on 
ground-based videos. 
Phase 6 (GMT 14:01:10 to approximately GMT 14:35:00): Ground impact of the crew remains and the majority 
of the crew module debris. 
cabin depressurization. Had the suits been configured
with the visors down and locked, gloves on, and
emergency oxygen system activated, the depressurization
event by itself probably would have been survivable. 
Recommendations to future programs 
The “Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report” 
contains many recommendations related to pressure 
suits. The two key recommendations listed below 
are related to the cabin depressurization lethal 
event. The findings and conclusions related to these 
recommendations are described in detail in the 
“Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report.” 
Recommendation L1-21 
“Future spacecraft and crew survival systems should 
be designed such that the equipment and procedures 
provided to protect the crew in emergency situations are 
compatible with nominal operations. Future spacecraft 
vehicles, equipment, and mission timelines should be 
designed such that a suited crewmember can perform all 
operations without compromising the configuration of 
the survival suit during critical phases of flight.” 
Recommendation L1-3/L5-1 
“Future spacecraft crew survival systems should not rely 
on manual activation to protect the crew.” 
1 The recommendation numbers trace to the recommendations listed in the “Columbia
Crew Survival Investigation Report.” 
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How NASA’s MPCV program is addressing 
the recommendations 
The next vehicle NASA is developing for human
space flight, the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV),
includes pressure suits in the design. The suits will
be worn for ascent and reentry. They are included in
the vehicle design from the beginning, and critical
controls are designed to be compatible with a
pressure-suited crew. Additionally, vehicle operations
will address the incompatibilities described in
Recommendation L1-2. 
2. Exposure to a Dynamic Rotating 
Environment with Non-Conformal 
Helmets and a Lack of Upper-Body 
Restraint 
Description of the event 
The initial breakup of Space Shuttle Columbia 
resulted in an intact nose portion, or “forebody,” 
of the vehicle separating from the rest of the major 
vehicle components. The forebody consisted of the 
forward fuselage (outer skin) structure and the crew 
module (pressure vessel) structure. This forebody was 
not aerodynamically stable. From the time of vehicle 
breakup until the crew module breakup, the forebody 
was rotating about all three axes at about 0.1 revolution 
per second (6 revolutions per minute, 36 degrees per 
second) with increasing rates and accelerations. The 
increasing atmospheric drag on the forebody and the 
rotational motion of the tumbling forebody resulted in 
the crew being exposed to oscillatory and increasing 
accelerations in all three axes. 
Impact on the crew 
Shortly after the vehicle breakup, the crewmembers lost 
consciousness as a result of the loss of cabin pressure. 
Debris evidence indicates that the seat inertial reel 
mechanisms on the crewmembers’ shoulder harnesses 
did not lock and that the inertial reel straps were 
extended. Therefore, the unconscious or deceased 
crewmembers were exposed to the cyclical rotational 
motion while being restrained only at the lower 
body. The suit pressure helmets were not conformal. 
Consequently, lethal trauma occurred to the unconscious 
or deceased crewmembers because of the lack of upper-
body support and restraint. 
Survivability using today’s technology 
The Shuttle seat and helmet design and operational 
practices did not protect the crewmembers from this 
lethal event. Complete strap-in with inertial reels locked 
would have reduced the risk of injury or death; however, 
even in this configuration, the Shuttle seat and restraint 
system provided limited protection from dynamic 
acceleration events (specifically, it had no lateral 
restraints, no control of extremity motion, and no head 
and neck support). Better restraint designs that include 
head and neck support (that is, conformal helmets), 
extremity control, and spine support are achievable to 
reduce the risk of injury or death. 
Crashes in automobile racing are common, and it is not 
unusual for crashes to expose the driver to dynamic 
rotating environments as the car tumbles. The racing 
community has evolved driver seats, seat restraints, 
helmets, and head-and-neck restraint devices that protect 
drivers during crashes. The technology exists to protect 
occupants of a spacecraft from a dynamic rotating 
environment such as was experienced by the Columbia 
crew during lethal event #2. 
Recommendations to future programs 
The three key SCSIIT recommendations listed below 
are related to the dynamic rotating environment 
lethal event. The findings and conclusions related to 
these recommendations are described in detail in the 
“Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report.” 
Recommendation L2-4/L3-4 
“Future spacecraft suits and seat restraints should use 
state-of-the-art technology in an integrated solution 
to minimize crew injury and maximize crew survival in 
off-nominal acceleration environments.” 
Recommendation L2-7 
“Design suit helmets with head protection as a 
functional requirement, not just as a portion of the 
pressure garment. Suits should incorporate conformal 
helmets with head and neck restraint devices, similar to 
helmet/head restraint techniques used in professional 
automobile racing.” 
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Recommendation L2-9 
“The use of inertial reels in future restraint systems 
should be evaluated to ensure that they are capable of 
protecting the crew during nominal and off-nominal 
situations without active crew intervention.” 
How NASA’s MPCV program is addressing 
the recommendations 
The MPCV spacecraft seat design includes side bolsters 
and more robust seat restraints. Also, the seat does not 
use inertial reels. 
3. Separation from the Crew
Module and Seats with Associated
Forces, Material Interactions, and
Thermal Consequences 
Description of the event 
This lethal event occurred around the time of the crew 
module breakup. The breakup of the crew module and 
resultant exposure of the crew to reentry conditions 
was an extremely significant event but was difficult 
to characterize, as many related events occurred in a 
short period. During this lethal event, the crewmembers 
were separated from their seats and the crew module, 
and were exposed to the hostile reentry environment. 
The seat restraints played a role in the lethality of this 
event. All crewmembers were deceased before, or by the 
end of, this event. 
Impact on the crew 
The seat restraint system caused lethal-level injuries
to the unconscious or deceased crewmembers when
they separated from their seats. Upon separation
from the seat and crew module, the crewmembers’
bodies were exposed to aerodynamic forces, elevated
temperatures, and the chemical environment associated
with the disintegration of the vehicle structure.
Analysis of the recovered suit debris indicated that
the pressure suits completely failed and separated from
the crewmembers’ bodies. Suit failure was caused
by mechanical loading (due to aerodynamic forces),
and hastened by thermal exposure and possibly
chemical effects from the atomic oxygen present in
the upper atmosphere.
Survivability using today’s technology 
Although the seat restraints played a significant role 
in the lethal injuries, there is currently no full range of 
equipment to protect for this event. The event was not 
survivable by any means known to the investigative 
team, other than by ensuring the integrity of the crew 
module until the airspeed and altitude were within 
survival limits. This was not possible for the Space 
Shuttle design; however, future vehicle designs 
incorporating a principle of “graceful degradation” 
and crew module stabilization may be possible. 
Recommendations to future programs 
The two key SCSIIT recommendations listed below 
are related to the separation lethal event. The findings 
and conclusions related to these recommendations are 
described in detail in the “Columbia Crew Survival 
Investigation Report.” 
Recommendation L2-4/L3-4 
“Future spacecraft suits and seat restraints should use 
state-of-the-art technology in an integrated solution to 
minimize crew injury and maximize crew survival in 
off-nominal acceleration environments.” 
Recommendation L3-5/L4-1 
“Evaluate crew survival suits as an integrated system 
that includes boots, helmet, and other elements to 
determine the weak points, such as thermal, pressure, 
windblast, or chemical exposure. Once identified, 
alternatives should be explored to strengthen the 
weak areas. Materials with low resistance to 
chemicals, heat, and flames should not be used on 
equipment that is intended to protect the wearer from 
such hostile environments.” 
How NASA’s MPCV program is addressing 
the recommendations 
The MPCV spacecraft seat design includes side bolsters 
and more robust seat restraints. Suit design currently is 
in the preliminary stages. The suit is being designed to 
be compatible with the various environments to which it 
may be exposed. 
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4. Exposure to Near Vacuum, 
Aerodynamic Accelerations, and
Cold Temperatures 
Description of the event 
This lethal event occurred as the crewmembers’ bodies 
were in free-fall from about 140,000 ft, after being 
exposed to the hostile, chaotic environment discussed in 
lethal event #3 above. 
Impact on the crew 
At the altitude and speeds that the deceased
crewmembers departed the crew module, the
environmental risks included lack of oxygen, low
atmospheric pressure, high thermal loads as a result
of deceleration from high Mach numbers, shock wave
interactions, aerodynamic accelerations, and exposure
to cold temperatures.
Survivability using today’s technology 
The Shuttle pressure suit system was certified to
operate at a maximum altitude of 100,000 ft, and
certified to survive exposure to windblast associated
with 560 knots equivalent air speed. The operating
envelope of the orbiter was much greater than this.
The actual maximum protection environment for the
Shuttle suit system is not known, and the Shuttle suit
was not evaluated for protection from high temperature
exposures. The only protection that is achievable is
to ensure the integrity of the crew module until the
airspeed and altitude are within the suit capability,
which was not precisely determined. 
On October 14, 2012, the Red Bull Stratos high-
altitude skydiving project had Austrian skydiver Felix 
Baumgartner fly a helium balloon to about 127,000 ft 
over New Mexico. Wearing a pressure suit similar to 
the Space Shuttle suits, Baumgartner jumped from the 
balloon’s capsule, free-falling for more than 4 minutes 
before landing safely under parachute. Baumgartner 
reportedly reached a maximum speed greater than 840 
mph or 1.25 times the speed of sound. The Stratos 
project demonstrated the possibility of surviving a high-
altitude free fall. 
Threat Matrix and Survival Gap 
Table summarizes the events of lethal potential
that the crew members of STS-107 faced,
the possible threat mitigations at the time of
the STS-107 accident, and the potential future,
achievable threat mitigations. 
Lethal Threats* STS-107 Achievable 
1. Depressurization 
2. Off-nominal dynamic G 
environment 
3. Thermal intrusion into 
crew cabin 
4. Exposure to high-speed/ 
high-altitude environment 
5. Ground impact 
R G 
R G 
R Y 
R Y 
R G 
* As configured during STS-107 (visors open, some gloves off, 
inertial reels unlocked, etc) 
Red (R) = Threat could not be mitigated.
Yellow (Y) = Threat can probably be mitigated with new 

designs, operational procedures and/or hardware. 

Green (G) = Threat can be mitigated 
Recommendations to future programs 
The key SCSIIT recommendation listed below is related 
to the lethal event of exposure to the high-altitude 
environment. The findings and conclusions related 
to this recommendation are described in detail in the 
“Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report.” 
Recommendation L3-5/L4-1
“Evaluate crew survival suits as an integrated system that
includes boots, helmet, and other elements to determine
the weak points, such as thermal, pressure, windblast, or
chemical exposure. Once identified, alternatives should
be explored to strengthen the weak areas. Materials with
low resistance to chemicals, heat, and flames should
not be used on equipment that is intended to protect the
wearer from such hostile environments.” 
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How NASA’s MPCV program is addressing 
the recommendation 
Unlike the Space Shuttle, the MPCV does not include
an in-flight bailout capability with an individual
parachute for each crewmember. Free-falling from a
high altitude after a vehicle breakup is not a survivable
scenario for the MPCV.
5. Ground Impact 
Description of the event 
After a period of free fall, the crewmembers’ bodies 
struck the ground. 
Impact on the crew 
The deceased crewmembers’ bodies had lethal-level 
injuries caused by ground impact. 
Survivability using today’s technology 
The Shuttle crew escape equipment included a parachute 
that protected against ground impact. However, 
the parachute system required manual action by a 
crewmember to initiate the parachute opening sequence. 
Military and sport parachuting solutions exist for 
opening parachutes independent of crew action. 
Recommendations to future programs 
The key SCSIIT recommendation listed below is 
related to the ground impact lethal event. The findings 
and conclusions related to this recommendation are 
described in detail in the “Columbia Crew Survival 
Investigation Report.” 
Recommendation L1-3/L5-1 
“Future spacecraft crew survival systems should not rely 
on manual activation to protect the crew.” 
How NASA’s MPCV program is addressing 
the recommendation 
Unlike the Space Shuttle, the MPCV does not include an 
in-flight bailout capability with an individual parachute 
for each crewmember. Therefore, automatic opening of 
individual parachutes to protect against ground impact 
is not relevant to MPCV. However, the MPCV design 
incorporates crew seats mounted on stroking struts. 
In the event of a hard landing of the vehicle (due to a 
failure of one of the capsule’s three parachutes), the 
struts will attenuate the loads so the crewmembers will 
not be exposed to excessive forces. 
Conclusion
The Space Shuttle Program recognized the importance 
of capturing the lessons learned from the loss of 
Columbia and its crew to benefit future human 
exploration. The SCSIIT performed a comprehensive 
analysis of the accident, focusing on factors and events 
affecting crew survival. The SCSIIT report documents 
the five events that had lethal potential, and provides 
recommendations for improving survival of crews on 
future human space flight vehicles.
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Aerospace Medical Forensic Analysis 
Legal Analysis and Issues from Recovery and
Investigation of the Columbia Accident 
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Aerospace Medical
Forensic Analysis 
Michael Barratt, Robert Banks, Philip C. Stepaniak, and Helen W. Lane 
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Columbia streaking over the Owens Valley Radio Observatory in Big Pine, California
Columbia crossed the California coast west of Sacramento at 8:53:26 a.m. CST, traveling at Mach 23 and 231,600 feet. The leading edge of 
the orbiter’s wing typically reached more than an estimated 2,800ºF. Crossing California toward Nevada, the orbiter appeared to observers 
on the ground as a bright spot of light moving rapidly across the sky. Signs of debris being shed were sighted at 8:53:46 a.m. CST, when the 
superheated air surrounding the orbiter suddenly brightened, causing a noticeable streak in the orbiter’s luminescent trail. 
Human space flight involves large energies and forces 
to overcome Earth’s gravity, attain orbital velocity, and 
eventually return through the atmosphere, with flight 
hardware operating at extreme limits of performance in 
a poorly characterized environment. Although the level 
of risk to crew is understandably high, mishaps are rare 
events. When an accident does happen that involves 
human casualties, just as in the aviation world no 
investigation is complete without a forensic pathology 
analysis. That human tissue bears witness to physical 
events is well established and can be extremely useful 
in understanding the processes at work, the sequence of 
events, and causal mechanisms. These findings directly 
contribute to understanding and eventually closing 
gaps in survivability. 
After 16 days in orbit, the crew of Columbia tragically
died as the orbiter broke apart at an altitude of
between 181,000 and 140,000 feet while traveling
at approximately Mach 15. The Columbia accident
comprises the only source of information on high-
altitude hypersonic spacecraft breakup during reentry
to Earth’s atmosphere and on the resulting human
exposure to these forces. An interpretation of the
forensic findings in the context of the physical forces
involved is crucial to a complete understanding of
mishap events and crew protection factors that might
be enhanced to optimize safety and survival. This
chapter summarizes the human forensic findings of
the Columbia accident, emphasizing those that truly
contribute to our understanding. The primary aim is to
ensure that the lessons learned and recommendations
resulting from the Columbia mishap investigation are
available to current and future spacecraft designers in
the development of new vehicles and systems.
There is no evidence that the crew contributed to
this accident. 
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 Entry simulation of representative vehicle dynamics after loss of signal
with failed hydraulic pressure and elevons in full up position 
This graphic represents the sequence (1-second intervals) showing a simulation of orbiter loss of control pitch-up from GMT 13:59:37 to 
GMT 15:59:46. The Spacecraft Crew Survival Integration Investigation Team concluded that loss of control occurred as a result of the loss of 
hydraulics at GMT 13:59:37. The white line indicates vehicle trajectory relative to the ground. 
Aeromedical Forensic Analysis 
Crew awareness and actions during reentry, 
loss of signal, and loss of vehicle control and 
before the catastrophic event 
During reentry the flight deck crew of Columbia
most probably was aware of a multisystem problem
when tire pressure warnings and ambiguous gear
deployment indications occurred, involving the
left main landing gear. The flight deck crew could
only monitor the problem and acknowledge
communications from the Johnson Space Center
Mission Control Center. The orbiter then lost ground
communications at GMT 13:59:32. At the time
of loss of signal, the flight deck crew was likely
troubleshooting the caution-and-warning messages
associated with the left tire pressure, left gear
deployment, and flight-control system fault messages.
Jet firings from the orbital maneuvering system
thrusters were increasing in frequency to maintain
vehicle attitude as aerodynamic integrity became
increasingly compromised. The orbiter then lost all
hydraulic pressure for flight-control surface activation,
which further resulted in a rapid override of the orbital
maneuvering system jets; this, in combination with the
damage to the left wing, resulted in an uncontrolled
pitch-up and loss of vehicle control at GMT 13:59:37.
The orbiter motion can be described as a highly
oscillatory flat spin. The orbiter was pitching and
rolling with a strong and consistent yaw component
of the overall motion, but its “belly” was the structure
predominantly oriented to the velocity vector. After
hydraulic pressure was lost, the flight deck crew
most certainly understood that a serious situation
had developed. Evidence exists that the pilot tried to
recover hydraulics by attempting an auxiliary power
unit restart. This showed good system understanding
and an appropriate cognitive and motor response
to the emergency in the face of a hostile motion
environment. Although G loads at this time were
still relatively light, after 16 days of weightlessness
it is expected that the effects of these loads would be
magnified somewhat, producing spatial disorientation
out of proportion to that of a normal ground or
aviation population. The middeck crewmembers
had no outside visual reference, and this motion
environment potentially would have produced
greater disorientation.
The G loads in the three axes continued and the left
wing departed the vehicle. The loads were initially
low and then peaked at 3.5 G at the time of the
catastrophic event (CE), defined as separation of the
forebody from the midbody of the orbiter. The time
of the CE was approximately GMT 14:00:18, when
the orbiter was at an altitude of between 181,000
and 140,000 feet, traveling at about Mach 15. The
crew module remained intact initially after CE but
depressurized rapidly. The crew module catastrophic
event (CMCE) involved the complete breakup of the
crew module after several seconds of high G loads,
occurring at GMT 14:00:53. Bracing injuries,
catastrophic depressurization with nearly immediate
loss of consciousness and pulmonary barotrauma, and
other mechanical injuries all occurred in sequence
during the 35-second interval between CE and CMCE. 
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Crew Configuration During Reentry 
The orbiter had a habitable volume of 2,525 ft3 and consisted of three levels: flight deck, middeck, and utility 
area. The flight deck, located on the top level, accommodated the commander (CDR), pilot (PLT), and two 
mission specialists (MS). The middeck, located directly below the flight deck, accommodated three additional 
crewmembers: two mission specialists and a payload specialist (PS). The crewmembers’ preparation for 
reentry into the Earth’s atmosphere included securing the crew compartment, setting up the seats, and 
donning their Advanced Crew Escape Suit (ACES), which included the suits, helmets, oxygen supply, gloves, 
and radios. For landing they connected their restraint system. 
Middeck seating (views from aft to starboard and forward to port) 
Flight deck seating 
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Orbiter Motion Entry Simulation and Representative Vehicle Dynamics After Loss of 
Control and Before the Catastrophic Event 
This graphic illustrates a possible sequence of dynamic vehicle motions derived from best fit synthesis of 
ballistic data, imagery and debris analysis. The view is from a point in front of the orbiter’s direction of travel, 
looking backward along the velocity vector. The snapshot for GMT 14:00:04 shows the left wing departing 
intact. In reality, the left wing did not come off all at one time but was shedding debris over a period of time. 
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The forensic medical findings of injuries incurred
during and after the CE and the CMCE can be
categorized as follows: 
1. Mechanical injuries incurred during the CE 
2. Depressurization injuries incurred after the CE 
3. Mechanical injuries incurred after the CE and before 
the CMCE 
4. Thermal injuries incurred after the CMCE and 
exposure to the atmospheric environment 
5. Common injuries incurred during the CMCE and 
ground impact 
Mechanical injuries incurred during the 
catastrophic event
Very soon after loss of vehicle control, the left wing 
shed debris for a period of time and then departed the 
vehicle, followed by the CE, separation of the orbiter 
forebody from the midbody. Analysis of structural 
debris supports the hypothesis that an impact occurred 
between the forward fuselage (outer vehicle shell) 
and the crew module (internal pressure vessel) in the 
area of Volume E on the floor of the middeck. When 
the vehicle forebody separated, all resources from the 
midbody were lost, including electrical power from the 
fuel cells required for lighting, crew displays, radios, 
intercommunications, ventilation, and the main oxygen 
supply. At this time the entire crew may have realized 
that it was not a recoverable situation. 
Probably at this time some crewmembers responded 
to the motion associated with the CE by bracing 
against structures, subsequently sustaining defensive-
type injuries. Bracing indicates that crewmembers 
were capable of conscious and volitional action up to 
this point. Shoulder harness restraint was apparently 
ineffective because of the relatively low acceleration 
rates involved compared with the designed impact rates 
required to lock the inertia reels on the restraints. 
Catastrophic Event 
This graphic illustrates the catastrophic event (CE). The CE was a period during which the orbiter vehicle was 
undergoing a major structural breakup. At this time, the accelerations on the forebody were estimated to be 
3.5 G. The breakup sequence progressed over several seconds. Analysis of ground-based video of the event 
established the first detectable signs at GMT 14:00:18. On the basis of engineering analysis, the CE is thought 
to have started with the compromise of the payload bay doors, exposing the payload bay longeron sill to entry 
heating. As shown in the illustration, the forebody rotated away, from its starboard side to its port side. As 
the forebody separated from the midbody, various power, data, and life-support systems failed and the crew 
module moved forward with the forward fuselage. 
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Depressurization 
The Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team report concluded that failure of the starboard
x-link attachment resulted in separation of the forward fuselage. This failure allowed the crew module to
move within the forward fuselage, resulting in damage to the crew module pressure vessel in the area of
Volume E (red circle). 
The depressurization was due to relatively small cabin breaches above and below the middeck floor and was 
not a result of a major loss of cabin structural integrity. The crew compartment depressurization began at GMT 
14:00:18. The depressurization rate was high enough to incapacitate the crewmembers within seconds. As the 
crew module lost structural integrity, it was fully depressurized by GMT 14:00:59, if not sooner. 
View of starboard side 
Bracing Injuries 
Probably during the catastrophic event, the crewmembers responded to the motion by bracing themselves
against structures, resulting in sustained defensive-type injuries. The photos show how the crew may have
braced themselves. These injuries indicate that crewmembers were capable of conscious and volitional
action up to this point. This bracing caused fractures as illustrated by the schematic showing a wrist fracture. 
Demonstration of possible bracing position 
in the middeck. 
Demonstration of possible bracing positon 
using legs, middeck. 
Schematic showing defensive injury to wrist. 
Defensive injury to wrist 
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Depressurization injuries incurred after the at body temperature (Armstrong’s line, 62,000–63,500 
catastrophic event feet). This event would cause ear barotrauma with 
attendant severe pain and disorientation and rapid loss
After the forebody separated from the midbody, rapid of consciousness due to hypoxia within 3 to 10 seconds.
depressurization occurred at an altitude greater than The transient differential between alveolar and ambient 
100,000 feet. This is well above the altitude at which pressure led to massive pulmonary barotrauma with
ambient pressure is less than the vapor pressure of water alveolar rupture and hemorrhage, and all respiratory 
Tissues Showing Bubbling 
After the forebody separated from the midbody, complete depressurization occurred over a maximum
of 41 seconds and probably over much less time, with resulting cessation of respiration, hypoxia, and rapid
loss of consciousness. With pulmonary and vascular tissues exposed to near vacuum, the phenomenon
of ebullism ensued, with bubbling or vacuolation occurring in multiple tissues throughout the body.
Along with the pulmonary barotrauma seen, this rapid depressurization may have caused ear barotrauma
with attendant severe pain and
disorientation. The micrographs
illustrate the bubbling observed in
multiple tissues in crewmembers:
lung, brain, spinal cord, and
bone marrow. Formation of vapor
bubbles in body fluids occurs
when the ambient pressure falls
below the vapor pressure of
water at 98.6°F (47 mm Hg) or
applicable body temperature. 
Intra-alveolar hemorrhage in lung. Rupture of alveolar septa, the partitions 
dividing one alveolus from another. 
Bubbles in vasculature of the brain. Bubbles in spinal cord. Bubbles in lung tissue. 
Bubbles in bone marrow. Bone marrow embolus in pulmonary tissues. 
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exchange ceased. With pulmonary and vascular tissues 
exposed to near vacuum, the phenomenon of ebullism 
ensued, with bubbling or vacuolation occurring in 
multiple tissues throughout the body. One crewmember 
is known to have died from massive pulmonary 
barotrauma, as evidenced by lack of hemorrhage 
associated with subsequent tissue injuries, because of 
complete cessation of circulation. 
Although all crewmembers were wearing pressure 
suits, none managed to pull their visors down to form a 
protective pressure seal, an action that normally takes 
only a few seconds. The investigation team concluded 
that the depressurization event was sufficiently rapid 
to promptly incapacitate all crewmembers and preclude 
this response. 
Mechanical injuries incurred after the 
catastrophic event and before the crew 
module catastrophic event 
After the CE and depressurization occurred, the motion 
and acceleration dynamics rapidly became increasingly 
hostile. During this time the unconscious crewmembers 
sustained mechanical trauma and associated 
hemorrhage into soft tissues, with the exception of the 
individual who succumbed to pulmonary barotrauma. 
Active hemorrhage into injured tissue implies active 
circulation; therefore this is an important temporal 
marker for events occurring antemortem. 
An unconscious individual with an unsupported
head-neck complex is vulnerable to head flail injury.
The anterior and posterior hemorrhages found in the
neck strap muscles of most crewmembers indicated
that anterior, posterior, and lateral flail of their heads
did occur along with atlanto-occipital separation.
The unsupported head in association with the weight
of the helmet and the helmet neck-ring geometry
provided a fulcrum that caused cervical spine fractures
together with neck injuries such as fractures of the
hyoid bone and thyroid cartilage. 
Most crewmembers sustained head trauma from internal 
(head-to-helmet) and external (helmet-to-structure) 
impacts consistent with movement of the head within a 
non-conformal helmet. These injuries included soft-
tissue scalp hematomas, depressed skull fractures, small 
hemorrhages into the subdural space, and petechial 
hemorrhages of the brain parenchyma. Also noted were 
subarachnoid hemorrhages of the spinal cord. 
Correlations between the injuries sustained and
the restraint system contribute to understanding
of safety system function. With one exception, all
Tissues Showing Bleeding due to Mechanical Trauma 
Between the catastrophic event and the crew module catastrophic event, the unconscious crewmembers
(with the exception of one crewmember who succumbed to pulmonary barotrauma) sustained mechanical
trauma and associated bleeding into soft tissues. Active hemorrhage into injured tissue implies active
circulation, as seen in these slides of crewmember neck muscles. This is an important temporal marker for
events that occurred antemortem. 
Petechial hemorrhages in neck muscle. Streak hemorrhage in neck muscle. 
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Head and Neck Injuries 
An unconscious individual with an unsupported head-neck complex is vulnerable to head flail injury. The 
unsupported head, in association with the weight of the helmet and the helmet neck-ring geometry, provided 
a fulcrum that caused cervical spine fractures together with neck injuries such as fracture of the hyoid bone 
and thyroid cartilage. The following illustrations show the effects of the helmet and the suit and harness on the 
cervical spine and the soft tissues of the head and neck complex. This illustration shows the atlanto-occipital 
dislocation (red arrows) and distraction fractures (yellow arrows) of the cervical spine. 
Head Injuries Caused by the Non-conformal Helmet 
Soft-tissue injuries in the area shown by the red circle on the manikin were caused by impacts with the
helmet, which was non-conformal. The Advanced Crew Escape Suit helmet shown is not from STS-107 but
is identical to the STS-107 helmets. 
Head strike within non-conformal helmet. 
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crewmembers were restrained in their entry seats by a
standard five-point harness system. (One crewmember
was incompletely restrained, suggesting that donning
restraints was in progress at the time of CE.) A lap belt
secured the lower torso and a crotch strap prevented
“submarining,” keeping the occupant from sliding
forward and beneath the lap belt. Two shoulder harnesses
attached to an inertial reel via the inertial reel strap that
was designed to secure the upper torso. Engineering
analysis of the STS-107 restraints indicated that the
inertial reel straps did not lock and were extended during
dynamic motion, leaving the upper torso unsupported
and free to move. As stated above, this happened because
the strap velocity was lower than the locking threshold
velocity of the inertia reel system, which was designed
for higher velocity transient acceleration associated with
impact. With the upper body functionally unrestrained
and the lap belts secured, the crewmembers sustained
lower spinal and pelvic fractures; these injuries were
also noted to have a hemorrhagic component in most
crewmembers. The lumbar spine injuries (Chance fracture
or transverse vertebral body fracture) resulted from the
sudden forward and downward rotation of the torso
over the lap belts. This injury pattern is similar to those
experienced by victims of automobile accidents who were
secured with only a lap belt in a forward impact. 
Crew Restraints 
Crewmembers were restrained in their seats by a five-point harness system (diagram on the left). A lap belt 
secures the lower torso and a crotch strap prevents “submarining,” keeping the occupant from sliding forward 
and beneath the lap belt. The photo of a technician shows how the two shoulder harnesses attach to the 
restraint buckle. The drawing of the seat with restraints shows that the two shoulder harnesses attach to the 
inertial reel by means of the inertial reel strap which was designed to secure the upper torso. 
Illustration (left) and photograph (right) of five-point harness. 
Headrest 
Inertial
reel strap 
Seatback 
Seat pan 
Shoulder 
belts 
Lap 
belts 
Buckle 
Crotch 
belt 
Five-point
restraint 
Restraint buckle
for the 5-point
harness system 
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Chance-type Fracture 
This is an illustration of the mechanism causing 
lumbar spine Chance-type fracture. With the 
upper body functionally unrestrained and the lap 
belts secured, the unconcious crewmembers’ 
lumbar spine injuries occurred from the sudden 
forward and downward rotation of the torso over 
the lap belts. 
Flail Injuries 
All crewmembers exhibited upper- and lower 
extremity fractures consistent with deceleration 
injury or aerodynamic flail. Using a model that 
analyzed the possible strike envelopes of the 
seated crewmembers, correlation was found 
between the possible injury locations and the 
actual sites found at autopsy. The static flail 
analysis predicted that most injuries would be 
located in the distal limbs and parietal skull, with 
some slight variations due to crewmember seat 
location. The shaded areas represent the common 
flail injury patterns found. The illustration is based 
on an analysis using a static strike envelope. 
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All crewmembers had exhibited upper and lower 
extremity fractures consistent with deceleration injury 
(G flail) before CMCE and aerodynamic flail after 
CMCE and exposure to windblast. Using a model that 
analyzed the possible strike envelopes of the seated 
crew, correlation was found between the possible 
injury locations and the actual sites. The static flail 
analysis predicted that most injuries would be located 
in the distal limbs and parietal skull, with some slight 
variations due to crewmember seat location. 
Thermal injuries after the crew module 
catastrophic event and exposure to the 
atmospheric environment 
Forensic evidence supported exposure of the deceased 
crewmembers to at least two separate thermal events. 
The first was a directional thermal event that occurred 
while the crewmembers were suited and restrained 
in their seats. This first thermal event is consistent 
with a breach of the crew module pressure vessel in 
the vicinity of the starboard x-link when the forebody 
separated from the midbody at the CE. A breach in 
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The Initial Stages of the Destruction of the Crew Module with the Separation of the 
Forward Fuselage from the Body of the Crew Module 
Position and condition of starboard x-link. 
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this location permitted thermal energy to enter the 
crew cabin after atmosphere evacuation had occurred. 
Analysis of thermal skin burn patterns suggested that 
the burns initially occurred within the crew cabin with 
crewmembers in their seats protected by relatively intact 
suits. As the thermal environment worsened, the suit 
material was weakened and failed, allowing second-
and third-degree burns and thermal shadowing patterns 
consistent with thermal intrusion. 
The second thermal event occurred during the interval
from the start of crew module disintegration at GMT
14:00:53 through the total dispersal of the crew
compartment structures at GMT 14:01:10. In this
time interval the deceased crewmembers underwent
additional mechanical trauma. As the remaining
forward fuselage and crew module structures were
disintegrating, exposure to windblast and possibly
shock wave forces rapidly stripped the damaged
Advanced Crew Escape Suits (ACES) from the
deceased crewmembers. The denuded crewmember
remains then passed through the surrounding hot gas
and molten metal mist “cloud,” incurring additional,
universal second-degree flash burns and molten metal
Burns During the Thermal Events 
These graphics illustrate the thermal skin burn patterns that occurred during the thermal events with the 
breakup of the crew module and its dispersal. The crewmembers had  2nd- and 3rd-degree burns and 
patterns of thermal shadowing with molten metal deposition. The thermal event was severe enough to cause 
portions of the ACES material to adhere to the skin of one crewmember. 
All crewmembers exhibited some degree of 
increased thermal injury/metal deposition on 
their heads and necks consistent with exposure 
while wearing an ACES with helmet visors open. 
Some shadowing from the communications 
cap was visible on some crewmembers. It 
is therefore concluded, from the burn/metal 
deposition patterns, that the initial burns 
occurred with the crewmembers in the cabin, 
in their seats, helmet visors up and covered 
by a relatively intact ACES that afforded them 
some thermal protection. 
Burn and metal deposition patterns 
The shadowing is caused by some of the suit 
materials protecting the crewmembers from the 
thermal intrusion into the crew module. 
Burns on the feet 
The feet of several crewmembers exhibited 
thermal injuries in areas coinciding with the 
nylon panels of the boots vs. the leather 
portions. These injuries are consistent with 
initial failure of the nylon panels and boot 
soles. The feet of several of the crewmembers 
exhibited a greater degree of burn/material 
deposition on the forefoot consistent with 
failure of the boots at the mid-sole. All of these 
second-degree burns were associated with 
“molten metal mist” deposits. This illustrates the burn mapping of a deceased crewmember’s foot. 
Shadowing
from
communications
cap 
Shadowing 
from ACES 
Area of 
burn/material 
deposition 
Area of adhered Maximum Absorbent Garment (MAG) material 
Shadowing from parachute harness 
Areas of third degree burn 
Area of second degree burn 
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No Evidence of Fire 
No deposition of foreign material or evidence of thermal injury was present in any of the respiratory tracts 
available for review. Forensic analysis showed no significant levels of carbon monoxide or cyanide 
(combustion by-products) in body fluids. These facts indicate that there was no fire in the crew module 
before breathing cessation and crew death. These micrographs show a representative section of a 
crewmember’s trachea with intact cilia, free of deposits and evidence of thermal injury. 
Thermal Injuries 
During the second thermal event, the crew module catastrophic event through total dispersal of the crew 
module, the unconscious crewmembers passed through a surrounding mist “cloud” of hot gas and molten 
metal, which caused additional 2nd-degree flash burns. 
These slides show examples of the superficial skin burns incurred by crewmembers. The left-hand image (20X) is stained with a
trichrome stain and demonstrates a superficially burned epidermis in red and the spared deeper reticular dermis in blue (characteristic
of a flash burn). The right-hand image is a higher magnification (40X) hematoxylin-eosin stained skin section showing the metallic
deposits over the burned surface. 
Metallic Mist 
Deposition 
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deposition caused by conductive and irradiative transfer
of thermal energy. The FBI material analysis laboratory,
using scanning electron microscopy and energy-
dispersive x-ray spectrometry, identified the following
elements present in the skin deposits: aluminum,
calcium (normal component of skin), copper, iron
(normal component of skin), manganese (normal
component of skin), nickel, phosphorus (normal
component of skin), silicon, sulfur (normal component
of skin), and titanium.
No deposition of foreign material or evidence of 
thermal injury was present in any of the respiratory 
tracts available for review in spite of the presence 
of superficial facial burning associated with the first 
thermal event while crewmembers were still suited and 
seated. Forensic analysis showed no significant levels of 
carbon monoxide or cyanide (combustion by-products) 
in body fluids. This is consistent with the complete 
cessation of respiration after depressurization, shortly 
after the CE and before the thermal intrusion. 
After these two thermal events, the crew remains
were exposed to the atmospheric environment at
an altitude above 100,000 feet. The remains were
subjected to additional thermal injuries during the
hypersonic to subsonic deceleration. The findings
indicated exposure to near vacuum, aerodynamic
heating, highly reactive monatomic oxygen, and
subfreezing ambient temperatures during the free-fall
descent. As human exposure to these environmental
extremes is not well documented, the contribution
of these environmental conditions to the pathology
findings remains uncertain. 
Common injuries incurred during the crew 
module catastrophic event and ground impact 
The common injuries that occurred during the CMCE
period were consistent with the application of high
dynamic loading, from complex deceleration forces,
to the seated, partially restrained and unconscious
crewmembers. Engineering and ballistic analyses of
the CMCE supports the scenario that the middeck floor
and everything attached to it separated from the crew
module structure first. When this lower half of the
crew module separated from the flight deck “pod,”
it is likely that a negative G
z
 load was imparted along
the hinge line where the middeck floor was attached
Mechanical Injuries During the Destruction of the Crew Module 
Mechanical injuries occurred during the destruction of the crew module. The high negative Gz translational 
and rotational decelerations at the time of module disintegration were thought to be the major cause of 
the most severe traumatic mechanical injuries sustained by the deceased crew. An example of these injuries 
is the basilar skull fracture depicted in this graphic. The fracture was probably caused by the neck ring on 
the Advanced Crew Escape Suit sticking the lower jaw as the neck ring departed the body due to windblast. 
All crewmembers but one exhibited these basilar skull fractures. 
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Illustration of the mechanism of basilar skull fracture. 
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Plot of Relative Range and Recovery Locations Based on the Ballistic Coefficients of the 
Principal Human Remains Found on the Ground 
to the aft bulkhead. Because of this negative G
z 
loading, the middeck floor and the Environmental
Control and Life Support System bay would have
quickly disintegrated together with the middeck floor
panels. On the basis of structural design analysis,
thermal damage, and position in the debris field, the
flight deck “pod” and aft bulkhead are thought to
have remained intact for a slightly longer time.
At the time of disintegration, the high negative G
z 
translational and rotational decelerations were thought
to be the major cause of the most severe traumatic
mechanical injuries sustained by the deceased
crewmembers. These mechanical injuries included
hemi-transection associated with multiple flexion-
type distraction fractures of the spine and separation
fractures of the pelvis. In addition to the major
traumatic injuries involving the pelvis and spine, all
but one crewmember exhibited basilar skull fractures,
which are thought to have been caused by the neck ring
on the ACES striking the lower jaw as the neck ring
departed due to windblast; all exhibited comminuted
fractures of facial bone(s); and all exhibited
other multiple skeletal fractures, disarticulations,
dislocations, and amputations. Although some of the
flail injuries were sustained while the crewmembers
were restrained in their seats, other flail injuries
were inflicted during a period of deceleration from
supersonic to subsonic velocity, during free-fall descent 
and ground impact. Some crewmembers’ remains found 
later in the recovery process had evidence of insect and 
animal predation. 
Gross examination of the recovered remains revealed 
that the occupants on the starboard side of the vehicle 
incurred a greater degree of mechanical trauma than 
those on the port side, suggesting that more energy was 
imparted to these individuals. This is consistent with 
the calculated ballistic coefficients of the remains and 
where the crewmembers were found on the ground 
during the recovery operations. The ballistic analysis 
could not be used to determine the sequence and the 
release times of the crewmembers. 
Summary 
In summary, the forensic analysis of the Columbia 
accident led to the following conclusions regarding 
lethal events and lessons learned: 
1. The STS-107 crew died as a direct result of a rapid 
depressurization causing pulmonary barotrauma and 
ebullism, followed by blunt-force trauma. 
2. An off-nominal dynamic G environment, combined 
with a lack of restraint of the upper body and 
nonconforming helmets, contributed significantly 
to lethal trauma. 
3. A third traumatic event consisted of thermal intrusion 
into the crew cabin, causing extensive second- and 
third-degree burns on all crewmembers. 
4. A fourth traumatic event occurred when the
crewmembers separated from the crew module
and were subjected to restraint injuries, transonic
velocity changes, windblast, aerodynamic flail,
exposure to near vacuum, aerodynamic heating,
monatomic oxygen, and subfreezing temperatures
during free fall. 
5. The fifth traumatic event was ground impact. 
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Aerospace Medical Forensic Findings
and Recommendations 
Finding 1: Spacecraft accidents are rare; each event
adds critical knowledge and understanding for
future spacecraft designs and for improvement of
operational procedures.
Recommendation 1: As was executed with the
Columbia mishap, spacecraft accident investigation plans
must include provisions for debris recovery and storage,
data preservation, and security. The investigators must
catalog, store, and preserve all debris and data so it will
be available for future study.
Finding 2: Crewmembers exhibited injuries consistent 
with bracing, a conscious and volitional act. The loads 
associated with the CE, together with the lax shoulder 
harnesses and mass of the crew escape equipment, 
contributed to these injuries. 
Recommendation 2: The design of the restraint system
should be integrated with the design of suit and seat, so
that crewmembers are not required to use their arms and
legs to brace against nominal and off-nominal loads. 
Finding 3a: The unprotected crewmembers (helmet 
visors open, some gloves off) were exposed to a 
depressurization event sufficient to cause severe 
barotrauma, hypoxic hypoxemia, ebullism, and death. 
Finding 3b: The depressurization incapacitated the crew
so rapidly that they were not able to configure their crew
survival equipment (e.g., lower their helmet visors). 
Finding 3c: When the ACES is properly deployed 
(visor down, gloves on, O
2
 flowing), it is incompatible 
with the Shuttle hazard controls for preventing cabin 
fires, impedes operation of user interfaces, and interferes 
with crew communications. 
Recommendation 3a: Future spacecraft and crew 
survival systems should be designed so that the 
equipment and procedures provided to protect the crew 
in emergency situations are compatible with nominal 
operations. Future spacecraft vehicles, equipment, 
and mission timelines should be designed so that a 
suited crewmember can perform all operations without 
compromising the configuration of the survival suit 
during critical phases of flight. 
Recommendation 3b: A feature should be incorporated
into the suit helmet/O
2
 system that will automatically
activate (lower the visor and turn on O
2
) upon cabin
depressurization. Operational and design changes must
also be made so the integrity of the ACES is ensured and
prolonged emergency “in suit” O
2
 breathing is permitted
without exceeding the O
2
 cabin safety fire limits. 
Recommendation 3c: None.
Finding 4: Ebullism or bubble formation was 
present in examined tissues (brain, spinal cord, lung, 
thyroid, myocardium, and bone marrow), indicating 
that the unprotected crew was exposed to a pressure 
altitude above 62,000 ft (Armstrong’s line, the altitude
that produces an atmospheric pressure so low [0.0618 
atmosphere] that water boils at the normal temperature of 
the human body: 98.6°F [37°C]). 
Recommendation 4: None.
Finding 5: Injuries of the lower lumbar spine, upper 
body extremity, and skull were consistent with 
crewmembers’ torsos flailing forward and downward 
while anchored by their seat belts. This evidence 
indicates that those so injured had their seat belts in 
place, but their inertial reel straps were extended. 
Recommendation 5: The use of inertial reels in future
restraint systems should be redesigned to ensure that
they are capable of protecting crewmembers during
off-nominal situations (for example, seat belts should be
wider, and extremity flail protection could be provided)
without active crew intervention. 
Finding 6: The crewmembers had lethal injuries due to
the seat restraint system. 
Recommendation 6: The design of the seat restraint 
systems should include considerations to preclude 
restraint-induced injuries during dynamic motion (e.g., 
NASCAR racing-type straps). 
Finding 7: Most crewmembers had hemorrhage into 
the anterior and posterior strap muscles of the neck 
and fractures of cervical vertebrae. The unsupported 
head (nonconformal helmet) in association with the 
helmet neck ring acting as a fulcrum contributed to the 
neck flail injuries.
Recommendation 7: The suit-seat-restraint system
should provide support for the head-neck complex (e.g.,
conformal helmets, head and neck restraint-type devices). 
Finding 8: All crewmembers had evidence of global 
second-degree burns with deposition of metallic particles 
and pyrolysis products on skin surfaces. 
Recommendation 8: Future crew cabin designs should 
protect the crew in the event of vehicle disintegration 
(e.g., crew encapsulation). 
Finding 9: The crewmembers’ body fluids had no
significant levels of carbon monoxide or cyanide
(combustion by-products), and they had intact ciliated
columnar cells in their tracheas with no evidence of
deposition or other thermal injury to the respiratory
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tracts. This indicates that there was no cabin fire
before depressurization and that the crew had ceased
breathing before any thermal intrusion into the crew
module occurred.
Recommendation 9: None.
Conclusion
One of the legacies of the Columbia accident was
the documentation of the catastrophic injuries of the
crewmembers themselves. NASA, through the efforts
of the Crew Survival Working Group, the Spacecraft
Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team, the Office
of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, the Armed
Forces Institute of Pathology, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and the Biodynamic Research Corporation,
developed findings and recommendations about the
effects of a high-altitude hypervelocity spacecraft
accident on the crewmembers. These medical findings
and recommendations provide the basis for improved
systems design, engineering, and operations of human
spacecraft to enable a crew to survive such a mishap
in the future. We honor the Columbia crew for the
significant aeromedical lessons learned from this mishap.
Integrated Summary Timeline of Crew-related Events 
A high-level overview depicts the probable timeline of medically significant events, illustrating their temporal 
relationship with major environmental conditions. The illustration also emphasizes the short period of time over 
which these events occurred: about 35 seconds from the forward fuselage separation (catastrophic event or 
CE) to the crew module disintegration (crew module catastrophic event or CMCE). The cabin pressure profile 
presented is a reconstructed scenario based on debris analysis and ballistics. The rapid depressurization event 
started at GMT 14:00:18 with an uncertainty of up to +10 seconds. 
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Legal Analysis and Issues 
from Recovery and Investigation
of the Columbia Accident 
Donna M. Shafer and Amy V. Xenofos 
Immediate Response Phase 
Despite the extraordinary focus and perseverance of 
the personnel at NASA, the Columbia accident was not 
the first time NASA has lost a Space Shuttle orbiter 
and its crew—Challenger was tragically lost 73 seconds 
after lift-off from the Kennedy Space Center in 1986. 
NASA learned and applied many lessons from the 
Challenger accident, including a need for an overall 
contingency plan to be in place as well as a plan for an 
independent assessment. As a result, today at NASA, 
activation of an investigation board is required for any 
event involving serious injury or loss of life, other 
serious mishaps, or significant public interest. The plan 
to activate an investigation board was accomplished 
through the implementation of NASA Policy Directive 
8621.1, NASA Mishap and Close Call Reporting, 
Investigating, and Recordkeeping Policy. 
After the Columbia accident, NASA immediately
established recovery and investigation teams. At
10:30 a.m. on February 1, 2003, NASA Administrator
Sean O’Keefe activated the International Space
Station and Space Shuttle Mishap Investigation Board,
naming retired naval Admiral Harold Gehman, Jr. as
its chairman. The board renamed itself the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). On the NASA
side, we established the Space Shuttle Mishap
Investigation Team (MIT) and the Columbia Task
Force (CTF). The CTF served as the primary interface
between the Agency and the CAIB. The MIT was
responsible for gathering and preserving evidence to
allow the CAIB to conduct its analysis and make a
causal determination. By the evening of February 1,
2003, the MIT arrived at Barksdale Air Force Base and
began organizing its efforts.
This chapter will focus on some of the matters addressed
by the NASA legal community. First we cover the
primary legal framework within which the recovery and
investigation efforts were completed. Then we cover
the methods used in the collection and control of the
The Johnson Space Center Legal Office logo at the time of the 
Columbia Space Shuttle Accident. 
enormous amount of data involved in the aftermath
of the accident. Next, we will look separately at the
recovery and investigation phases and the unique legal
questions raised by each. Finally, we will discuss the
claims associated with the search and recovery efforts,
survivor privacy issues, balancing assessments, the Crew
Survival Investigation Report, and some lessons learned.
Primary Legal Framework 
This section will describe some of the more important 
laws and legal frameworks within which NASA
conducted activities related to the Columbia mishap. 
This framework is by no means all-inclusive. 
National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958: The 
National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (Space 
Act) created NASA to carry out US policy that 
“activities in space should be devoted to peaceful 
purposes for the benefit of all mankind.” From a 
legal perspective, the Space Act encompasses almost 
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any situation and is one of the most flexible pieces of 
organic legislation written for a federal agency. 
Under the Space Act, NASA may enter into 
and perform such contracts, leases, cooperative 
agreements, or other transactions as may be 
necessary in the conduct of its work and on such 
terms as it may deem appropriate. This provision 
gave NASA the ability to enter into agreements with 
some of the more than 100 state and local agencies 
and individuals in Texas, Louisiana, New Mexico, 
Nevada, and Utah, who assisted NASA in the search 
for debris. The Space Act was also used in making 
initial preparations for conducting investigative tests 
in support of the CAIB. 
Stafford Act and Emergency Assistance Act:
Ultimately the Space Act did not play a significant 
role during the recovery efforts because the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) became 
involved. On February 1 and reiterated on February 
6, 2003, President Bush issued a declaration, under 
the Stafford Act and Emergency Assistance Act, of 
emergency conditions in certain areas of the United 
States relating to the loss of the Space Shuttle 
Columbia. The Stafford Act was drafted to provide 
an orderly and continuing means of assistance by the 
federal government to state and local governments 
in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate 
suffering and damage resulting from disasters. The 
basis for this presidential declaration included the 
fact that the Space Shuttle and the space program 
are federal property and federal programs. The 
memo issued by the White House authorized FEMA
to coordinate and direct other federal agencies and 
to fund activities not otherwise authorized. FEMA
was instructed to consult with the governor of any 
affected state before providing assistance. This is 
because FEMA Public Assistance grants are given 
only to states, and the state distributes money to 
qualified applicants. 
Freedom of Information Act: The Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) was enacted in 1966 and 
generally provides that any person has the right 
to request access to federal agency records or 
information. Nine statutory exemptions authorize 
withholding of certain information, including 
information of a sensitive nature. FOIA exemptions 
found in 5 U.S.C. § 552(d) include (1) classified 
information, (2) internal personnel rules and 
policies, (3) information exempt under other laws, 
(4) confidential business information, (5) internal 
government communications, (6) personal privacy 
interests, (7) records or information compiled for 
law enforcement purposes, (8) records related 
to the regulation or supervision of financial 
institutions, and (9) geological information. For 
any exemption cited by an agency as a reason to 
withhold requested information, an administrative 
appeal process is described in NASA regulations 
available to the requestor. One of the lessons 
learned from the Challenger accident was that the 
Agency should release as much information as it 
is legally authorized to release without the need 
of a FOIA request. Even though the CAIB and the 
Agency learned this lesson and proactively released 
as much information as possible, without in any 
way disrupting or jeopardizing the integrity of the 
investigation, the number of requests specifically 
related to the accident still totaled nearly 500. 
Other Acts that played a significant role include the 
Privacy Act of 1974 and, to a much lesser degree, 
the Arms Export Control Act (and its implementing 
regulations: the International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations [ITAR] and the Export Administration 
Regulations) and the Federal Advisory Committee Act. 
Privacy Act: This Act is a companion to the FOIA. 
It allows individuals to seek access to agency 
records about themselves. The Act also restricts the 
disclosure of personally identifiable information by 
federal agencies. The essential feature of both the 
Privacy Act and FOIA is that they make agencies 
accountable for information disclosure policies 
and practices. If a record cannot be released, the 
requestor is entitled to be informed of the rationale 
for the denial and has a right to appeal the denial as 
well as challenge it in court. 
Export Control: The existing NASA export control 
process was used to facilitate public releases of 
information by the CAIB. The Space Shuttle 
Program Office Export Control Representative 
reviewed all NASA data turned over to the CAIB 
and made a written recommendation concerning 
releasability of that information. It was important to 
sensitize individuals unfamiliar with NASA data to 
the fact that much of the Shuttle data is controlled 
by ITAR. As the cognizant Agency, NASA had the 
authority to approve such data for public release. 
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Guide to the Law 
NASA’s actions are governed by three levels of 
requirements: Federal Law, which defines what 
we must do; Federal Regulations, which define 
how we implement Federal Law; and Federal 
Policy, which defines how we will exercise our 
discretion under the Regulations. Below is a list of 
all the Federal laws and regulations discussed in 
the chapter, along with a citation, to aid readers 
interested in further research. 
Federal Law 
National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, 
51 U.S.C. § 201 
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 
Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, as amended 
Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 
22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2799 
Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 
5 U.S.C. apps. §§ 1-16, as amended 
Federal Regulations 
Availability of Agency Records to Members of 
the Public, 14 C.F.R. 1206 
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), 
22 C.F.R. §§ 120-130 
Export Administration Regulations (EAR), 
15 C.F.R. §§ 730-774 
Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA): The
purpose of the FACA is to ensure that advice
rendered to the executive branch of the US
government is both objective and accessible to
the public. All of the formalities required by the
Act for record keeping and publications were
not compatible with the broadly defined, time-
intensive Columbia accident investigation or
with the effective oversight of more than 100
staff members and thousands of debris searchers.
Because of a number of practical considerations, all
CAIB members who were not already employees
or officers of the United States were hired as
full-time federal employees. However, (5 U.S.C.
app. 3(2) provides that FACA does not apply to
committees “comprised wholly of full-time officers
or employees of the federal government.”) Even
though the Act was therefore not applicable to the
CAIB’s activities, the Board resolved to comply, to
the maximum extent practicable, with its standards. 
Collection and Control Methods 
The recovery of human remains began immediately, 
and within only 10 days of the accident, February 10, 
2003, NASA Human Remains for Columbia Recovery 
Guidelines had been drafted and concurred on by 
NASA, FBI, FEMA, the Office of the Armed Forces 
Medical Examiners, and Air Force Mortuary Affairs. 
The objectives of the guidelines were to optimize use 
of resources available in the main search area and to 
deliver suspected human remains as soon as practical for 
definitive forensic examination. The guidelines outlined 
operations for material in the main search area near 
Lufkin, Texas, material outside the main search area, 
and late-phase operations for suspected human remains. 
Formal human remains efforts terminated on February 
13, 2003, with instructions to refer any suspected human 
remains located after that date to local law enforcement 
authorities, all of whom were instructed to contact 
USAF mortuary Affairs. NASA also provided points 
of contact within the Agency for questions concerning 
human remains, life support, or biohazards via the JSC 
Emergency Operations Center.  
With any investigation quickly comes the compilation
of data. The CAIB soon realized that the sheer volume
of available data involved with the technically complex
Space Shuttle could quite easily overwhelm them
if it was not properly cataloged. As a result, the US
Department of Justice was enlisted to assist with the
collection and control of the data for the CAIB. The US
Department of Justice Office of Litigation Support was
brought in because of their vast experience in collecting
and controlling evidence for the US attorneys conducting
litigation on behalf of the US government. Configuration
management between the CAIB and NASA was
accomplished through the Columbia Task Force. 
The CAIB Document Database contains over 35,000
records created or received by the CAIB during
its investigation. Records include testing reports,
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interim recommendations, independent assessment
team reports, presentations, photographic images,
drawings, correspondence, and e-mail messages. These
records are permanent government records that NASA
transferred to the custody of the National Archives
and Records Administration after the work of the
CAIB was completed. 
NASA maintained its own database, known as the
CTF Document Database. The CTF Database contains 
about 45,000 records that the CAIB requested,
reviewed, and used during its investigation. It is
important in noting the sheer volume of information
that there is minimal duplication between the CTF
and the CAIB databases. 
The CAIB created and controlled extensive witness 
testimonies in the formats of audio recordings, 
electronic transcripts, and interview notes. Consistent 
with longstanding practice in aircraft accident 
investigation, the CAIB granted confidentiality to 
individuals who were interviewed. The Archivist of the 
US, the chief official overseeing the operation of the 
National Archives and Records Administration, acceded 
to the CAIB’s request to restrict access to the statements 
for a period of 50 years. These statements have been 
found privileged with respect to pretrial discovery. 
The US Supreme Court has also recognized the 
privilege as exempting such statements from disclosure 
under FOIA. Also included in these records are copies 
of the written statements made by the staff of NASA’s 
Mission Control Center immediately after the accident. 
Other records were divided into permanent and
temporary records and were archived or deleted/ 
destroyed according to the appropriate disposition for
the record. Those records include interim and final report
records, public affairs records, public comment records,
CAIB World Wide Web content and Web management
records, and e-mail and word-processing system copies.
For more information, see the article “First Hand
Account of Selected Legal Issues From the Recovery
and Investigation of the Space Shuttle Columbia,”
Journal of Space Law, Volume 30, Number 1 (2004). 
Right of Entry Agreements: NASA entered into an
agreement with FEMA which included the stipulation
that NASA would not remove debris from public
and private property until the landowner signed an
unconditional authorization termed a “Right of Entry
Agreement.” The agreement included notification
that the agreement’s execution did not obligate the
government to clear the debris and contained a hold
harmless agreement for claims arising from activities
on the property.
Recovery Phase Legal Issues 
As of May 5, 2003, ground, water, and air searches 
combined covered more than 2.28 million acres, and 
about 25,000 personnel took part in the Columbia 
recovery operations. The Texas operation was unique. 
Texas was the site of the majority of debris recovered 
and had by far the largest number of state and local 
agencies with which NASA coordinated. By one count, 
about 130 different agencies were involved. Debris 
reports came in daily from 28 other states and three 
foreign countries. 
Reimbursable and Tort Claims
FEMA’s public assistance program projected
reimbursable payments in Texas and Louisiana to total
about $10.5 million; however, the parameters of the
program were such that many groups were not eligible
for FEMA support. Because FEMA’s funding efforts
were not all-inclusive, NASA took the highly unusual
step of soliciting claims. The many state agencies and
individual entities assisting NASA were all happy
to learn that NASA was being very proactive in our
efforts to ensure that all entities providing assistance
were being reimbursed by NASA. Generally, if
NASA’s search and recovery efforts led to unintended
expenses, NASA reimbursed those costs under Space
Act authority. For example, NASA paid Nacogdoches
County $4,000 for expenses incurred in moving the
Texas Spring Classic Horse Show to Navarro County.
NASA paid Stephen F. Austin State University $15,000
for the mapping work they did, associated with human
remains recovery. NASA paid Palestine Texas Regional
Medical Center $6,000 for medical transportation and
decontamination services. Carroway-Claybar Funeral
Home was reimbursed for transportation of remains. In
addition to claims from Texas and Louisiana, we paid
claims from Utah and New Mexico. NASA reviewed
about 70 requests for reimbursement from various
entities and provided compensation totaling just over
$1.2 million. NASA also provided about $90,000
resulting from153 property-damage claims. 
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For the processing of monetary claims against NASA
under the Federal Tort Claims Act or under the Space 
Act, the claimant is required to submit a claims form 
which was furnished by NASA installations upon 
request. For example, a mounted patrol officer fell off 
of his horse and broke his leg and was required to seek 
reimbursement for medical expenses under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act. 
Controlling Theft of Debris 
In an attempt to curb the desire of any individual to
retain any debris as a souvenir of an historic event,
the US Attorneys for the Southern and Eastern
Districts of Texas issued a 1-day moratorium from
prosecution for anyone who had Shuttle debris and
had not reported it or turned it in to authorities. The
NEWS RELEASE 
Office of the United States Attorney
Eastern District of Texas 
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Contact: Duncan Woodford 
DATE: February 6, 2003 Public Information Officer 
(409) 839­2538 
The United States Attorney's Office encourages residents of Texas to assist in the recovery
of debris from the wreckage of the shuttle Columbia.  Any person who is in possession or
finds debris from the space craft should immediately call the Columbia Shuttle Command
Center Debris Reporting Line at 936­699­1000 or the Johnson Space Center Emergency
Operations Center  telephone number  at  281­483­3388.  You may also  call  your  local 
sheriff's office or police department to report any items.  Individuals are strongly cautioned
not to handle or touch the debris but to contact the appropriate authorities to secure the
objects. 
To assist in the recovery effort, the U.S. Attorney's Office is offering a grace period to
anyone who turns in debris until Friday, February 7, 2003 at  5:00 p.m.  Anyone having a
piece of debris from the wreckage is strongly urged to take advantage of this period of
leniency to avoid federal prosecution and hefty fines.  After Friday afternoon, the U.S. 
Attorney's Office will  resume prosecuting  individuals who  take or  keep  pieces  of  the 
wreckage. 
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moratorium was publicized in a press release (Press
Release, US Department of Justice, US Attorney Eastern
District of Texas, First Indictments in Shuttle Debris
Recovery, Limited Prosecution Moratorium Announced,
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/txs/releases/ 
February2003/030205-columbiamoratorium.htm (Feb.
5, 2003). During the moratorium quite a few individuals
called about turning in property to NASA, including
individuals who had debris from the Challenger accident. 
Texas Death Investigation System 
The Death Investigation System in the State of Texas, 
including the state’s 254 counties, has a mixed system 
of coroners and medical examiners. The preparation 
of certificates of death includes the direction that the 
provider pronouncing death prepares a death certificate 
and sends it to proper authorities according to state and 
civil requirements. Although human remains from the 
Columbia accident were originally located in Texas, 
they were initially transported to Louisiana and then 
to Delaware. The death certificates were issued by the 
State of Texas, Angelina County, and executed by Philip 
Stepaniak, MD, with certification by the Armed Forces 
Medical Examiner, Craig Mallak, MD. The immediate 
cause of death was “blunt force and thermal injuries in 
association with exposure to extreme altitude” with an 
underlying cause of “Spacecraft Mishap.” 
Investigation Phase Legal Issues 
Survivor Privacy Rights 
As an agency, NASA flies high-performance and 
experimental vehicles in mission-oriented operations 
like the military services, but it is a more public 
organization with relatively high-profile operators. 
As a result, NASA policy for the release of sensitive 
information is necessarily a hybrid of the two 
approaches, with points at which decisions are to be 
made by and at the discretion of identified personnel. 
The aim of making NASA aircraft and spacecraft 
mishap information available is to educate the aerospace 
medical communities and to inform the design and 
development processes of new spacecraft by the lessons 
learned about crew safety and survivability. 
The privacy of an individual and surviving relatives is 
a personal and fundamental right that must be respected 
and protected. Survivor privacy rights for families of 
government employees have been recognized by the 
United States government for more than 40 years. In 
the case of Hale v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 973 
F. 2d 894, 902 (10th Cir. 1992), the court ruled that 
there was “…no public interest in photographs of the 
deceased victim, let alone one that would outweigh 
the personal privacy interests of the victim’s family” 
(Exemption 6(C), cert. granted, vacated and remanded 
on other grounds, 509 U.S. 918 (1993). In KTVY-TV
v. United States, No. 87-1432-T, slip op. at 9 (W.D. 
Okla. May 4, 1989), the court ruled that “The privacy 
rights asserted—those of the survivors and family of 
the victims in not having photographs of the bodies of 
the victims and clinical descriptions of their wounds 
being divulged—are patent and compelling and within 
the protections of the Act.” (Exemption 6(C), aff’d per 
curiam, 919 F. 2d 1465 (10th Cir. 1990)). 
The recognition of survivor privacy rights is primarily 
found in case law and government policy and 
memoranda, and stems from a long common law 
tradition of acknowledging a family’s control over the 
body and death images. After much litigation, spanning 
1987–1991, in New York Times v. NASA, 782 F. Supp. 
628, 631-32b (D.D.C. 1991), NASA’s recording of 
the voices of the Challenger crew was found properly 
withheld under FOIA exemption 6 on the basis that 
“exposure to the voice of a beloved family member 
immediately prior to death is what would cause pain…
a disruption of their peace of mind.” 
This recognition of rights protects survivors against
the clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
Concern about family is well ensconced into
investigation activities and information release.
NASA is also obligated to distribute information,
including investigational findings, to stakeholders
involved in human space flight, both government and
commercial, particularly to those who are integrating
safety and survivability elements into new designs.
The overarching goal is to prevent further losses of
crew or vehicle by incorporating observations and
lessons learned into new designs as well as ongoing
flight operations.
To best protect surviving families and also adequately 
inform communities involved in prevention, there must 
be a well-defined balance between privacy and the 
public need to know. 
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Balancing Assessment for Survivor Privacy 
Determination
To determine if information would be protected, a 
balancing assessment was made by considering the 
following factors: 
• 	Does disclosure violate a viable privacy interest? 
Privacy encompasses the identifiable living 
individual’s control of information concerning his/ 
her person. This interest extends to surviving family 
member(s) primarily under case law. 
• 	Is there a public interest in disclosure? Does it 
directly reveal operations or activities of the federal 
government? 
• 	Does public interest qualify for balancing? (Only if 
an identified public interest sheds light on NASA’s 
performance of statutory duties.) 
• 	Balance personal privacy against qualifying public 
interest. This involves assessment and comparison of 
the relative magnitudes of the two interests. 
A “public release” is any external release of data, 
including information given to the academic, 
engineering, and industrial communities involved 
in high-performance aircraft and spacecraft design, 
construction, and operation. The assessment to 
determine what information to release is informed by 
what the public needs to know. The basic guidelines of 
this assessment are as follows: 
What the public needs to know about crewmembers: 
• 	Fundamental causative factors 
• 	Factors contributing to the mishap (eye toward 
prevention), structural and medical 
• 	Circumstances of injury 
• Mechanism of injury
	
What the public does not need to know:
	
• 	Photographs, video, or other imagery of 
human remains 
• Audio of sensitive content 
• 	Medical information or levels of detail not germane 
to the understanding of the event 
• 	Information about family members or personal items 
not germane to the understanding of the event 
At the conclusion of the investigation, which can 
be defined as the release date of the investigative 
committee’s findings, NASA determined how best to use 
the sensitive information from the accident to improve 
medical care and vehicle performance and safety. A
body of stakeholders consisting of representatives from 
the JSC Flight Crew Operations Directorate (astronaut 
management), Space Life Sciences Directorate 
(medical), Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate, 
and Office of Chief Counsel informally worked together 
to determine how to do the following: 
• 	Provide for long-term curation of the medical 
and biomechanical data used and generated by 
the investigation. 
• 	Ensure that this information is used for preparing and 
educating teams for timely and correct response to 
aircraft and spacecraft mishaps. 
• 	Ensure that this information is fed into the design of 
new vehicles, if the information is deemed applicable 
to a particular aspect of design that would influence 
crew safety or survivability. 
• 	Review and approve public release of information 
related to medical and human factors of a mishap 
including the following: 
Internal NASA reports 
Academic journal articles and other publications 
Academic meetings and symposia 
Presentation to industry 
NASA routinely tries to maintain all medical data in 
non-attributable form. However, the small number of 
crewmembers involved, the unique circumstances of 
the mishap, and the large number of people involved 
in aircraft and spacecraft operations may cause 
circumstances to arise in which data are attributable to a 
specific individual. 
NASA astronauts are public figures, but they do not 
surrender all rights to privacy by placing themselves 
in the public eye, though their expectations of privacy 
certainly may be diminished. Disclosure of sensitive 
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personal information contained in an investigative 
report about a public figure is appropriate only where 
exceptional interests militate in favor of disclosure. 
Although one’s status as a public figure might tip the 
balance in favor of disclosure, a public figure does 
not, by virtue of status, forfeit all rights of privacy. 
Redaction of all identifying information is possibly 
sufficient to protect privacy interests. 
If the information at issue is particularly well known 
or is widely available within the public domain, there 
generally is no expectation of privacy. In Nat’l W. 
Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 512 F. Supp. at 461, 
the court noted that names and duty stations of most 
federal employees are routinely published and available 
through the Government Printing Office. Nor does an 
individual have any expectation of privacy with respect 
to information that the individual has made public. On 
the other hand, if the information in question was at 
some time or place available to the public, but now is 
“hard-to-obtain information,” the individual to whom 
it pertains may have a privacy interest in maintaining 
its “practical obscurity.” See Dayton Newspapers, 
Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d at 1010 (reasoning that although 
modern search engines might make even otherwise 
obscure personal information more widely available, 
that “does not mean that [individuals] have lost all traits 
of privacy” in that information); Linn v. United States 
Dep’t of Justice, No. 92-1406, 1995 WL 417810, at 31 
(D.D.C. June 6, 1995) (declaring that even if “some 
of the names at issue were at one time released to the 
general public, individuals are entitled to maintaining 
the ‘practical obscurity’ of personal information that 
is developed through the passage of time”). Public 
availability of information in question will disqualify 
it from privacy protection only where it fails the new 
“practical obscurity” standard. 
Columbia Crew Survival
Investigation Report 
As in all mishap investigations, NASA was motivated
both to understand the cause of the accident and to find
ways to prevent future accidents. Although the Columbia
accident was not survivable, the investigation looked
into the survival aspects of the accident and published
a report to recommend enhancements to equipment and
operations, to improve survivability in future accidents.
The most sensitive medical data from the accident were
not publicly released; however, we needed to balance
the protection of the privacy interests with the inclusion
of sufficient data to support the report’s conclusions. We
minimized the disclosure of medical information and
endeavored to ensure that no injury could be definitively
tied to a specific crewmember.
One of the key recommendations from the Columbia 
Crew Survival Investigation Report is that medically 
sensitive and personal effects data should always be 
protected to preserve the privacy of the victims and their 
families. Additionally, issues surrounding public release 
of this type of sensitive information during a NASA
accident investigation should be resolved and policies 
documented throughout the Agency to ensure that the 
recommendation is followed when future crew survival 
investigations are performed. The successful publication 
of the Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report
is in large part a result of the team’s tireless dedication 
to ensuring close and careful coordination with the 
surviving family members. 
Future Investigations 
In 1986 after the loss of Challenger, a Presidential 
commission was established to investigate the accident. 
This body, named the Rogers Commission, was chaired 
by William P. Rogers. In contrast, after the Columbia 
accident, the ISS and SSP Mishap Interagency 
Investigation Board, an external board, was established 
by the NASA Administrator. The positions on this 
board, renamed the Columbia Accident Investigation 
Board, were filled with employees who occupied 
specific government positions. 
To create more consistency, on December 30, 2005, 
Congress passed Public Law 109-155, the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization 
Act of 1958 as amended. This law had two provisions, 
under which NASA now operates, that pertain to 
investigation of space flight mishaps. 
One provision established a Human Space Flight 
Independent Investigation Commission, an independent 
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Presidential Commission to investigate loss of a Space 
Shuttle; loss of the International Space Station or its 
operational viability; loss of any other US space vehicle 
(owned or contracted); or loss of a crewmember or 
passenger in any of these types of space vehicle. 
Under the new law, the Commission shall, to the 
extent possible: 
• 	Investigate the incident 
• 	Determine the cause 
• 	Identify all contributing factors to the cause 
• 	Make recommendations for corrective action 
• 	Provide additional findings or recommendations 
deemed important whether or not they are 
related to the specific incident 
• 	Prepare a report to Congress, the President, 
and the public 
The other provision established recovery and 
disposition authority. Under this authority, the NASA
Administrator may take control over human remains 
and order autopsies and other scientific or medical 
tests. Additionally, each crewmember shall provide his/ 
her preferences regarding the treatment accorded to 
their remains and the Administrator shall, to the extent 
possible, respect those preferences. 
This provision does not permit the Administrator to
interfere with any federal investigation of a mishap or
accident. A crewmember is defined as an astronaut or
other person assigned to a NASA human space flight.
A NASA human space flight vehicle is a space vehicle
that is intended to transport one or more persons; is
designed to operate in outer space; and is owned by
NASA or a NASA contractor or cooperating party and
operated as part of a NASA mission or joint mission
with NASA. 
Summary 
Even though NASA understood the cause of the 
Challenger accident fairly early on, we were not 
proactive in getting information out to the public. 
After the Columbia accident, the lengthy investigation 
into the cause of the accident was conducted in an 
open and thorough manner, and records were released 
to the public as quickly as possible. Improvements that 
can be made include formalization of policies relating 
to the public release of sensitive information during 
a NASA accident investigation and documentation of 
these policies throughout the Agency, to ensure that 
future crew survival investigations are performed; 
documentation of authority for the payment of claims; 
documentation of methods for obtaining complete and 
accurate witness statements; and review of internal 
guidance on existing regulations and how those 
regulations may need to be altered with the emergence 
of commercial space flight. 
Including attorneys as an integral part of the Columbia
accident teams as they were formed enabled proactive
legal advice to be given in the areas of FOIA and
its exemptions, payment of reimbursable claims,
and protection of survivor privacy rights. The work
performed by the NASA legal team, though less visible
to the public than that of recovery teams, made possible
the expeditious recognition and resolution of legal
issues that might otherwise have encumbered progress.
One thing that was evident on February 1, 2003,
was a strong commitment and dedication among the
employees in the Agency to the mission and goals of
space exploration. 
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 Human Space Flight Incidents and
Crew Survival Lessons Learned 
Jonathan B. Clark 
This section describes human space flight incidents
and historic lessons learned related to occupant
protection and crew survivability in space exploration.
Mishaps, incidents, and close calls often serve as a
basis for making improvements in system designs,
mission architecture, and operations.
Challenges 
Crew survivability is the collective implementation of 
abort, escape, emergency egress, safe haven, emergency 
medical, and rescue capabilities throughout all phases 
of a mission. The survivability concept of operations 
includes the autonomy of systems, size of the crew, 
duration and type of life support measures, and systems 
protecting individual crewmembers. The challenges of 
developing a crew survival system include predicting 
its effect on vehicle design and performance, and 
such systems are limited in that they should not create 
added risks to the crew or significantly limit spacecraft 
capability, affordability, and sustainability. Survival and 
escape systems that jeopardize nominal operations may 
defeat overall mission success. The main challenges 
are to strengthen the ability to keep the crew alive and 
return them to Earth safely in response to an imminent 
catastrophic condition. 
Major Historical Mishaps 
Human space flight is extremely risky, and threats
to crew health have happened in all mission phases
including ground testing, launch pad aborts, ascent, orbit,
reentry, landing, and post-landing. Fatalities related to
space operations include 5 Russian fatalities: 1 during
an altitude chamber oxygen (O2) fire and 4 on reentry
and landing (Soyuz 1 and Soyuz 11). The US has had
18 fatalities: 3 during ground testing (Apollo 1 crew
cabin fire), 7 on ascent (Challenger accident), and 8
on reentry (7 in the Columbia accident and 1 during a
high-altitude X-15 flight). Catastrophic loss of crewed
launch vehicles has occurred on the pad (Soyuz 18A)
and on ascent (Soyuz T10A); both of the Soyuz crews
survived. Reentry anomalies have occurred frequently
and are often due to vehicle configuration or faulty
separation from modules. Landing and post-impact
issues also occur, including hard-impact injuries and
inability of rescue forces to reach a crew in a timely
fashion. On-orbit space flight emergencies have included
cabin pressure loss, fire, and toxic environment. Also,
evacuations from space have occurred due to intractable
headaches following combustion event (Salyut 5/1976),
for fever and urinary infection (Salyut 7/1985), and
for a cardiac irregularity (Mir/1987). Space flyers and
ground controllers have made human errors to which
near-catastrophes and effects on mission milestones were
attributed in the following programs: Mercury, Gemini,
Apollo, Space Shuttle, and Russian Mir.
Ground System and Vacuum Chamber 
Test Incidents 
Accidents have also occurred during vacuum chamber 
tests, used to evaluate equipment at high altitude. 
During a chamber ground test in 1961, a Russian 
crewmember died when an alcohol wipe hit a hot plate 
and started a fire in the oxygen-rich chamber. 
In 1966 a spacesuit technician experienced rapid
decompression to 120,000 ft altitude equivalent, and
recalled the saliva boiling off his tongue as he passed
out. He regained consciousness once the chamber
pressure increased to that of 14,000 ft altitude equivalent
and suffered no neurological sequelae and was not
hospitalized. In another case occurring in an industrial
vacuum chamber in 1982, a technician was accidentally
decompressed to greater than 74,000 ft, and remained
above 63,000 ft for 1 to 3 minutes. He underwent
hyperbaric recompression for 5 hours, and by 24 hours
he was awake and alert. At a 1-year follow-up he was
neurologically normal. The lessons from these vacuum
chamber events are that exposure to near-vacuum for
seconds is survivable with no medical care, and exposure
to near-vacuum for a minute or two is survivable with
aggressive medical care. A field treatment protocol for
ebullism and vacuum exposure is now available.
On January 27, 1967, the three US Apollo 1 
crewmembers died in a cabin fire when an electrical 
short circuit occurred during a test in a high-O2 
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On January 27, 1967, a flash fire swept through the Apollo 1 Command 
Module during a launch rehearsal test. Astronauts Virgil “Gus” Grissom, 
Ed White, and Roger Chaffee perished in the fire. 
atmosphere. An accident board listed findings, 
determinations, and recommendations. The conditions 
leading to the disaster were summarized as follows: 
• 	Failed to identify the test as hazardous – 100-percent
pure oxygen cabin atmosphere at 16.7 psi. 
• 	Spacecraft inward opening hatch required at least 
90 seconds for either internal or external removal and 
crew egress. 
• 	Ground safety procedures were completely inadequate. 
• 	Operational test procedures were subjected to last-
minute changes. 
• 	Communications were overall unsatisfactory. 
• 	Control of combustible material standards 
established for nonmetallic materials were too low 
and the criteria for selection and approval of 
spacecraft material were inadequate. 
• 	Engineering, workmanship, and quality 
control deficiencies created an unnecessarily 
hazardous condition. 
The rapid spread of the fire caused an increase in cabin 
pressure and temperature and filled the cabin with toxic 
gases. The increased pressure prevented the rescue 
crew from being able to open the inwardly opening 
hatch. Rescuers were only able to open the hatch after 
the Command Module pressure shell ruptured and 
the pressure equalized. Death of the crew was from 
asphyxiation due to inhalation of toxic gases caused 
by fire. The fire melted the hoses that connected the 
crewmembers’ spacesuits to their life-support system. 
It was estimated that the crewmembers lost 
consciousness between 15 and 30 seconds after the 
first suit failed. A contributory cause of death was 
thermal burns. NASA implemented changes including 
limitations on oxygen levels, reduction in flammable 
materials, spacecraft designs to improve crew egress, 
and increased crew and personal emergency training. 
Parachutes and Aviation High-Altitude 
Mishap Incidents 
In preparation for sending humans to space, both the 
former Soviet Union (Russia) and the US military 
tested life support and survival systems with human test 
subjects using high-altitude balloon parachute jumps. 
The US Air Force conducted high-altitude balloon
studies on humans in programs such as Project Excelsior,
which consisted of a series of high-altitude balloon
flights and bailouts, with free fall and descent under
canopy. These flights were fraught with difficulties, but
many lessons were learned about survivability at high
altitudes. In 1959, on the Excelsior I jump, Joe Kittinger
became entangled with the drogue and went into a high-
speed spin and lost consciousness. On the third flight in
Project Excelsior in 1960, Kittinger, wearing the David
Clark MC-3 partial pressure suit, parachuted in free
USAF Captain Joe Kittinger begins his historic free fall in August 1960. 
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fall with a small stabilizing drogue chute from an open
gondola at 102,800 ft for 4 minutes, 36 seconds until
the main parachute opened at 17,500 ft. His right glove
lost partial pressure during the final ascent phase and
his hand became swollen, causing extreme pain, but the
hand had completely returned to normal by 3 hours after
landing. The lesson learned was that a localized suit leak
may result in focal tissue swelling from exposure to near
vacuum and can completely recover in hours. 
The Russian Volga stratospheric balloon parachute
test program evaluated the pressure suit for the Vostok
space program in a pressurized gondola in 1962.
Evgeny Andreev exited at 83,524 ft and free-fell
80,360 ft, setting the record at that time for highest
free fall without a drogue parachute, a record that
stood for 50 years. In the same program, Pyotr
Dolgov intentionally opened his parachute as he
exited at 86,156 ft above the Earth, but as he exited,
his helmet visor hit the capsule and cracked, and
his suit depressurized. Because of the high altitude
and prolonged descent, he was unable to survive the
depressurization and was found dead on landing.
An American civilian high-altitude parachute test 
(Project Strato Jump) was conducted in 1966, with 
parachutist Nick Piantinata. While Piantinata was 
ascending through 57,600 ft, his visor inadvertently 
opened and the suit depressurized. Ground controllers 
recognized the emergency and cut the balloon from the 
gondola. Piantinata landed 25 minutes later. The rescue 
team was on the scene within 30 seconds, and found him 
unconscious; he died 4 months later in a hospital. 
On Soyuz 1 in 1967, both the main and reserve 
parachutes failed, leading to the death of the crewman. 
On Apollo 15 in 1971, one of the three main chutes 
failed, resulting in a slightly harder splashdown landing 
than normal (32 feet per section (fps) vs. 28 fps), but the 
seat stroking (load-limiting) mechanisms did not reach 
The Soyuz 1 parachute failures in 1967 resulted in loss of the sole 
crewman aboard the spacecraft. 
The Apollo 15 Command Module, with astronauts David R. Scott,
commander; Alfred M. Worden, command module pilot; and James
B. Irwin, lunar module pilot, aboard, nears a safe touchdown in the
mid-Pacific Ocean to conclude a highly successful lunar landing mission.
Although causing no harm to the crewmen, one of the three main
parachutes failed to function properly. The splashdown occurred at
3:45:53 p.m. (CDT), August 7, 1971, some 330 miles north of Honolulu,
Hawaii. The three astronauts were picked up by helicopter and flown to
the prime recovery ship USS Okinawa, which was only 6 1/2 miles away.
activation threshold and no injuries occurred. Possible 
causes of the parachute failure were 
• damage from the jettisoned forward heat shield, which 
was in close proximity to the spacecraft flight path; 
• a broken riser/suspension line connector link, which 
was found on the recovered parachute; 
• damage from firing of the propellant in the command 
module reaction control system and fuel dump from 
the same system. 
The most probable cause of the anomaly was the 
burning of raw fuel (monomethyl hydrazine) being 
expelled during the latter portion of the depletion firing, 
and this resulted in exceeding the parachute riser and 
suspension-line temperature limits. 
Red Bull Stratos was a privately funded manned
stratosphere balloon flight test; its free-fall parachute
jump program was completed in 2012. The test program
included unmanned balloon and capsule tests, vertical
wind tunnel and high troposphere tests of the drogue and
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main parachutes and the spacesuit, low-pressure chamber
tests of the spacesuit, and integrated thermal and vacuum
chamber tests of the capsule, spacesuit, and parachute
and life support systems. These tests ultimately led to
incremental stratosphere free-fall parachute jumps. A
team was formed to develop and implement medical and
physiological support for this program. Issues addressed
included development of a protocol for oxygen
prebreathe to reduce the risk of decompression sickness,
briefing crewmembers on medical and physiological
threats, medical and physiological monitoring for
the thermal vacuum test phase and stratospheric
flights, launch and recovery medical planning, and
contingency planning. Contingency planning included
the development of protocols against two serious known
threats during a stratospheric bailout. The Red Bull
team developed a protocol for treatment of ebullism in
response to the potential threat of exposure to vacuum
from a suit depressurization. Also the team addressed
another serious threat, flat spin with negative acceleration
in the vertical direction (-Gz). 
Manned Balloon Flight (MBF) 1 occurred on March 15,
2012, with test parachutist Felix Baumgartner ascending
to 71,581 ft in a 1.22-million cubic foot (MCF) balloon,
from which height he free-fell 63,691 ft, reaching a
maximum speed of 364.4 mph. For MBF 2 on July 25,
2012, Baumgartner ascended to 97,146 ft in a 5.3-MCF
balloon from which he free-fell 84,357 ft, reaching
546 mph. For the last test, MBF3 on October 14, 2012,
Baumgartner ascended to 127,852 ft in a 29-MCF balloon
and free-fell 119,431 ft, reaching 843.6 mph (Mach 1.25).
The parachutist was in free fall for 3 minutes 40 seconds
on MBF1, 3 minutes 48 seconds on MBF2, and 4 minutes
20 seconds on MBF3. He was weightless (< 0.1g) until
he reached terminal velocity, for 6 seconds on MBF1, 9
seconds on MBF2, and 25 seconds on MBF3. During the
weightless phase the jumper had no aerodynamic control.
A manually or automatically deployed drogue chute was
available if the jumper became significantly unstable. A
multiaxis, dynamically unstable spin occurred on MBF3,
reaching a maximum of 60 rpm for 10 seconds, which
was below the automatic drogue trigger set for 3.5 G
for 6 seconds. Aerodynamic control was regained by
the test parachutist, but the spin, which was multiaxis
and approached -2.5 Gz, approached human physical
performance (but not injury) limits. The conclusion was
that stratospheric free fall should include stabilization
with a drogue parachute. 
Aviation accidents have also tested human exposure to 
high altitudes. In 1966 an SR-71 Blackbird traveling at a 
speed of Mach 3.18 at 78,800 ft became unstable, broke 
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On October 14, 2012, Red Bull Stratos team member Felix 
Baumgartner jumped from a helium balloon at 127,851 ft into the 
stratosphere over New Mexico, before free-falling in a pressure suit
and then parachuting to Earth. 
up, and disintegrated in flight because of an engine 
unstart. The pilot and system operator were torn from 
the aircraft and both parachutes deployed automatically. 
The pilot suffered only minor injury, but the system 
operator in the back seat sustained a fatal neck injury. 
The pilot attributed his survival to the protection 
afforded by his inflated pressure suit from the intense 
buffeting and g forces during the supersonic transition. 
A second SR-71 breakup at a similar airspeed and 
altitude occurred in 1966 during a drone release. Both 
crewmembers survived the breakup and successfully 
ejected, although one died from drowning after landing. 
Acceleration Risks Associated
with Ejection Seats 
Ejection seats were used in the US Gemini capsule, 
the first 4 Space Shuttle missions, and the Russian 
Vostok capsule. All 6 of the cosmonauts on the Vostok 
series ejected before the capsule landed. Ejection seats 
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were considered in a Shuttle escape study. The injury 
potential with ejection seats is related to ejection seat 
G forces, fouling with seat/cockpit structure, windblast, 
flail and wind drag deceleration, and parachute opening 
shock. Major injuries and fatalities, mainly from flail, 
rise sharply at ejection speeds over 600 knots airspeed. 
For the first four flights, the Orbital Flight Test phase, 
the Space Shuttle program used a modified SR-71 seat 
and pressure suit. 
Challenger Accident and 
Lessons Learned 
In 1986 the Shuttle flight 51L (Challenger mishap)
broke up on ascent while traveling at Mach 1.92 at
48,000 ft, and the crew module lofted to 65,000 ft and
then fell back to the ocean. The vehicle breakup forces
were estimated to be 12 to 20 G and were short-term
and survivable. The crew at this time wore standard
Nomex® flight suits accompanied by a launch and entry
helmet that interfaced with a personal egress air pack
that provided breathing air. The external investigation
body for this accident, called the Rogers Commission,
recommended that a system be developed to ensure
On January 28, 1986, the Space Shuttle Challenger broke apart on 
ascent while traveling at Mach 1.92 at 48,000 ft. 
crew egress and escape: “The crew egress and escape
(CEE) together with other elements of the egress/escape
system, shall enhance the capability for all crewmembers
to safely escape from a disabled orbiter on the pad, in
subsonic flight, or on the ground. Controlled subsonic
gliding flight conditions shall be required for in-flight
use of the CEE. The CEE shall provide the necessary
protective and survival equipment to sustain the crew
Portrait of the Space Shuttle Challenger crewmembers holding their launch and entry helmets and wearing their standard Nomex® flight suits.
Back row, left to right: Ellison Onizuka, Christa McAuliffe, Gregory Jarvis, and Judith Resnik; front row: Michael Smith, Francis Scobee, and
Ronald McNair.
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at or below 100,000 ft altitude and to ensure the crew’s
safety after vehicle egress until such time as the danger is
past and/or they are removed to a safe area.” 
NASA has considered various crew escape systems that 
provide coverage during ascent and reentry, including 
bailout, ejection seats, extraction rocket systems, 
encapsulated seats, modular separation, and hybrid 
combinations of these systems. However, implementing 
modifications after a vehicle has been designed could 
dramatically affect other operational parameters. The 
Space Shuttle Program performed several escape 
studies during its 30-plus years of existence. Initial 
design considerations in 1971 (the first shuttle flight 
was in 1981) determined that the only system that could 
provide protection for more than the two crewmembers 
on the experimental flights was the separable crew 
compartment, which would add substantial weight and 
developmental cost. 
The National Space Transportation System Crew Egress 
and Escape Study, conducted after the Challenger 
accident in 1986, reviewed past studies to identify new 
and innovative concepts. Low-cost options provided less 
coverage, whereas more costly concepts would have 
had a severe impact on the performance capability of 
the Shuttle orbiters. In 1989 the Crew Escape Module 
Study assessed the impacts of retrofitting a crew escape 
module into the orbiters that would be equivalent to a 
“new” orbiter program. The Shuttle Evolution II Crew 
Escape Study, done in 1991, assessed the impacts of 
incorporating ejection seat and extraction seat concepts 
into the existing orbiters. 
The ejection seat concept was the option having the 
lowest risk, and it provided for the escape of five or 
fewer crewmembers (the Space Shuttle routinely had six 
or seven crewmembers for complicated payloads). The 
high cost of incorporating additional escape capabilities, 
combined with the significant impact on vehicle 
capabilities, did not warrant the addition of escape seats 
or an escape pod. 
However, after the Challenger accident, the program 
implemented a Crew Escape System (CES) suit and 
supporting equipment. The CES includes a pressure 
suit, personal parachute assembly, emergency oxygen 
system, survival kit, and flotation system. The original 
CES suit was a partial pressure suit (David Clark 
Company Model S1032) called the Launch Entry Suit. 
In 1994 the Advanced Crew Escape Suit Model S1035 
full pressure suit began replacing the Launch Entry 
Suit. The Shuttle CES was certified to an atmospheric 
altitude environment up to 100,000 ft. Bailout scenarios 
were developed for the CES. A bailout below 30,000 ft 
required stable gliding flight below Mach 1. The plan 
was for the crew to jettison the Shuttle hatch below 
30,000 ft, using the crew escape pole, which allowed 
them to clear the left wing on exit. Jettisoning the hatch 
and using the crew escape pole initiated the automatic 
parachute opening sequence that would deploy the 
parachute at 14,000 ft. 
The scenario for a bailout at or above 30,000 ft was
egress from a loss-of-control breakup from a detached
crew module, the situation in the Challenger accident.
As there was no wing to clear, the crew would jettison
from the hatch without deploying the escape pole, and
this action eliminated the automatic parachute-opening
sequence. Hence each crewmember was required to
manually deploy their parachute. If crewmembers
became disabled or unconscious during the bailout or
descent, they would not be able to manually deploy
their parachute. Consequently, astronauts William
In 1994 the David Clark Company Model S1035 Advanced Crew 
Escape Suit began replacing the S1032 Launch Entry Suit. 
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Test of Space Shuttle bailout using the crew escape pole to allow crewmembers to clear the left wing. 
Shepherd and Michael Foale reviewed the feasibility
of using the Shuttle CES equipment for egress during
a loss of control or breakup. They examined the forces
leading to vehicle breakup, crew module dynamics
following a breakup, crew module survivability, crew
module stable attitudes, and time available to egress.
The primary egress concern was when to leave the
orbiter. Shepherd and Foale recommended crew egress
procedures and techniques.
Vehicle egress should begin once the crew module 
was below 40,000 ft. Cues to egress should be G 
forces diminishing and suit depressurizing; use of 
this guideline would allow about 80–90 seconds to 
egress. The contingency egress during a loss of control 
following vehicle breakup was not a defined egress 
mode, but a bailout. Shepherd’s and Foale’s conclusion 
was that the crew module could withstand reentry 
heating for an ascent breakup occurring at 280,000 ft 
and below. The forces causing breakup of the Challenger 
were estimated to be <12–20 G and were short-duration 
and non-lethal. For vehicle breakup during ascent below 
100,000 ft, drag would cause initial rapid deceleration. 
Then G forces on the crew module would be low while 
it was lofting, followed by a 1-G force while the module 
was nose down in free fall. 
After a high-altitude breakup (>100,000 ft), no initial 
deceleration would occur. The module would travel in 
a low-G-force ballistic arc while lofting, then below 
70,000 ft it would be subject to a deceleration of 3 G to 
8.5 G from aerodynamic drag, then to 1 G while nose 
down in free fall below 50,000 ft. 
Columbia Accident Lessons Learned
After the Columbia accident, NASA Associate
Administrator Bill Readdy said “…. I do not anticipate
that the next system will talk about ‘crew escape’ –
but rather ‘crew survival’….” The Columbia
Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) asked NASA
to form the Crew Survival Working Group (CSWG)
to evaluate life-support concerns related to the
disaster. The CSWG report was summarized in the
original CAIB Report in August 2003. The CAIB, in
Observation O 10.2-1, stated, “Future crewed-vehicle
requirements should incorporate the knowledge
gained from the Challenger and Columbia accidents
in assessing the feasibility of vehicles that could
ensure crew survival even if the vehicle is destroyed.”
Clearly, designing for crew survivability early is more
effective than post-production modification. Escape
systems must also consider human factors and the
deconditioning effects of space flight. 
NASA then appointed an independent team, called 
the Return to Flight Task Group, to assess NASA
actions to implement the 15 CAIB return-to-
flight recommendations. NASA met 12 of these 
recommendations before the STS-114 Shuttle mission 
in 2005. NASA could not completely comply with the 
three more challenging recommendations, but conducted 
further work to improve safety, as documented in the 
report NASA’s Implementation Plan for Space Shuttle 
Return to Flight and Beyond. 
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NASA commissioned a more complete report,
Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation
Teams (SCSIIT), which was published in December
2008. This report confirmed that the crew of Columbia
died as a result of an unprotected rapid decompression 
and blunt force trauma at an altitude of between 
181,000 and 140,000 ft, resulting in severe hypoxia,
pulmonary injury, and cardiovascular collapse. Post
mortem, the crew was exposed to acceleration-induced
in-seat flail, third-degree skin burns from thermal 
intrusion, aerodynamic flail at the time of crew module
disintegration, lack of protection from high-altitude
conditions (low pressure, monoatomic oxygen,
subfreezing temperatures), and ground impact.
Crew Survival Enhancements after 
the Columbia Mishap 
The SCSIIT report concluded that significant failures
occurred in the crew restraint system. Specifically, inertial
reels on the Shuttle seat belts were found to be unlocked
during exposure of the crew to acceleration forces during
the orbiter destruction. As a result of these findings, the
Space Shuttle Program upgraded the inertial reels that
lock with absolute load and differential acceleration
in any direction. The specifications for crew escape
equipment were changed to add a fail-safe parachute
capability for crew bailout from a detached crew module,
as well as adding an upgraded survival radio with
Global Positioning System (GPS) location reporting.
An improved portable O2 system was added to enhance
survivability in launch pad and landing emergencies.
Shuttle training for loss of control was modified to
emphasize transition between problem-solving (flying
the vehicle) and survival (lock inertial reels, close visors,
and activate personal O2 system). Training in Shuttle
unusual attitudes was incorporated (by using nose-down
mockups) to develop egress paths in unusual attitudes.
Closing the Survival Gap for 
Columbia Crew 
In the course of the Columbia mishap analysis, 
considerable discussion occurred about how close 
the crew was to a survivable state. Survival has 
occurred after free fall from stratospheric balloons 
at 102,800 and 127,852 ft and from aerodynamic 
aircraft breakups at Mach 3.18 and 78,800 ft. 
During the Columbia debris recovery, live worms 
were found in four of five experiment canisters, 
demonstrating that primitive animals can survive 
a relatively unprotected reentry into the Earth’s 
atmosphere. However, given that a rescue was not 
feasible, the only other option that might have been 
possible for the Columbia crew was repair of the wing 
breach, payload jettison, pre-entry cold soak, and 
modified reentry profile. 
The repair would have required complex, unproven 
extravehicular activity (EVA) procedures. Perhaps 
contingency water containers could have been 
placed into the hole in the wing leading edge and 
some other heat-and cold-resistant material could 
have been applied. This would have presented 
substantial difficulties, however. Another complex, 
unproven EVA procedure could have been performed 
to detach and jettison consumables and the Spacehab 
Research Module in the Shuttle payload bay, which 
could have reduced landing weight by over 30,000 
pounds from a nominal 250,000-pound vehicle. 
Although these measures might have reduced wing 
dynamics and thermal loading, they could have 
adversely altered the delicate wing boundary layer 
and vehicle aerodynamics. Optimistically this could 
have provided more time for the crew module to 
reach a lower altitude and airspeed. The Columbia 
mishap analysis showed that the detached crew module 
probably did not attain a stable aerodynamic trim 
condition that would have been necessary for a bailout. 
Video footage of the Challenger breakup showed a 
relatively stable nose-down crew module, with trailing 
wires acting as an aerodynamic decelerator, making 
bailout in this scenario at least possible. The Challenger 
breakup was transonic/low supersonic and lofted to a 
point where airspeed would have been close to zero, 
while the Columbia mishap was hypersonic. Any 
trailing wires on Columbia would have likely been 
destroyed from thermal or shock waves. The vehicle 
state of Columbia at the time of the catastrophic 
event (initial breakup and cabin depressurization) 
was estimated on the basis of modeling to be altitude 
181,000 ft, Mach 15, and the final crew module breakup 
was estimated to have occurred between 148,000 ft and 
138,000 ft and Mach 10–12. 
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Survival Enhancements for the Crew 
Exploration Vehicle for Commercial 
Crew and Exploration 
The lessons learned from the Columbia mishap have 
had a significant impact on both commercial and NASA
crew vehicle designs, including vehicles, such as Orion, 
that leave low Earth orbit but return to Earth for a water 
landing. These vehicle designs must address the threats 
to human health, listed with proposed countermeasures, 
in the accompanying table. 
NASA contracted for several studies to be done, using 
manikins and three cadavers for impact studies, to better 
understand occupant protection. These studies have led 
to major design changes in requirements for helmets, 
suits, and seat restraints. For example, pressure suits, 
restraints, and the seats themselves must be integrated 
into the vehicle. The restraint belt size and position were 
modified to improve limb mobility to maintain vehicle 
control under high acceleration. An autonomously 
activated GPS personal locator beacon was added to 
the NASA Launch Entry Suits, as was a survival kit for 
post-landing contingencies. To better understand the 
mishap environment, a requirement for a crashworthy 
data recorder for NASA capsules was established. 
The crew of the Orion space exploration vehicle 
will be recumbent, and thus some of these additional 
recommendations, such as inertia reels, will not be 
needed for that spacecraft. 
A mockup of the Orion Multi-purpose Crew Vehicle at the Johnson Space Center shows NASA’s next-generation spacecraft, designed to carry 
humans beyond low Earth orbit to the moon, asteroids, and Mars. 
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Human Health Threats and Countermeasures 
Entry Phenomenon Physical Characteristics Altitude/Speed Biological Effect Countermeasure 
Plasma Ionized molecular O2 > 130,000 ft Chemical/thermal burn Thermal protection system 
Excessive Delta G (dG/dT) Below entry Organ/skeletal damage,  Crew compartment 
acceleration x, y, z linear/ interface body fragmentation stability system, axial 
gradients angular planes (<400,000 ft) restraint system 
Shock-shock Blast wave pressure NA/supersonic Organ damage, body Aerodynamic design, crew 
interaction speeds fragmentation compartment integrity 
Dynamic heating Temperature > 150,000 ft Thermal burn Thermal protection system 
Dynamic pressure Q = measure of Organ/skeletal damage,  Crew protection system 
dynamic pressure body fragmentation 
Atmospheric Atmosphere absolute > 63,000 ft Tissue water vaporized to Pressure vessel, 
pressure (ATA) (<0.06 ATA) gas resulting in ebullism pressure suit, pressure 
breathing mask 
Atmospheric Atmosphere absolute > 18,000 ft Evolved tissue nitrogen Pressure vessel, 
pressure (ATA) (<0.5 ATA) resulting in decompression pressure suit, pressure 
sickness breathing mask 
Pressure differential Delta pressure (dP) Barotrauma in gas-
filled spaces (lung, ear, 
gastrointestinal) resulting 
in arterial gas embolism 
Pressure vessel, 
pressure suit 
Oxygen partial 
pressure 
ppO2 > 10,000 ft Hypoxia and asphyxiation Pressure vessel, 
pressure suit, mask, 
supplemental oxygen 
Intrusion of Physical trauma NA Fatal or severe organ Crew compartment 
habitable space damage due to penetration protective system 
Terrain impact Delta G (dG/dT) 
x, y, z linear planes 
Surface Injury due to rapid 
deceleration 
Parachute, ballute, lifting 
body, airbag, braking 
rocket, automated and 
crew initiated 
NA, not applicable 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Crew survivability should be considered the primary 
mission success criterion and should be the main 
driver in vehicle design and mission architecture. Crew 
survivability should incorporate advanced technologies 
where feasible and should be simple, reliable, and 
attainable to address catastrophic failure modes. Lessons 
learned from related high-risk operations, as well as 
space mishaps, incidents, and close calls, can enhance 
crew survival by providing insight into failure modes, 
and improving procedures, design requirements, and 
occupant protection strategies. 
Survival systems should be designed so that the
equipment and procedures provided to protect the crew
in emergency situations are compatible with nominal
operations. A pressure-suited crewmember should be
able to perform all operations without compromising
the configuration of the survival suit during critical
phases of flight. The design of personal protective
equipment needs to adequately address anticipated
catastrophic failure modes, and compliance with
protective equipment and procedures is essential.
Our current knowledge of injury mechanisms at high
Mach numbers and altitudes over 100,000 ft has
significant limitations, and crew survivability could be
enhanced by advanced technologies. Occupant protection
and crew survivability studies should be conducted
to fill these gaps. Although NASA has recognized the
importance of capturing lessons learned, it has often
been criticized for not following that principle. However,
NASA learned important lessons about crew survival
from the Columbia mishap, and these lessons hold great
benefit for all future human space exploration.
“The only thing we learn from history is that we learn 
nothing from history.” 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831)
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 The Future: Crew 
Survival Investigations 
Karon Woods 
“Those who don’t know history are destined to
repeat it.” 
Edmund Burke (1729-1797) 
One of the lessons learned from the loss of the Space
Shuttle Columbia was that root-cause investigations
do not dig deep enough to trace the individual
crewmember experiences to determine the successes
and failures of protective measures. Past mishap
investigations focused on determining the root cause
of the mishap and preventing recurrence. However,
if the crewmembers were not identified in the causal
chain of events, their experiences were not analyzed
and lessons were lost.
Until NASA’s Constellation Program1 vehicle, crew 
survivability under emergency conditions was not 
assessed. By postulating the outcomes of system and 
operational failures that would result in potentially 
catastrophic conditions, and analyzing those chains 
of events, it was possible to identify credible crew 
responses under emergency conditions. In each scenario, 
the must-work functions and equipment are evaluated 
for their ability to prevent crew injury or death. 
NASA documented a process for performing crew
survival investigation by integrating an understanding
of historical and potential spacecraft accidents with
an understanding of mishap investigation practices.
By understanding which emergency scenarios can
happen, how they may manifest, and anticipating
crew actions; we can predict potential mishap causes
and outcomes. This process adds space flight-unique
information to the aviation mishap knowledge base
and creates common language between the medical and 
engineering team members. 
The crew survival in-depth investigation process
supplements the root-cause investigation. The crew
1 NASA Constellation Program goals included vehicles that could have rocket and 
crew module capability to leave low Earth orbit. 
Johnson Space Center Safety & Mission Assurance Directorate logo. 
survival investigation focus is different from that
of the usual mishap investigation. Specifically, the
crew survival investigation team investigates the
performance of the crew, crew protective equipment,
crew-vehicle interfaces, emergency and crew survival
systems, training, and procedures that are intended to
protect the crew.
The outcomes of the crew survival investigation are
the awareness of factors and events that affected crew
survivability and recommendations for improving crew
survival for future human space flight. This chapter
provides an overview of investigation elements including
data and information management; imagery; debris
recovery and reconstruction; timelines; and assessments.
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Space Flight Considerations 
The starting point for spacecraft mishap investigation 
is the wealth of experience from aviation mishap 
investigations. Using aviation mishap investigation 
processes, analytical tools, and historical results, space 
flight specialists apply their understanding of the 
dynamic mission envelope and the hazards of space 
flight to the investigation. Some aspects of space flight 
that make crew survival investigation different from 
aviation mishap investigation are these: 
• 	Large quantities of fuels, presence of oxidizer, 
cryogenic temperatures 
• 	Severe vibroacoustic environment, high kinetic and 
potential energy, high acceleration loads, dynamic 
separation events, constrained flight trajectory 
• 	Extreme aerodynamic heating, plume heating, thermal 
cycling (extreme heat and cold), entry heating and hot 
gas intrusion, reactivity of heated gases 
• 	Consequences of depressurization, radiation, vacuum, 
plasma charging, atomic oxygen, collision with 
micrometeoroids or orbital debris 
• 	Orbital mechanics, abort modes, plume impingement, 
shock-shock interaction, hypersonic environment, 
absence of aerodynamic effects 
• 	Limited energy or capability for downrange 
correction; reliance on parachute, flotation, and 
uprighting systems 
• 	Limited egress paths, sea conditions at landing, crew 
deconditioning, crew suits that limit mobility, limited 
visibility and visual cues 
• 	Complex and constrained timeline, critical time 
sequencing, critical event timing 
The crew survival investigation process lends itself 
to a full range of investigations, from the destruction 
of a spacecraft to a crewmember injury during a 
spacewalk to an electrocution while interacting with 
onboard hardware. 
Team Member Selection
Crew survival investigation team member selection 
is determined by the mission phase of occurrence, the 
systems involved, and the likely cause of the mishap. 
In all cases, a crew survival specialist, with extensive 
mishap investigation and human factors training, leads 
the team. Typical team members are a medical doctor, 
a pathologist, a legal representative, and specialists 
in structures, environmental control and life support 
systems, flight performance, and crew equipment 
(crew survival and emergency equipment and crew
suits). Depending on the scenario, communications, 
mission operations, or ground operations specialists, 
as well as other technical specialists, may supplement 
the investigation team. 
Management of Data and Information 
All information generated by the investigation and 
collected from other sources must be documented, 
organized, and uncompromised to be useful to teams 
performing current and future investigations. Because of 
the high volume of information collected and analyzed 
during a crew survival investigation, much of which 
may be sensitive, organization and information control 
are important features of the crew survival investigation 
plan. Medical forensics data are graphic and highly 
sensitive, so “need to know” criteria must be established 
before any information is distributed. 
Data and information exist in many forms including 
presentations, spreadsheets, diagrams, user manuals, 
analysis reports, photographs, operating manuals, 
models and simulations, written notes, videos, and 
audio recordings. Improper cataloging practices make 
organizing or retrieving the information difficult. All 
items should be marked with a title, date, version, 
source or author’s name, and any other pertinent 
information. Information sources include mishap-site 
records (diagrams, maps, notes, and photographs), 
vehicle telemetry, analytical results, vehicle processing 
records, crew medical and training records, interviews, 
and debris and remains. 
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This information is used in analyses, tests, and
reconstructions to identify the sequence of events
that resulted in the mishap, to identify the cause(s)
of crewmember injury or death, and to justify the
recommendations. Once the investigation is complete,
a crew survival investigation report captures the
investigation results, recommendations, and investigation
lessons learned. Not only is the information used in the
current investigation, but it may identify trends or justify
improvements in vehicle design, crew equipment, or
operations to improve crew survival. A data retention
plan should identify where, how, and for how long the
investigation information will be kept.
Imagery
It is likely that other response teams will document 
the initial scene before the crew survival investigation 
team arrives, so it is important to collect copies of 
their photographs and video. Imagery documents the 
locations of crewmembers relative to the vehicle and 
to crew protective equipment, and captures evidence of 
crew actions. Videos and photographs help determine 
the breakup sequence, and videos reveal the conditions 
the crew experienced during the mishap. Regardless 
of the imagery medium, it is important to catalog and 
store all collected images for quick, reliable access. 
Because of the sensitive nature of some images, not all 
imagery may be accessible by all team members. For 
this reason, protocols should be established to manage 
release of crewmember photographs, videos, and 
advanced imagery. 
Photographs
The adage that a picture is worth a thousand words
holds true in mishap investigation as well. NASA
routinely takes photographs throughout vehicle
processing and the mission. During processing,
closeout photographs capture the final (or “as-
flown”) configuration of the vehicle, payloads, and
equipment. Launch and ascent photographs document
the performance of the launch vehicle. On-orbit
photographs, transmitted throughout the mission,
document the latest vehicle configurations and onboard
conditions. Photographs also capture the operation and
performance of the returning vehicle. A further benefit
to a crew survival investigation is photographs of the
interactions of crewmembers with each other and with
the vehicle and equipment throughout the mission.
Photographs of a spacecraft mishap come from 
many sources (including amateur photographers and 
astronomers, the news media, and mission photographs) 
and in some circumstances capture the mishap as 
it unfolds. “As-found” photographs are taken of 
the mishap scene or where the debris is located, as 
applicable. Aerial photographs may capture such 
features as spatial relationships, vehicle components, 
ground fire damage, and fuel spills. Reconstruction 
photographs are taken of reassembled vehicle wreckage 
or only the portion of recovered wreckage that is 
of interest to the investigation. Images of the crew 
protective equipment and systems and the hardware 
closest to the crew help the team relate the vehicle and 
equipment condition to crew injuries. 
Similar to the vehicle “as-found” photographs, “as-
found” crew photographs capture the human remains 
as they are discovered. These photographs are used 
to understand the relationship of the body or remains 
to the vehicle and the environment. “As-received” 
photographs are taken when the human remains are 
received at the facility for autopsy. The purpose of these 
photographs is to rule out confounding information, 
injuries induced during transport, or other noted changes 
in the remains. Autopsy photographs document the 
condition of the human remains to establish injury 
patterns and/or causes. 
Videos 
Videos are also important to an investigation. Onboard 
video provides insight into the status of the crew and of 
the crew protective measures, and the sights, sounds, 
and configuration of the vehicle. Depending on the 
type of mishap, the onboard video may provide critical 
information about the environmental conditions and 
timing of key events, capture crew communications 
and crew actions, record audible caution and warning 
alarms, or document damage to the vehicle. In addition 
to onboard video sources, ground-based or radar video 
can show deviations of the mission profile, capture a 
debris trail, reveal indications of leakages from vehicle 
systems, document events with their associated times, 
and document recontact of spacecraft elements or 
contact with foreign bodies or terrain. 
137 SECTION 5 – THE FUTURE
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STS-107 Columbia Commander/Seat 1 visor down and latched for
suit pressure integrity check (blue dashed circle) and Mission Specialist
2/Seat 4 with helmet on and left glove off (red dashed circle). Upon
completion of the pressure integrity check the visor is raised for reentry. 
Advanced Imaging
In addition to photography and videos, other imaging 
methods (including magnetic resonance imaging [MRI], 
radiology, computed tomography [CT], and electron 
microscopy) can document the current condition of the 
debris, body, and remains to further develop cause-and-
effect relationships. 
As a practice, imagery should be reviewed at the start 
of the investigation, then periodically reviewed as the 
analyses progress and scenarios develop. As with all 
other analyses, images can support or refute findings. 
Debris Recovery and Reconstruction 
Debris recovered from a spacecraft mishap provides
tangible evidence that can be used to determine failure
mechanisms, failure modes, fracture dynamics, and
thermal exposure. It can also provide insight into
crewmembers’ injuries and the environmental conditions
the crew experienced. The focus of the crew survival
investigation is on the bodies and remains on the crew-
vehicle interactions (the crew cabin, windows, vehicle
systems, crew-worn equipment), and on crew emergency
and survival equipment and systems. One relevant
vehicle system is the environmental control and life
support system; this system provides the atmospheric
pressure, oxygen, humidity, and temperature, along
STS-107 Columbia Mission Specialist 2/Seat 4 donning left glove; 
Commander/Seat 1 and Pilot/Seat 2 with gloves ON and MATED. 
with water for sanitation and potable water. The
evidence collection techniques described in this section
are applicable to both spacecraft debris and bodies or
remains. For example, instead of collecting debris to
reconstruct the spacecraft for analysis, the crew survival
investigation team can collect remains to virtually
reconstruct a crewmember. Of course, the timeliness and
sensitivity when dealing with crew remains or injuries
differ greatly from such considerations when dealing
with spacecraft debris.
The amount and type of evidence generated during the 
mishap will vary, depending on the mishap and when 
it occurs during the mission. The amount of recovered 
debris depends on the size of the recovery effort, 
location of the debris (e.g., on board a vehicle, in rugged 
or remote terrain, in water), and when the mishap 
occurred in the mission profile. 
Site Documentation and Debris Recovery Plan 
The first step in a debris recovery plan is to observe
the site and document the scene. The major components
of the spacecraft and the flight path should be located
as references to crew-relevant debris. Specifically, the
relative locations of the crew and crew protective and
survival equipment and systems should be diagrammed.
When a crewmember is rescued or remains are
recovered, their condition should be documented
along with their relationship to their crew equipment,
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the vehicle, prominent terrain features, and areas
of post-impact fire. These “as-found” records (e.g.,
descriptions, photographs, videos) provide clues for
interpreting injury patterns and comparing conditions
of crewmembers. Mechanisms at the scene that could
explain the injuries and any protective equipment
accessed by the crew should be documented. For a
crew survival investigation, the highest priority is
locating and retrieving the vehicle components that
were closest to the crew during the mishap and at
the mishap site, emergency or protective equipment
and systems that were activated or should have been
activated, and crew remains. It is also important to
document what debris is missing or out of place given
the circumstances of the mishap. 
Crew survival investigation teams should consider 
indications of intrusion into the cabin, of seat restraint 
failures or separation of the seat from the vehicle, 
of ejection from the cabin, of impacts with interior 
surfaces or equipment, that the crew was not seated, and 
that crewmembers were executing procedures such as 
indications of deployed emergency hardware and switch 
or lever positions. They should look for indications 
that the crew survived the initial mishap but could not 
escape the ensuing conditions inside the vehicle (such as 
an obstruction or fire) or the hazards of the post-impact 
external environment. 
Many samples may be taken at the scene including 
medical samples, environmental samples (water, soil, 
foliage), and spacecraft samples (fuels, coolants, fire 
or toxic release products). For example, a pre- or 
postmishap toxic environment may be indicated by 
samples taken at the scene. Samples for crewmember-
to-crewmember comparisons should be collected at a 
consistent sampling site. 
It is important to distinguish damage related to recovery 
and transportation of evidence from damage related to 
the mishap. If the scene is not thoroughly documented 
before the crewmembers are removed, evidence on 
the crewmembers may be lost, further damage to the 
vehicle-related evidence may occur, or positions of 
controls or switches may be altered during removal 
of the crewmembers from the scene. At the collection 
location, by comparing the debris to photographs or 
video taken in the field, the crew survival investigation 
team can document any changes in the debris that are 
incurred during handling or transportation. After the 
recovered debris has been cataloged and stored, specific 
items of interest can be identified for reconstruction, 
testing, or analysis. 
Debris Reconstruction
Reconstruction provides the team an opportunity to 
see how the debris pieces fit together and the final 
positions of parts such as switches, valves, and levers, 
to determine the sequence of events. Reconstruction of 
all or a portion of the vehicle involves assembling the 
vehicle in the as-flown configuration using physical 
or virtual recovered debris. Physical reconstruction 
is the reconstruction of the vehicle using recovered 
debris, usually on a constructed grid or frame. Virtual 
reconstruction is the electronic reconstruction of the 
recovered debris, creating an as-flown configuration 
using specialized software and debris photographs 
to simulate the debris. It can also be an interactive, 
three-dimensional simulation of the flight dynamics 
and failure sequence. 
The focus of reconstruction is to observe the damage 
characteristics, or patterns, among the debris. The 
reconstructed wreckage may include only the portion of 
wreckage of interest to the crew survival investigation, 
such as the crew cabin, seats, and crew-protective 
emergency equipment and systems, which can assist 
the team in relating the hardware to the crew actions, 
conditions, and injuries. The recovered debris is 
tracked to a specific location on the vehicle, or in the 
Virtual reconstruction of the recovered Columbia flight deck panels. 
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Identified Debris from the Flight Deck Seats from the Columbia Accident 
More than 68 pieces of seat structure debris were recovered. The blue items in these figures represent pieces
of seat structure that were positively identified to a seat location. The green items are those pieces that could
be from one of two seats. 
case of the crew equipment, to a specific crewmember. 
Part numbers and serial numbers provide definitive 
proof of the as-flown location. For debris without part 
numbers, comparing the material composition of the 
recovered debris to vehicle drawings may determine the 
origin of the debris. 
Reconstruction also provides an opportunity to identify 
missing pieces of the vehicle and determine if additional 
debris recovery is necessary. It is unlikely that the 
team will recover the entire vehicle or match all debris 
to a definitive position on the reconstructed vehicle, 
so uncertainty is associated with reconstruction. 
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Analysis of the Evidence and • Materials (deterioration of paint or primer, sources 
Reconstruction Results and patterns of material deposits, deformation, 
The purpose of analyzing physical evidence is to 
develop scenarios or sequences of what may have 
taken place that caused the crew to incur the observed 
injuries. From a crew survival investigation perspective, 
reconstruction provides insight into the performance 
of the crew cabin and the surrounding structure, 
crew-vehicle interactions, initial and subsequent 
system or structural failures, toxic releases, fire, and 
other circumstances. To begin with, secondary, 
debris-debris, and ground-impact damage should be 
identified and excluded from consideration. Then, the 
collected evidence should be analyzed for indications 
of failure progression and crew actions. Team members 
should note outliers, anything that does not follow 
logic. The relative locations of debris (what departed 
first or last, emergency equipment in proximity to 
each crewmember, and so on), equipment settings 
and configurations, and other relevant evidence should 
be considered. 
In identifying the cause of the mishap, system or 
structural failures, the environment, crew actions, 
and anything else that might be relevant should be 
considered. Observations may include these categories: 
• 	Thermal (directional heating, random heating,
thermal erosion or degradation, hot gas flow, shock-
shock interaction, combustion/oxidation, melting,
fire, freezing)
• 	Structural (fractures, breach, rupture, weakening, 
shadowing, warping, fragmentation, tearing) 
degradation caused by exposure to the environments, 
flow redirection, properties) 
• 	Loads (mechanical, structural overloading, impact) 
• 	Chemical (residue deposit, discoloration, residual 
fuels, fluids or coolants) 
• 	Configuration (switch, handle, control surface or 
gimbal, and valve positions; deviations of settings, 
positions, or locations from nominal; configuration of 
deployed equipment and crew restraints) 
• 	Foreign material or debris 
• 	Premishap system failures 
This analysis may encompass a broad range of activities 
that include observing the physical evidence, conducting 
an engineering analysis of the debris, identifying 
the role of any system failures or crew actions, and 
determining the origin and progression of the failure(s). 
Timelines 
Timelines are one of the most effective tools used 
to build scenarios and to document the sequence of 
events. Timelines are graphical representations of the 
sequence of events based on collected information and 
analytical results. Developing scenarios and sequencing 
events is an iterative process as evidence and analytical 
results are integrated, eventually converging on a 
scenario supported by all of the available information. 
Using timelines, a team can visualize the progression 
of the events that led to crew injuries or death. 
Deorbit Preparation to Entry Interface from the Columbia Timeline 
This timeline illustrates key events from the beginning of deorbit preparation to entry interface. Green bars 
represent times when video data were available. The blue bar represents times when voice and telemetry 
transmissions were available (throughout this phase). Times shown are GMT. 
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When determining where the timeline starts, an
event occurring before the mishap may be relevant.
For instance, a change to a crew procedure for which
the crew was not trained may be a significant event
on a timeline. Typically, a good starting point is
the start of the mission. In most cases, the timeline
ends with the mishap. An example of an exception
is one where the crew survives a parachute failure
at landing, but succumbs to exposure because the
emergency equipment was not available or suited for
the environment.
The task of determining what is and is not relevant is 
different for each investigation. When constructing a 
crew survival investigation timeline, one should begin 
with events that have established confirmed times; 
those without uncertainty. These events are based 
on telemetry, video, air-to-ground communications, 
or some other source that provides a time stamp for 
events. Next, add events that occurred in conjunction 
with a specific mission event or crew action, but 
with associated uncertainty, such as a crewmember 
lowering their visor during entry preparations. Include 
events that would produce a crew action or reaction, 
system response, or known injury. If possible, verify 
individual crew-related milestones on the timelines with 
survivor interviews or substantiate with engineering 
or medical evidence. Assess all timelined events for 
significance as contributors to the survival or injury of 
the crewmembers. 
A separate medical timeline allows the crew survival
investigation team to capture relevant medical
events and develop an injury event sequence. A
separate timeline permits limited dissemination of
sensitive information. When sequencing the events,
associate the incidence of crewmember injuries
with the timelines. Remember that fire precedes burns,
impacts precede fractures, loss of pressure integrity
precedes decompression sickness, and so on. When
correlating injuries with an event on a timeline,
account for all injuries experienced by the individual
crewmembers. It is unlikely that all crewmembers
experienced identical injuries, so consider constructing
an individual medical timeline for each of the
crewmembers, and then add the significant events to
the crew survival investigation timeline. Before
finalizing the crew survival and medical timelines,
reconcile any conflicts and confirm the times of as
many events as is practical. 
Assessments 
Crew Survival Investigation Assessments 
The material presented in this section is not all-
inclusive, but provides general information and 
insight regarding the assessments and analyses that 
may be performed by a crew survival investigation 
to bound the crew experience during the mishap. 
The crew survival investigation assessments focus on 
(1) the failure of the vehicle, especially the portion 
of the vehicle closest to the crew at the time of 
the mishap; (2) the performance of equipment and 
systems designed to protect the crew; and (3) the 
medical forensics to identify each crewmember’s 
experience during the mishap. Both objective (e.g., 
air-to-ground communications, vehicle forensics) and 
derived (e.g., ballistics analysis, thermal analysis) data 
are used. The assessment results are used to develop 
failure scenarios, place events in the proper sequence, 
confirm times, and support or refute findings. The 
crew experience is defined by mapping analytical 
results to specific seat locations and/or crewmembers, 
then correlating vehicle or system failures and crew 
actions with the injuries observed in the crew. These 
results are essential for identifying the successes and 
failures of the protective measures of the vehicle 
and crew equipment and systems, and improvements 
for future missions. 
Spacecraft Assessments 
Typical spacecraft-related analyses include, but are
not limited to, aerodynamic and propulsive loading,
ballistics, motion, thermal, aero-thermal, structural,
environmental, and materials analysis; and evaluation
of debris, vehicle systems performance, and vehicle
telemetry. Depending on the type of mishap and
the phase in which it occurs, the team may include
evaluations of ground operations, mission operations,
and communications. Knowledge of the relevant phase(s)
of flight helps to determine the scope of the analyses
and bounds the likely velocities, trajectories, altitude,
environmental factors, and potential aerodynamic,
propulsive, and thermal loads. The phase of flight in
which destruction occurs (e.g., prelaunch, ascent, orbit,
rendezvous, reentry into Earth’s atmosphere, landing, or
post-landing) may be obvious. However, the mishap may
result from latent damage, failures, or events occurring
in a previous mission phase, so the initial cause and
timing of the mishap may be difficult to discern.
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Human Performance Limits of the Columbia Crew 
This graphic illustrates representative loads based on modeling in all three axes, including the effects of 
increasing rotational loads. Models showed that accelerations were initially low, and peaked between 2 G 
and 3.5 G by the time of the catastrophic event (separation of the forebody from the midbody). The dashed 
black lines (upper and lower) on the chart indicate human performance limits based on NASA-STD-3000.* The 
representative loads, which are based on modeling, were well within these human performance limits. 
* NASA-STD-3000, Man-Systems Integration Standards, Volume I, Section 5, Revision B, 1995. 
LOC – Loss of Control of Columbia
CE – Catastrophic Event 
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Analyses for Spacecraft Assessments 
• Flight Dynamics 
• Ballistics 
• Motion 
• Thermal 
• Aero-Thermal 
• Structural 
• Materials 
• Environmental 
The results of analyses conducted on the vehicle can
be used to calculate the resulting loads applied to
the crew cabin and to the crew. The loads and forces
acting on the vehicle can be mapped to the individual
crewmembers. Through understanding of the mission
phases, altitude, ballistic coefficient, and other factors,
engineers can calculate loads and other relevant
information vital to the crew survival investigation
medical team. The medical team uses this information
to determine the causes of the crew injuries and
fatalities, and the sequence of the medical events. 
In addition to conducting engineering analyses, a crew
survival investigation team should review historical
records to identify any potential contributors to the
mishap. Begin with the subset of vehicle records
applicable to the crew protective equipment and systems,
environmental systems, and the crew-vehicle interface.
These records include relevant design and manufacturing
drawings, and the subject spacecraft and fleet
manufacturing, assembly, and maintenance histories,
including any problem reports and corrective actions,
non-conformances, or design changes resulting from past
issues. In addition, capture any crew and safety concerns
with operational (human) factors, such as cabin layout;
emergency hardware quantity, accessibility, and stowage
locations; and situational awareness (annunciation,
indications, visibility, auditory levels, and so on).
Flight Dynamics Analysis
The spacecraft is subjected to thrust, drag, gravitational,
and lifting loads of varying magnitudes throughout the
mission. Together, the aerodynamic and propulsive loads
define the flight dynamics. Analyses of aerodynamic
and propulsive loads provide insight into the vehicle’s
trajectory, motion, and loads, and provide the reference
data necessary for other analyses such as thermal analysis.
Also, the vehicle’s trajectory provides information on
the gross vehicle motion, velocities, and acceleration
forces acting on the vehicle. An aerodynamics analysis
is done to study the interaction of aerodynamic forces on
an object. For mishaps that occur during flight through
the atmosphere (as during launch, reentry to Earth’s
atmosphere, and landing), the analysis of aerodynamic
stability data provides the relative motion of the vehicle.
A propulsive loads analysis is used to study the loads
imparted by the propulsive thrust of the engine, motor,
and thruster propulsion systems. Other sources of loading
events include collision of spacecraft elements, actuation
of the pyrotechnic system, inputs to directional flight
control, parachute deployment, landing, and braking.
These vehicle motions and forces are translated into the
motions and loads experienced by crewmembers.
Types of accelerations experienced by crewmembers
include sustained, oscillatory, impulse, and instantaneous
(impact) accelerations. Acceleration loads, whether
positive or negative, can affect human performance,
and can lead to loss of consciousness and/or physical
injuries. The degree of injury is related to the magnitude,
duration, and direction of the acceleration forces. The
human body is more able to withstand accelerations in
the fore-aft direction than in the up-down or side-to-side
directions. Also, deconditioned crewmembers have a
reduced tolerance for acceleration loads.
Ballistics Analysis
In cases of spacecraft breakup occurring during ascent
or reentry to Earth’s atmosphere, a ballistics analysis
can provide the order in which the crew, equipment,
and debris were shed during the mishap and determine
debris trajectories. This analysis uses the ground location
of the recovered debris (latitude and longitude) and the
debris properties (size, shape, and mass) to characterize
the breakup sequence. The ballistics analysis makes use
of the ballistic trajectory, controlling forces, ballistic
number, reference trajectory, and any cascading failures. 
Motion Analysis 
Motion analysis determines the gross movements of the 
spacecraft during the mishap. Data to support the motion 
analysis comes from telemetry, a flight data recorder, 
radar, and video. In the absence of any recorded data, 
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flight dynamics and ballistic analyses can provide 
information on the representative loads and motions 
experienced by the vehicle. Through understanding the 
motion of the vehicle, it is possible to combine these 
data with the flight dynamics and ballistic analysis 
to determine the loads the crew experienced through 
the evolving conditions. This information assists 
the medical team in evaluating the crew injuries and 
determining possible mechanisms of injury. 
Thermal Analysis
Thermal analysis identifies the thermal loads imposed 
on the vehicle, the crew equipment, and crewmembers. 
The spacecraft and crew are subjected to an induced 
thermal environment managed by flight profiles, 
vehicle orientation, and onboard thermal systems. 
When induced heating exceeds the design limits of the 
spacecraft materials, material failure may lead to the 
destruction of the vehicle. This analysis considers the 
source of the thermal energy, the transfer mechanisms 
(e.g., conduction, convection, or radiation), thermal 
effects, the ambient thermal environment, and the 
duration of exposure. The temperatures resulting 
from the thermal loads can affect the properties of 
the materials (e.g., strength, toughness, chemical 
composition, and phase state). Thermal injuries to the 
crew can also provide information on the sequence of 
the thermal event relative to any other traumas and/or 
death, and on the intensity, duration, and directionality 
of the event and the state of any crew protective 
equipment and surrounding structures at the time of 
the thermal exposure. 

If thermal systems fail to maintain a habitable 

environment, the crew may experience heat- and 
cold-related injuries, or conditions may affect their 
ability to function. Temperature-related injuries include 
hypothermia, frostbite, cryogenic burns (caused by 
contact with cryogenic materials), contact burns, heat 
stroke, heat exhaustion, and dehydration. The extent 
and severity of the injuries depend on the source and 
exposure time. Burns from radiant heat sources may 
show signs of shadowing, deposition, and/or adhered 
material and appear only on the side of the body 
exposed to the heat source. Sources of radiant heating 
are fire, materials heated to high temperatures, and 
exothermic chemical reactions. At high Mach numbers, 
shock-shock interactions result from an amplification 
of energy at the point where two shock waves intersect, 
and these interactions can result in laser-like damage to 
exposed tissue; cases exhibit areas of focal burning and 
cauterization injuries. 
Aero-Thermal Analysis
Aero-thermal analysis is performed on the spacecraft 
to identify probable failure sequences for launch, 
launch abort, and reentry mishaps. When considerable 
heat is generated, the high temperatures can affect the 
properties of the spacecraft materials and contribute 
to structural failure. Such high temperatures can result 
in combustion and chemical reactions unique to space 
flight. The aero-thermal analysis considers atmospheric 
reentry conditions, maximum survivable altitude 
analysis, reentry heating thermal analysis, vehicle 
orientation, and ablation. 
Structural Analysis
Structural analysis studies the behavior of the
spacecraft structure under various loading conditions.
Structural analysis performed in support of the crew
survival investigation is focused on the crew cabin and
the structure surrounding it for understanding of the
crew-to-vehicle load paths and how this hardware is
attached to the vehicle, and to determine when and how
it failed. The many types of structural, or mechanical,
failures include deflection, ductile fracture, brittle
fracture, impact, creep, thermal loading, buckling,
corrosion, stress corrosion, wear, and fatigue. Each type
of failure produces unique indicators near the fracture
surface. A crew survival investigation should consider
vehicle design margins, vehicle stresses, environmental
conditions, structural loads, translational loads from
aerodynamic drag, propulsive loads, rotational loads
from vehicle rotation, linear moments from motion
in roll, pitch, and yaw, and loads caused by differences
between internal cabin pressure and external static
and dynamic pressures.
It is important to distinguish each of the indicators
on the debris as either a cause of the initial failure, a
consequence of a subsequent failure, or an impact.
Materials Analysis
The mishap may expose spacecraft materials to 
conditions beyond their design limits and cause the 
materials to fracture, degrade, melt, and deform. 
Materials analysis can determine the sequence of the 
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failures by identifying the progression of changes 
in the properties of the materials (e.g., strength, 
hardness, toughness, chemical composition, phase 
state) and provide insight into the origin of any material 
deposits found on the vehicle structure or crew. Also, 
comparisons of the materials properties to the debris 
attributes may identify the origin of a piece of debris 
when other methods cannot. 
Environmental Analysis
The environmental conditions affecting a spacecraft 
and crew are both natural and induced, and affect crew 
health and performance. Environmental factors may be 
direct causes for injury or death, or contributors that 
compromised the ability of the crew to function. When 
determining whether the environment contributed to the 
crew condition, a crew survival investigation should 
consider human factors and environmental hazards in 
microgravity, space, and terrestrial environments. 
Inadvertent actions and crew errors can result from 
human factors such as overly complex procedures, 
insufficient lighting, unguarded switches, or excessive 
background noise, and contribute to a mishap. In 
a microgravity environment, translation corridors 
obstructed by stowage and unrestrained equipment 
can entangle the crew or the crew can be entrapped 
while moving or rotating equipment. Sharp corners and 
edges, pinch points, protrusions, and rough edges can 
snag clothing and impede crew actions or result in head 
trauma, lacerations, or broken bones. 
In a space environment and in the spacecraft design,
ionizing and nonionizing radiation and electric
shock hazards can contribute to a mishap. Ionizing
radiation from the natural environment, radioactive
power and heat sources, and some equipment may
produce short-term effects including nausea, vomiting,
headache, diarrhea, burns, and cognitive impairment.
Non-ionizing radiation sources, such as lasers,
radiofrequency transmitters, or the sun viewed through
unprotected windows, can result in eye irritation
or damage, temporary blindness, increased body
temperature, or burns. Electric shock can interfere
with nerve control or result in burns, ventricular
fibrillation, loss of consciousness, or death.
The environment at the landing site poses hazards to 
the crew including natural predators (e.g., fish, birds, 
mammals), lightning strikes, exposure, drowning, and 
entanglement. Although recovery forces and onboard 
emergency equipment may mitigate the hazards at the 
nominal landing site, recovery forces may be delayed 
or the emergency equipment may be inadequate or fail 
to function. Launch aborts and aborts from orbit may 
place the crew in an undesirable location without the 
necessary survival equipment. In some cases, well-
meaning Samaritans may extract the crew from their 
spacecraft and cause or exacerbate injuries. 
Crew Cabin Environment Assessments 
The cabin environment analysis determines whether 
conditions within the crew cabin affected the crew’s 
ability to respond under mishap conditions and/ 
or caused injury. For example, a crew survival 
investigation should 
• 	determine whether the vehicle structure invaded the 
space necessary for each crewmember; 
• 	evaluate the performance of the restraint system that 
secured the crewmembers to their seats and ultimately 
to the vehicle; 
• 	determine whether the energy-absorbing mechanisms 
in the design reduced the loads to within the tolerance 
limits for human survival; 
• 	determine whether and when a crewmember was 
unable to perform a response action, became 
permanently compromised, or lost consciousness 
due to loss of a habitable environment, toxic material 
release, or fire; 
• 	determine if postmishap conditions contributed to crew
injuries by limiting egress, exposure to fire or toxic
materials, or landing in a hostile environment or under
hazardous conditions. 
Conditions in the crew cabin can produce in-flight or 
postflight incapacitation, decrease visibility, hinder 
egress and rescue efforts, or contribute to crew injuries, 
all of which reduce survival chances. 
Impact injuries 
When investigating the cause of impact injuries, a crew 
survival investigation starts by assessing the cabin 
area in proximity to the crew for evidence of contact 
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with equipment or stowage. Impact injuries occur when 
a crewmember collides with an object or an object 
collides with a crewmember, such as when injuries 
result from forceful contact with equipment liberated 
during the mishap. Intrusion is also a type of impact 
injury. In this case, a deformation of the crew cabin 
reduces the available volume surrounding the crew and 
constricts respiratory function; this may be a momentary 
or permanent condition. Other consequences of impact 
are fracture, penetration, lacerations, contusion, blood 
loss, eye damage, and loss of consciousness due to head 
trauma or constriction. 
Toxicological injuries 
Toxicological injuries result from exposure to 
toxic substances (e.g., combustion products, fuels, 
coolants, airborne microbes, contaminated water, fire 
extinguishing gases) that damage tissues. Although 
spacecraft designers attempt to eliminate these 
substances from the crew environment, toxic substances 
can be introduced during a fire or enter the crew cabin 
on a contaminated spacesuit. Also, faulty environmental 
control and life support systems can fail to remove 
carbon dioxide, water can become contaminated, 
batteries can rupture, and solutions used to pretreat 
urine can leak out of their containers. Depending on 
the level of toxicity, exposure time, and concentration, 
exposure can result in burns, an inflammatory response, 
eye and mucosal irritation, visual disturbances, liver 
damage, gastrointestinal toxicity, central nervous system 
depression, and other effects. In microgravity, without 
forced airflow and the subsequent mixing of gaseous 
constituents, toxic accumulations of gases can lead to 
lung, eye, and skin damage; burns; unconsciousness; or 
death by poisoning or asphyxiation. 
Thermal injuries 
Thermal injuries result from failure to maintain a 
temperature-controlled environment or from thermal 
sources including radiation and combustion events. 
These injuries result from exposure to environmental 
temperatures and/or objects at temperatures that can 
harm the crew. The principal effect of a microgravity 
environment on heat transfer in the crew cabin is the 
loss of natural convection; that is, warmer air will not 
naturally rise. All convection under these conditions 
must be forced through the use of fans or blowers. 
Pressure injuries 
Pressure injuries result from excessive or insufficient
atmospheric pressure conditions, barotraumas, and from
exposure to high airflow. Changes in pressure generated
by explosions, failed systems, cabin breach, leaks, failed
overboard vents and valves, or ejection of the crew from
a pressurized environment can cause incapacitation,
injury, or death. An overpressure condition (e.g,
explosion) that exceeds the pressure relief capability
of the cabin can damage the ears, lungs, sinus cavities,
circulatory system (pressure waves transmitted through
blood), and teeth. Injuries to the lungs and ears due to
overpressurization are similar to those observed from
a rapid depressurization. Without sufficient venting, an
overpressure condition may result from the unmitigated
introduction of gases from failed environmental control
and life support systems, or a cabin fire may increase
pressure. Long-term exposure to elevated pressures can
result in oxygen toxicity and increase the amount of
nitrogen saturation. Ultimately, overpressurization of the
crew cabin may result in a cabin breach.
Depressurization occurs when the crew cabin is 
breached by structural failure, penetration, inadvertent 
hatch opening, a cabin leak (hatch, seal, or window), 
or failed overboard vent or valve. At pressure altitudes 
above 10,000 feet, as the pressure altitude increases, the 
oxygen partial pressure in the arterial blood decreases, 
which affects eyesight and cognitive abilities. The 
amount and pressure of oxygen delivered to the tissues 
is determined by arterial oxygen saturation, by the 
total oxygen-carrying capacity of the blood, and by the 
rate of oxygen delivery to the tissues. When the body 
is deprived of sufficient oxygen, hypoxia occurs. The 
four types of hypoxia are hypoxemic hypoxia, anemic 
hypoxia, stagnant hypoxia, and histotoxic hypoxia. 
In general, at pressure altitudes above 18,000 feet, 
decompression sickness occurs during depressurization 
when dissolved gases come out of solution and create 
bubbles inside the body. Symptoms include joint 
pain, rashes, paralysis, and death. Barotraumas are 
damage to the body’s tissues caused by the pressure 
differences between internal air cavities (e.g., sinus 
cavities, ears, dental fillings, lungs, and digestive tract) 
and the surrounding tissue when the body moves to 
or from higher pressures. Barotrauma effects include 
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pain, tearing or rupture of tissue, retarded breathing, 
disorientation, unconsciousness, and shock. 
Arterial gas embolism occurs when the depressurization 
rate overpressurizes the lungs, forcing gas into the 
arterial circulation, which disperses it throughout the 
body. The onset of arterial gas embolism is usually 
sudden, dramatic, and life-threatening. At higher 
altitudes, even while a person is breathing pure oxygen, 
the arterial oxygen partial pressure falls to a level that 
cannot support consciousness. Above 62,000 feet, 
the ambient pressure is low enough that the water in 
the body begins to boil at normal body temperature 
and ebullism occurs. Symptoms include bubbles 
forming in the blood, eyes, and mouth; tissue 
swelling and hemorrhaging; impaired breathing and 
circulation; and death. 
Acceleration injuries 
During atmospheric flight phases, breaches of the
cabin or ejection of the crew from the vehicle expose
the crew to the aerodynamic effects of high-velocity
airflows, or windblast, and acceleration loads. The
effects of windblast vary with the density of the air
and are proportional to the surface area exposed to the
flow. The atmosphere can exert significant loads on
exposed crewmembers even at high altitudes. During
ejection, the body can be subjected to substantial loads
from various sources (e.g., maneuvering loads, escape
system-induced loads, windblast) and may experience
torsional and shearing forces that produce internal
tears. The compressive loads acting on the body can
result in vertebral fractures and compress the chest
and abdomen. Injuries can be produced by windblast,
including petechial and subconjunctival hemorrhage,
and flail. Flail injuries occur when inadequacy of body
restraints for the vehicle’s dynamic environment causes
differential acceleration between the extremities and
the torso, terminating at the range of motion limit or
contact with surrounding structure. The effects of a
load on the crew are determined by its direction, onset,
magnitude, frequency, and duration. This information
may be available from video, radar, modeling, and
engineering analysis. Aircraft pilot ejection data
are relevant for many conditions experienced by a
spacecraft crewmember ejected from the crew cabin
during atmospheric flight.
Crew Equipment Assessment 
Crew equipment assessments focus on the utilization 
and performance of the individual crewmember seats, 
on crew protection and crew survival emergency 
equipment and systems, and on the analysis of each 
crew-vehicle interface. Data sources are audio and 
video recordings and the results of debris analysis. The 
as-found location of an equipment item can indicate 
when it was released from the vehicle. Because of 
their proximity to the crew, the condition and as-found 
locations of the seats, items worn by crewmembers, 
crew emergency and crew survival equipment and 
systems indicate the conditions experienced by the 
individual crewmembers during the mishap. Members 
of the crew survival investigation team should visually 
examine crew equipment for witness marks, thermal 
effects, materials effects, potential loads, hardware 
failures, and debris-debris impacts resulting from the 
mishap. The postmishap configuration of the equipment 
and systems, such as switch positions, provides insight 
into possible crew actions (e.g., activation of emergency 
breathing supplies, raft deployment, and activation of 
nitrogen purge). Analysis of the crew equipment and 
systems indicates whether individual crewmembers 
used or attempted to use the equipment and/or systems, 
how accessible the equipment was, and how well it 
performed. This analysis also provides insight into 
crew awareness of a hazardous condition and which 
hazardous conditions the crew experienced. 
Analysis of the crew seat-vehicle interface derives
the loading events experienced by the crew. The
investigation of recovered seat debris provides insight
into injuries resulting from loss of restraint. Injuries
resulting from restraint failures include bracing and
flail injuries, transections, fractures, disarticulations,
dislocations, and amputations. Bracing injuries, usually
noted on the lower legs and feet or lower arms and hands,
are a result of inadequate upper-body restraint against
the vehicle motion (e.g., tumbling, spinning). Bracing is
a deliberate act by a conscious crewmember to counter
loads imposed on them or to respond to ineffective or
failed restraints. Flail produces fractures, dislocations, or
total disarticulations. Transecting (or shearing) fractures
of the vertebral column result when extremely high
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loads imposed on the crewmember react against the
restraint in such a way that the restraint transects the
body. Fractures, disarticulations, and dislocations may be
caused by overloading of the seat structure or the loss of
restraint. Fractures of the extremities are consistent with
deceleration injury or aerodynamic flail. Amputations
may result from impact, flail, or exposure to high
pressures or inertial forces. They may not occur at a joint
but may be coincident with a restraint.
Crew-worn or crew-donned equipment may cause 
injuries at the crew-equipment interface. Injuries can 
result when the weight of equipment under inertial 
loads is imposed on a crewmember by crew-worn or 
crew-donned protective equipment. The types of injuries 
include head and neck injury and mass augmentation 
injuries. Head injuries may result from the failure of 
helmets or head/neck devices to support the head and 
neck. Equipment worn or donned by a crewmember 
augments the crewmember’s mass properties (such 
as center of gravity and moment of inertia), and this 
augmentation may exacerbate the loads imposed on the 
crewmember and result in injuries such as a neck injury 
to a crewmember wearing a portable breathing apparatus 
during an acceleration event. 
Medical Forensics Assessment
Medical forensic assessments are sensitive in nature 
and encompass medical factors, types of injuries, 
autopsy, crew involvement, and mechanisms of crew 
injury and crew death. These assessments also include 
evaluation of the crew’s awareness of and responses 
to timeline events, including any that were potentially 
lethal to the crew. Through review of medical and 
training records, autopsies, survivor examinations and 
interviews, and examination and analysis of data and 
physical evidence, the crew survival investigation team 
systematically creates and substantiates the mishap 
scenario for each crewmember. This assessment 
considers each crewmember’s awareness, response, 
and involvement from the start to the end of the 
mishap, the mechanisms and sequence of injuries and/ 
or death, and any conditions limiting the crewmember’s 
awareness or response, including human physiological 
limits under mishap conditions. The team considers the 
mishap conditions, injury patterns, and other potentially 
lethal conditions relative to each of the crewmembers, 
and determines why some crewmembers sustained 
injuries and others did not, and why some crewmembers 
survived, or survived longer, while others did not. 
Detailed documentation of all injuries and medical 
conditions is important when assessing the safety 
of the spacecraft design and the effectiveness of the 
protective equipment. 
The Crew Condition 
The investigative team should develop the medical
sequence of events by first differentiating between
premishap, mishap, and postmishap contributors to the
condition of the crew. It is possible that an event that
occurred before the mishap may be relevant. So review
preflight psychological evaluations and medical records
for evidence of preexisting conditions, injuries, or
diseases of crewmembers, their psychological state (e.g.,
stress, family events, sleep, significant emotional events),
and each crewmember’s performance during training
and on previous missions, if applicable. Consider
any conditions that might make a crewmember more
sensitive to mission conditions, such as reduced sensory
or motor capacities. Identify any injuries or illnesses the
crewmember incurred before the flight that are relevant
to the crewmember’s circumstances. Determine the role,
if any, that preflight conditions played in the mishap or in
contributing to the crewmember’s injuries or death.
For conditions occurring during the mission, assess
the crewmember’s workload, interactions, performance,
and human factors issues immediately before and
throughout the mission. Identify the roles and
responsibilities of each of the crewmembers as well
as any indications of their performance throughout
the mission. Changes to mission timelines (e.g., sleep
schedules, reprioritization of tasks, added activities
such as extravehicular activities, isolation of the crew,
and mission termination, extension, or delays) and off-
nominal or contingency operations or system failures
can affect the crew. The duration of the flight may also
be a factor because of the short- and long-term effects
of microgravity on body functions and capabilities;
consider the consequences of bone loss and morphology
changes, immune system suppression, intracranial and
eye pressure changes, and psychological alterations.
Also, injuries may have occurred during the mission
that impair crew performance during the mishap.
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Payload specialist Ilan Ramon (left), astronauts Laurel B. Clark, mission specialist, and Michael P. Anderson, payload commander, participate in 
mission training in one of the high fidelity trainers/mockups in the Space Vehicle Mockup Facility at the Johnson Space Center (JSC). The three, 
attired in training versions of the full-pressure launch and entry suit, are seated on the middeck for an emergency egress training session. Ramon 
represents the Israeli Space Agency. 
Next, assess all of the areas mentioned earlier, including 
human factors and psychological, physiological, and 
environmental conditions, but only the findings specific 
to the time of the mishap event. For instance, if a 
crewmember was incapacitated by motion sickness, 
this may have affected their actions. Evaluate the 
crewmember’s exposure to potential environmental 
conditions resulting from the mishap, in light of 
their injuries. Mishaps occurring in a microgravity 
environment make the analysis of fluid splatter patterns 
more challenging because the fluid may have floated 
free or pooled on a surface, then been transferred when 
conditions changed. In microgravity, blood and other 
fluids can cross-contaminate crewmembers. DNA
analysis and blood serology may be needed to trace 
blood to the source crewmember. After a mishap, the 
contributors to the crew condition are exposure (which 
could lead to decomposition or artifacts), environment 
(e.g., weather, temperature, humidity, season), and 
predation (causing, for example, alteration of evidence 
due to insects, mammals and plant life), or sometimes 
dispersal of remains. Environmental conditions 
influence the effects of delayed recovery. Evidence can 
be lost and artificial evidence introduced if a significant 
amount of time passes before remains are recovered. 
Awareness of postmishap contributing factors allows the 
team to rule out any postmishap injuries. 
Medical Examinations and Autopsies 
The medical examinations of the crewmembers should 
follow a systematic and well-organized plan. The 
objectives of the pathology inquiry are the diagnosis of 
preexisting disease or injury conditions, documentation 
of all injuries and analysis of the injury pathogenesis, 
and cataloging all observations, to substantiate the 
mishap cause and sequence. During the medical 
examination of a survivor or autopsy of human remains, 
record all injuries and document all evidence that can 
be used to identify potential sources of injury and to 
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sequence the injuries. Many methods are available, 
such as thorough descriptions, photographs, diagrams, 
sketches, X-rays, MRI, and CT, to reveal various aspects 
of the injuries. Full-body radiographs with special 
emphasis on the head, neck, and extremities are useful 
in the clarification of injury mechanisms, particularly 
when the radiographs are correlated with photographs 
and diagrams. Describe and interpret all observed 
injuries in sufficient detail to identify possible causes 
in the context of the mishap, the time and/or sequence 
of injury, and the nature of the injurious event, and to 
differentiate mishap injuries from postmishap injuries. 
The pathologist performing the postmortem exam 
should be familiar with the spacecraft, the mission 
phase of the mishap, the environmental factors that were 
present from the time of the mishap until the time of the 
autopsy, and any handling errors. 

When you are interpreting medical evidence, 

relationships are important. These include the locations 
and conditions of the crew equipment relative to 
the crewmembers or remains, of the crew relative 
to hardware, and of injured crewmembers and their 
injuries relative to other crewmembers. It is ideal if all 
of the crew-worn or crew-protective equipment on the 
crewmember is documented before it is removed, or if 
it is left in place until the time of the autopsy. Assess 
whether any equipment limited the crewmember’s 
ability to respond (e.g., by impairing vision) or 
shows evidence of an impact that was translated to 
the crewmember. When analyzing the location of 
crewmembers relative to that of hardware, consider 
the events that resulted in the final configuration and 
identify supporting evidence found during the medical 
examination or autopsy. An example of an important 
relationship would be a fire extinguisher or breathing 
mask located next to a crewmember exhibiting 
evidence of smoke inhalation. Patterns of injuries may 
define events and injury mechanisms. Document each 
crewmember’s injury patterns, and then compare them 
to the injury patterns of the other crewmembers. A
suggested technique is mapping the injuries onto virtual 
crewmembers. The virtual crew can be placed into a 
virtual model of the spacecraft to aid in visualizing 
injury patterns relative to potential sources. 
Mechanisms of Injuries 
Typical causes of crew injury are categorized as
impact, loads, pressure, toxicological, thermal, and
those from other environmental causes. This is not
a comprehensive list, and a mishap may not involve
all of these mechanisms of crew injury. To determine
the mechanisms of crew injury, identify the crew’s
injury patterns, reconstruct the mishap scenario, and
correlate the injuries to a cause. This is an iterative
process between examining the vehicle for evidence
of interaction with the crew and mapping any
interaction to a crew response or injury, and examining
the crewmembers and correlating the source of an
injury with the physical evidence on the vehicle or
with analytical results. During this iterative process,
eliminate postmishap injuries from consideration. The
medical interpretations must be consistent with the
circumstances of the mishap and findings from other
lines of the investigation. 
Mechanisms of Survival
The goal of the crew survival investigation is to identify 
ways to eliminate the mechanisms of injury and death 
and enhance crew survival. The injury potential must 
be reduced to a level that would not impede life-critical 
actions. Life-critical actions are actions the crew must 
take to protect themselves from serious harm or death 
(e.g., being able to release their harness and exit a 
sinking capsule). Once the mechanisms of injury and 
death are identified, the team can identify ways to 
prevent or mitigate them. Items that may be needed for 
crew survival include these: 
• 	Energy-attenuation systems to maintain loads within
a tolerable range
• A life-compatible environment (i.e., pressure, 
breathable atmosphere, temperature, and humidity that 
are compatible with life) 
• 	Adequate post-event factors such as escape paths, 
removal of fire or toxic event byproducts, secondary 
flotation methods, and availability of portable 
breathing apparatus 
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The Crew Survivability logo. 
• 	Structural integrity of the crew cabin sufficient to 
preclude intrusion 
• Adequate head and body restraint 
• 	Clear translation paths and control of stowage 
• 	Elimination of contact surfaces or rigid structures in 
close proximity to a seated crew 
• 	Elimination of hazards in the crew cabin such as
sharp edges, surfaces exceeding touch temperatures,
or pinch points
• 	Protective measures that effectively mitigate the 
hazards without inhibiting mobility or the senses 
Ultimately, the purpose of the crew survival
investigation is to identify the successes and failures
of the crew protective equipment and systems in
order to make recommendations for future spacecraft.
This is accomplished by identifying the sequence of
events; the attempted, unsuccessful, and successful
crew actions; the performance of the crew protective
equipment and systems; and the resulting outcome for
each crewmember. If equipment or systems failed to
provide a habitable environment for the crew for the
duration of the mishap, the crew survival investigation
team must understand why they failed. To answer
this question, they must determine whether the
failure occurred within certified capabilities or if the
conditions exceeded the design specifications. If the
conditions exceeded the design specifications, they
should attempt to determine the amount by which the
design specifications were exceeded so that they can
recommend changes to improve survival in a future
spacecraft mishap. 
Crew Survival Investigation — 
Process of Discovery 
The crew survival investigation is an iterative 
process of discovery. By examining the hardware 
and cross-matching the crew injuries to the hardware, 
the crew survival investigation team substantiates 
the mishap scenario. Once the mishap scenario is 
understood, the crew survival investigation team can 
recommend changes to spacecraft design, equipment, 
or operations to improve crew survivability. These 
are the lessons learned that improve the safety of 
human space flight. 
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Abbreviations and Acronyms
 
GMT Greenwich Mean Time 
GPC general purpose computer 
GPS global positioning system 
ISS International Space Station 
ITAR	 International Traffic in Arms Regulations 
JSC Johnson Space Center 
KSC Kennedy Space Center 
LOC loss of control 
LOS loss of signal 
MBF	 manned balloon flight 
MCC Mission Control Center 
MCF million cubic feet 
MEIDEX Mediterranean-Israeli Dust Experiment 
MILA Merritt Island Launch Annex 
MIT Mishap Investigation Team 
MMACS maintenance, mechanics, and crew systems 
MMT Mission Management Team 
MPCV Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle 
MRI magnetic resonance imaging 
MS mission specialist 
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board 
OAFME	 Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner 
ORSAT object reentry survival analysis tool 
PLT pilot 
PLBD payload bay doors 
POC point of contact 
PPE personal protective equipment 
PS payload specialist 
SCSIIT Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated 
Investigation Team 
SLF shuttle landing facility 
SLSD Space Life Sciences Directorate 
SO space operations 
STS Space Transportation System 
TAEM terminal area energy management 
TD total dispersal 
TPS Thermal Protection System 
UTC Coordinated Universal Time 
VITT Vehicle Integration Test Team 
ACES
AFB
AFIP
AFMES
AsMA
ATA
BRC
CACO	 
CAIB
CAP
advanced crew escape suit 
Air Force Base 
Armed Forces Institute of Pathology 
Armed Forces Medical Examiner System 
Aerospace Medicine Association 
atmosphere absolute 
Biodynamic Research Corporation 
casualty assistance calls officer 
Columbia Accident Investigation Board 
contingency action plan 
CAPCOM capsule communicator 
CDR
CE
CEE
CES
CFS	 
CISD	 
CMCE
CMG
CSI
CSWG
CT
CTF
DDMS
DNA
DOD
EAP
ECLSS
EI
EMS
EPA
ERT
ET
EVA
FACA
FBI
FEMA
FOIA
G
g
commander 
Catastrophic Event 
crew egress and escape 
crew escape system 
chief flight surgeon 
critical incident stress debriefing 
Crew Module Catastrophic Event 
Contingency Medical Group 
crew survival investigation 
Crew Survival Working Group 
computed tomography 
Columbia Task Force 
Department of Defense Manned Space 
Flight Program Support Office 
deoxyribonucleic acid 
Department of Defense 
employee assistance program 
environmental control and life support system 
entry interface 
emergency medical services 
Environmental Protection Agency 
Evidence Response Team 
external tank 
extravehicular activity 
Federal Advisory Committee Act 
Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Federal Emergency Management Agency 
Freedom of Information Act 
acceleration acting on objects or 
crewmembers, in units of the Earth’s 
gravitational acceleration 
acceleration due to gravity (1g = Earth gravity) 
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Section 2 – The Response 
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2003. 
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York: Springer, 2008.
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Jennifer A., editors. Philadelphia: Lippincott Williams & 
Wilkins, 2008. 
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Campbell, Charles H., BS, MS, PhD 
Dr. Campbell has 25 years of experience in hypersonic entry systems supporting the Space Shuttle, the X-38, 
and recent Mars technology development efforts. This includes significant contributions to understanding the 
hypersonic entry environments which contributed to the STS-107 accident. After completing a BS in Aerospace 
Engineering at the University of Minnesota, he also completed an MS in Mechanical Engineering at the University
of Houston. In 2007, a PhD in Aerospace Engineering was conferred upon him by the University of Minnesota. 
Awards received by Dr. Campbell include the NASA Exceptional Achievement Medal, the Rotary National Award
for Space Achievement – Mid-Career Stellar Award and an AIAA Thermophysics Conference Best Student Paper 
Award. Dr. Campbell has also been recognized as an Associate Fellow of the AIAA for his technical contributions. 
Chandler, Michael R., Major, USAF (Ret.), BS, MBA 
Mr. Chandler is the Chief, Human Space Flight Operations Branch at the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC).
He has a BS from Tarleton State University in Texas and an MBA from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
in Florida. He was a fixed-wing and rotary-wing pilot while in the Air Force. Mr. Chandler supported Space 
Shuttle missions at Northrup Strip (White Sands Space Harbor) and later supported the STS-3 landing there. 
As a member of the Department of Defense STS Contingency Support Office at Patrick AFB, he supported the 
Space Shuttle Challenger accident recovery operations. At JSC, Mr. Chandler was selected as a member of
the medical contingency team in 1998 and helped develop response plans and procedures. He was requested 
by the NASA Space Life Sciences Directorate to be one of the two primary medical representatives on the
STS-107 Mishap Investigation Team. He assisted the NASA Medical Operations Branch in the development of 
landing augmentation plans for the Soyuz in May 2003 following the STS-107 accident. 
Charles, John B., BS, PhD 
Dr. Charles earned his BS in Biophysics at The Ohio State University and his Doctorate in Physiology and 
Biophysics at the University of Kentucky. He has been at the Johnson Space Center since 1983, where he 
investigated the cardiovascular effects of space flight on Space Shuttle astronauts and on crewmembers of the 
Russian space station Mir. He was Mission Scientist for the NASA research on American astronauts on Mir, 
on John Glenn’s Space Shuttle flight STS-95 and on STS-107, Columbia’s last mission in January 2003. 
He co-chaired the 18th “Humans in Space Symposium” of the International Academy of Astronautics in Houston, 
Texas, in 2011. Dr. Charles is now the chief of the International Science Office of NASA’s Human Research 
Program and leads space life sciences planning for the joint US/Russian one-year mission on ISS. He is a Fellow 
of the Aerospace Medical Association and a Full Member of the International Academy of Astronautics, has 
published over 60 scientific articles, and has received several professional awards. 
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Clark, Jonathan, Captain, USN (Ret.), BS, MD, MPH 
Dr. Jonathan Clark is an Associate Professor of Neurology and Space Medicine at Baylor College of Medicine
(BCM) and teaches operational space medicine at BCM’s Center for Space Medicine. Dr. Clark received his
BS in Biology from Texas A&M University, MD from the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, 
and MPH from the University of Alabama. He completed his residency training in neurology at the Naval Hospital,
Bethesda. Dr. Clark was a member of the NASA Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team from
2004 to 2007 and Constellation EVA Systems Project Standing Review Board from 2007 to 2010. Dr. Clark 
worked at NASA from 1997 to 2005 as a Space Shuttle Crew Surgeon. He served 26 years active duty in the US 
Navy as a Naval Flight Officer, Flight Surgeon and Military Freefall Parachutist. Dr. Clark is Medical Director of 
the Red Bull Stratos Project. His professional interests focus on the neurological effects of extreme environments
and crew survival in space.
Davis, Jeffrey R., MD, MS 
Dr. Davis is the Director, Human Health and Performance and Chief Medical Officer at the NASA Johnson 
Space Center (JSC), Houston, Texas. He joined NASA as an operational flight surgeon in 1984 and subsequently 
served as Chief, of the JSC Flight Medicine Clinic and Chief of JSC Medical Operations. Dr. Davis has served as
Corporate Medical Director of American Airlines and Professor of Preventive Medicine and Community Health
at the University of Texas Medical Branch, Galveston, Texas. He received his BS in Biology from Stanford
University and MD from the University of California at San Diego. He also holds a Master of Science (MPH
equivalent) degree from Wright State University, Dayton, Ohio. Dr. Davis’ residency training included internal
medicine at University of California, Davis and aerospace medicine at Wright State University. He is certified 
by the American Board of Preventive Medicine. Dr. Davis is the senior editor of Fundamentals of Aerospace
Medicine, Fourth Edition. After the Columbia accident Dr. Davis established the Crew Survival Working Group. 
Flynn, Christopher F., Lieutenant Colonel, USAFR, BA, MD 
Dr. Flynn is an Associate Professor of Psychiatry and of Space Medicine at Baylor College of Medicine and 
currently the Director, Assessment Service at the Menninger Clinic. He received his BA from Berry College, 
Rome, Georgia and MD at the Medical College of Georgia. Dr. Flynn completed his residency in psychiatry at the 
University of Colorado (Denver), and studied aerospace medicine at Brooks Air Force Base in Texas. He is board 
certified in Psychiatry by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology. Dr. Flynn has over 20 years’ practice 
caring for those who serve in difficult or dangerous environments. He deployed from 2005 to 2009 to assist US 
Department of State officers and families serving in the Middle East and West Africa—later becoming Director, 
Mental Health Services from 2010 to 2011. From 1996 to 2005, he served as Chief, Psychiatry and also as a flight 
surgeon at the NASA Johnson Space Center. While there, Dr. Flynn helped develop NASA’s behavioral health 
program for long duration space flight; cared for astronauts and families and was crew surgeon for two space flight 
missions. He is a Senior Flight Surgeon and Lieutenant Colonel in the USAF Reserves with 26 years’ experience 
working with aircrews in multiple types of military aircraft. 
Gilmore, Stevan M., MD, MPH 
Dr. Gilmore has been a flight surgeon with NASA since 2002 and has been a crew surgeon for multiple Space 
Shuttle and International Space Station missions. He is also assigned to support the medical operations contingency 
group providing contingency planning, training, and mission support. Dr. Gilmore studied Chemistry at Grinnell 
College prior to attending Wake Forest Bowman Gray School of Medicine. He completed clinical residencies in 
Emergency Medicine and Aerospace Medicine at Wright State University and the University of Texas Medical 
Branch respectively. Dr. Gilmore is board certified by the American Board of Emergency Medicine (ABEM). 
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Johnston, Smith L., MD, MS 
Dr. Johnston is the Medical Director of NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Aerospace and Occupational Medicine 
Clinics and also the lead physician, for the JSC Wellness and Fatigue Management Programs. He received his BS in 
Biology in 1976 and his MD in 1981 from Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia. From 1984 to 1990, Dr. Johnston 
completed his residencies in Internal and Aerospace Medicine from Wright State University. He is board certified 
in Aerospace Medicine from the American Board of Preventive Medicine and a Fellow of the Aerospace Medical 
Association (AsMA). Dr. Johnston joined NASA in 1994 as a flight surgeon in the Medical Operations Branch of 
the NASA Johnson Space Center. Over the past 20 years he has supported the medical care of the Astronaut Corps 
and dependents, and served as the crew surgeon for numerous missions of NASA’s Space Shuttle and International 
Space Station (ISS) programs. Dr. Johnston has served AsMA on numerous committees over the last two decades 
and recently as the President of the Space Medicine Association in 2005, and the President of the Society of NASA 
Flight Surgeons in 2006. He is a member of the clinical faculties, at the University of Texas Medical Branch, 
Department of Preventive, Occupational and Environmental Medicine in Galveston, Texas, and the Wright State 
University Department of Aerospace Medicine at Dayton, Ohio. Dr. Johnston presently serves on the Board of 
Directors for Houston Medical Centers Hospice and Palliative Care System. He has served on the Advisory and 
Oversight Committees for the National Science Foundation’s American Polar Medicine Program, Washington, 
DC and has held staff positions with the Veterans Administration Medical Center Emergency Department and 
Department of Internal Medicine, Kelsey-Seybold Clinic, Inc., in Houston, Texas. Dr. Johnston was the crew 
surgeon for the STS-107 Space Shuttle Columbia crewmembers. 
Lane, Helen W., BS, MS, PhD, RD 
Dr. Lane is a Senior Scientist for Biological Sciences and Applications with the Human Health and Performance 
Directorate at the Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas. She received her BS from the University of California, 
Berkeley, MS from the University of Wisconsin, Madison, and PhD in Nutritional Biochemistry from the University 
of Florida, Gainesville. Dr. Lane was trained in dietetics at Veterans Health Administration hospitals in Madison, 
Wisconsin, and Gainesville, Florida. She was an associate professor at the University of Texas Health Science 
Center, Houston, Texas and a professor at Auburn University, Alabama. Dr. Lane joined NASA in 1989 and has 
served as branch chief of biomedical laboratories, chief nutritionist, assistant to the director, and manager of 
university affairs at the Johnson Space Center. She has edited three previous books including the 2010 Wings in 
Orbit. She has published over 100 peer reviewed papers related to space flight. Dr. Lane has received many NASA 
honors and was a principal investigator on Space Shuttle and Shuttle–Mir spaceflights. 
Mallak, Craig T., Captain, USN (Ret.), BS, JD, MD 
Dr. Mallak received his BS in Criminalistics from Michigan State University and his JD and MD from Creighton 
University. During his career in the US Navy he has served as a General Medical Officer, Regional Armed Forces 
Medical Examiner and Director of Ancillary Services, and Medical Corps Detailer. At the time of his retirement 
from the Navy, Dr. Mallak was the Armed Forces Medical Examiner. Throughout the conflicts in Iraqi and 
Afghanistan he initiated the first ever complete forensic investigation of every fatality from a declared conflict. Data 
gathered has been used to improve body armor, helmets, vehicles, and enhance battlefield medical care. Dr. Mallak 
directed the medical investigation and analysis of NASA crewmembers following the Space Shuttle Columbia 
mishap. He is board certified by the American Board of Pathology in Anatomic and Clinical Pathology and Forensic 
Pathology. Dr. Mallak is currently the Broward County Medical Examiner, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. 
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Melroy, Pamela A., Colonel USAF (Ret.) BA, MS 
Ms. Melroy is Deputy Director, Tactical Technology Office at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA). Prior to joining DARPA she was the acting Deputy Associate Administrator and Director of Field 
Operations in the Federal Aviation Administration’s Office of Commercial Space Transportation. Ms. Melroy served 
as a pilot in the USAF from 1983 to 2007 and is a veteran of Operation Just Cause and Operation Desert Shield/ 
Desert Storm, with more than 200 combat and combat support hours. Ms. Melroy also served as a USAF test pilot 
and has logged more than 6,000 hours flight time in more than 50 different aircraft. Ms. Melroy was selected by 
NASA as an astronaut candidate in 1994. She served as pilot on two Space Shuttle missions, STS-92 and STS-112. 
Ms. Melroy was the Mission Commander on STS-120 in 2007. She was the second woman to command a Space 
Shuttle mission. She held several key positions within the NASA Space Shuttle Program from 1994 until 2009, 
including Crew Module Lead on the Columbia Reconstruction Team, Deputy Project Manager for the Columbia 
Crew Survival Investigation Team, and Branch Chief for the Orion Branch of the Astronaut Office. Ms. Melroy 
holds a BA in Physics and Astronomy from Wellesley College and an MS in Earth and Planetary Sciences from 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
Packham, Nigel, BS, PhD 
Dr. Packham is the Associate Director, Technical, Safety and Mission Assurance at the Johnson Space Center. He 
received his BS in Chemistry and Biology from City of London Polytechnic and PhD in Physical Electrochemistry, 
from Texas A&M University. Dr. Packham has been awarded the NASA Exceptional Achievement Medal, the 
NASA Outstanding Leadership Medal, the NASA Silver Snoopy Award and numerous other JSC and Agency 
awards. Dr. Packham was a member of the Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team and Project 
Manager for the Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report. 
Patlach, Robert, Lieutenant Colonel, Texas ANG (Ret.), BS 
Mr. Patlach is a Space Flight Medical Contingency Coordinator with Wyle, Science, Technology & Engineering 
Group where he supports the Human Space Flight Operations Branch, NASA Johnson Space Center. He received a 
BS degree in Electrical Engineering from The Citadel in South Carolina. Mr. Patlach was a C-130 instructor pilot 
in the US Air Force and C-26 evaluator pilot in the Texas Air National Guard. During his career supporting NASA 
he served as a Space Shuttle simulator instructor, a Space Shuttle payload integration engineer and a project engineer 
with the Boeing International Space Station Project Engineering Group. Mr. Patlach was a member of the Space 
Shuttle Mishap Investigation Team and was deployed to the Lufkin, Texas, disaster field office during the STS-107 
Columbia crewmember recovery operation. 
Pogue, David J., BS, M. Eng. 
Mr. Pogue is an engineer with the Extravehicular Activity, Robotics and Crew Systems Operations Division within 
the Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) at the Johnson Space Center. He has served MOD as the International 
Space Station Crew Systems Lead, the Space Shuttle Crew Escape Lead, the Technical Lead of the Crew Systems 
Group, and the Lead for Exploration Crew Systems and Crew Survival Operations. He received his BS and Masters 
of Engineering in Biomedical Engineering from Texas A&M University. Mr. Pogue has been awarded the NASA 
Exceptional Engineering Achievement Medal, NASA Silver Snoopy, and numerous NASA Group Achievement 
Awards. Mr. Pogue was the Crew Equipment Team Lead for the Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation 
Team and was a major author of the Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report. 
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Scarpa, Philip J., MD, MS 
Dr. Scarpa is the Deputy Chief Medical Officer at the NASA Kennedy Space Center in Florida. He received his 
BS in Biology from Rutgers University and MD from Rutgers Medical School. He also holds a Master of Science 
(MPH equivalent) degree from Wright State University in Dayton, Ohio. Dr. Scarpa completed residency training in 
Internal Medicine at the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey and in Aerospace Medicine at Wright 
State University. He is currently certified by the American Board of Preventive Medicine in Aerospace Medicine and 
Occupational Medicine. Dr. Scarpa led the biomedical management of the Space Shuttle Columbia reconstruction 
and analysis activities conducted at the Kennedy Space Center. 
Shafer, Donna M., BS, JD 
Ms. Shafer is the Deputy Chief Counsel at the NASA Johnson Space Center. She earned a BS in Criminal Justice 
from Midwestern State University in 1987 and a JD from the University of Houston in 1994. Ms. Shafer began her 
career at JSC in 1989 as a security specialist, and joined the Office of Chief Counsel in 1997 where she has held 
progressively more responsible positions. She has experience in all legal practice areas, and served as the Assistant 
Chief Counsel for Procurement matters, Assistant Chief Counsel for International matters, and the Assistant Chief 
Counsel for General Legal matters. Ms. Shafer served as the legal advisor to the Columbia Task Force. She has 
received numerous awards and recognition for her work, including being named NASA Attorney of the Year in 
2004, a NASA Space Flight Awareness award in 2008, the NASA Silver Snoopy in 2010, the Michael Taylor Shelby 
Award in 2011, the NASA Legal Leadership award in 2012, and a NASA Outstanding Leadership Medal in 2013. 
Stepaniak, Philip C., MD, MS 
Dr. Philip C. Stepaniak currently serves as a NASA operational flight surgeon for the International Space Station 
Program at the Johnson Space Center (JSC), Houston, Texas. He is also the lead medical operations flight surgeon 
to the JSC Contingency Medical Group for NASA aircraft and spacecraft accidents. Dr. Stepaniak received his MD 
from the Northeast Ohio Medical University. He is residency trained in Aerospace and Emergency Medicine from 
Wright State University and is board certified in Emergency Medicine. Past positions include the lead Medical 
Operations Branch flight surgeon for the Space Shuttle Program and Medical Operations Training Group. Since 
1986 Dr. Stepaniak has supported crews for 29 Space Shuttle flights as their flight surgeon. These flights included 
STS-71, the first Shuttle-MIR docking in 1995; STS-95, which flew Senator and former astronaut John Glenn in 
1998; STS-96, the first Space Shuttle and International Space Station docking mission in 1999; STS-125, the final 
Hubble Space Telescope repair mission in 2009, and STS-135, the final flight of the Space Shuttle Program in 2011. 
Dr. Stepaniak has achieved numerous NASA service awards including the Stellar Award from the Rotary National 
Space Foundation presented in 1999 for operational excellence in aerospace medicine. He is a former major and 
flight surgeon with the United States Air Force Reserve and is a member of the Society of NASA Flight Surgeons. 
During the Columbia STS-107 accident Dr. Stepaniak served as the medical lead for the Mishap Investigation Team 
(MIT) at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, during crewmember recovery and identification operations. 
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Wetherbee, James D., Captain, USN (Ret.), BS 
Mr. Wetherbee received a BS in Aerospace Engineering from the University of Notre Dame in 1974. He is a former 
NASA astronaut, selected in 1984. Mr. Wetherbee flew six flights aboard the Space Shuttle, including docking 
missions to the International Space Station and the Russian Space Station, Mir. He is the only American to have 
commanded five missions in space. During his 20-year career at NASA, Mr. Wetherbee held the management 
positions of Deputy Director, Johnson Space Center, and Director, Flight Crew Operations. Mr. Wetherbee 
was a US Naval Aviator and test pilot, and has logged 7,000 flight hours in 20 types of air and space vehicles, 
with 345 carrier arrested landings. In 2009, Mr. Wetherbee was inducted into the US Astronaut Hall of Fame. 
During his military career, Mr. Wetherbee was awarded a Distinguished Flying Cross, Navy Achievement Medal, 
two Meritorious Unit Commendations, six Space Flight Medals, two Outstanding Leadership Medals, and four 
Distinguished Service Medals. He is a lifetime member of the Society of Experimental Test Pilots, and an 
honorary member, Musicians’ Union, Local 47, American Federation of Musicians, Los Angeles, California. 
From February 1 through February 13, 2003, Mr. Wetherbee was the Operational Search Director for the human 
remains of the Columbia crew in Lufkin, Texas. 
Woods, Karon S. B., BS 
Ms. Woods is the crew survival and operations specialist for the Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate at the 
Johnson Space Center. She has also served as an International Space Station Safety Risk Analyst and Emergency 
Response Strategy Specialist, and Space Shuttle Probabilistic Risk Assessment Lead for the Safety and Mission 
Assurance Directorate and as the Shuttle Training Aircraft Project Engineer for the Flight Crew Operations 
Directorate. She has authored numerous technical papers on the subjects of damage-tolerance of aging aircraft and 
on Space Shuttle mission integrated probabilistic risk assessment, and a reference manual for performing a crew 
survivability investigation. Ms. Woods has a BS in Aeronautical and Astronautical Engineering from The Ohio 
State University. She is the recipient of the NASA Flight Safety Award, NASA Silver Snoopy, NASA Exceptional 
Service Medal and numerous NASA Group Achievement Awards. 
Xenofos, Amy Voigt, JD 
Ms. Xenofos is the Assistant Chief Counsel for General Law and External Partnerships at NASA’s Johnson 
Space Center in Houston, Texas, and has been with NASA since August 2000. Her areas of responsibility include 
government ethics, personnel/equal employment opportunity matters, environmental and real property matters, tort 
claims and litigation, internal NASA policies and processes, fiscal law, Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act 
matters, and agreements and partnerships using NASA’s “other transaction” authority. Ms. Xenofos served as the 
legal advisor to the NASA Mishap Investigation Team during the Space Shuttle Columbia investigation in 2003. 
She spent 2 years working at NASA Headquarters serving as lead counsel for the Exploration Systems Mission 
Directorate and 6 months in the Office of Procurement working on procurement policy matters. She received her 
juris doctorate, cum laude, from The Florida State University College of Law in 2000 and is an active member of 
the Florida Bar and the American Bar Association. 
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